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IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES 
There are only two parties to this action: Plaintiff/ 
Appellant Stanley L. Wade (hereafter referred to as "Wade") and 
Defendant/Appellee F.C. Stangl III (hereafter referred to as 
"Stangl"). 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STANLEY L. WADE, ) 
) BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
F. C. STANGL III, ) Case No. 920221-CA 
Defendant/Appellee. ) Priority No. 16 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Wade has appealed a decision of the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in favor of Stangl. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR 
REVIEW AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issues 
1. Should the trial court's judgment be upheld in all 
respects because of Wade's default? 
2. Was prejudicial bias shown by the trial judge? 
3. Did the trial court err in allowing evidence at trial 
regarding an oral agreement or an oral modification of the written 
agreement? 
4. Was the trial court's finding that the parties agreed to 
allocate taxes based on the respective amount of land owned by each 
party clearly erroneous? 
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5. Did the trial court err in resolving this dispute on a 
basis other than the doctrine of equitable conversion? 
6. Is Stangl entitled to attorneys' fees and costs incurred 
in connection with this appeal? 
Standards of Review 
Issues 1, 3, 5 and 6 involve questions of law or procedure. 
This Court is not required to give any particular deference to the 
district court's conclusions in connection with these issues, but 
must instead review them for correctness, Gravson Roper Ltd. 
Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Town of 
Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 800 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Issue 4 involves a determination of whether certain factual 
findings by the trial court are "clearly erroneous." Such a 
determination is a question of law for this Court, which must 
decide if the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence 
or if they support a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made. Southern Title Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Bethers, 761 
P.2d 951, 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). However, the findings 
themselves involve questions of fact and they must be given 
deferential review, Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership, 782 P.2d at 
470, such that this Court's review of such findings is "strictly 
limited." Craig Food Industries, Inc. v. Weihing, 746 P. 2d 279, 
283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
With regard to Issue 2, the courts of this state apparently 
have not specified the standard of review for establishing 
prejudicial bias by a trial court judge. Generally, however, a 
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party asserting bias on the part of a trial judge must establish 
that the judge had a substantial bent of mind against him or her. 
The record must establish such bias clearly, and mere speculative 
statements and conclusions are insufficient to satisfy the burden 
of proof. People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1249 (Colo. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND 8TATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c): 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading 
to a preceding pleading, a party shall set 
forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, 
arbitration and award, assumption of risk, 
contributory negligence, discharge in 
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of 
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by 
fellow servant, laches, license, payment, 
release, res judicata, statute of frauds, 
statute of limitations, waiver, and any other 
matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense. When a party has 
mistakenly designated a defense as a 
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, 
the court on terms, if justice so requires, 
shall treat the pleadings as if there had been 
a proper designation. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h): 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives 
all defenses and objections which he does not 
present either by motion as hereinbefore 
provided or, if he has made no motion, in his 
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense 
of failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, the defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party, and the objection of 
failure to state a legal defense to a claim 
may also be made by a later pleading, if one 
is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the 
pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and 
except (2) that, whenever it appears by 
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that 
the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject 
STGL\105.wr 
-3-
matter, the court shall dismiss the action. 
The objection or defense, if made at the 
trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that 
may have been received. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b): 
(b) Amendments to conform to the 
evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleading are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated 
in all respects as if they had been raised in 
the pleadings. Such amendments of the 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to 
conform to the evidence and to raise these 
issues may be made upon motion of any party at 
any time, even after judgment; but failure so 
to amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues. If evidence is 
objected to at the trial on the ground that it 
is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings 
to be amended when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be subserved thereby 
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence 
would prejudice him in maintaining his action 
or defense upon the merits. The court shall 
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable 
the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a): 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon 
the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings 
are not necessary for purposes of review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that 
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the court adopts them, shall be considered as 
the findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and 
recorded in open court following the close of 
the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. 
The trial court need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
The court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(3): 
(3) A judge should take or initiate 
appropriate disciplinary measures against a 
judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of 
which the judge may become aware. However, 
this provision shall not apply to information 
which is generated and communicated under the 
policies of the Judicial Performance 
Evaluation Program. 
Rules of Profession Conduct, Rule 8.4: 
Rule 8.4. Misconduct. 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly 
assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another: 
(b) Commit a criminal act that reflects 
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trust-
worthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects; 
(c) Engage in conduct involving dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudi-
cial to the administration of justice; 
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(e) State or imply an ability to 
influence improperly a government agency or 
official; or 
(f) Knowingly assist a judge or judicial 
officer in conduct that is a violation of 
applicable Rules of Judicial Conduct or other 
law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1978, Stangl sold Wade part of a piece of real property 
owned by Stangl. The sale was pursuant to a written installment 
land contract, with payments to be made by Wade over a period of 
approximately seven years. The agreement was ambiguous with 
respect to responsibility for property taxes, in that it provided 
for apportionment during the year of the closing (1978) but not for 
the rest of the seven-year executory period. 
After the closing, the taxing authority failed to segregate 
the two parcels and continued to assess Stangl for the entire 
consolidated parcel. The parties agreed that payment of the joint 
tax assessment would be allocated based on the proportionate amount 
of land owned by each party. The parties operated under this 
agreement for the first four years, after which Wade ceased to pay 
any of the taxes on the property. To prevent loss of the property 
through a tax sale, Stangl thereafter paid both parties' share of 
the taxes. 
Wade eventually finished making his installment payments, but 
refused to reimburse Stangl for the several years worth of property 
taxes paid by Stangl on Wade's behalf. Wade brought this action in 
1987 to compel conveyance of his property. Stangl counterclaimed 
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that Wade should be required to pay his share of the taxes before 
any conveyance was required. Since that time, over 166 pleadings 
have been filed in this action. Judgment against Wade has been 
entered four times, three times by summary or default judgments 
(that have been vacated for one reason or another) and most 
recently after a trial on the merits. 
The trial court found the parties' written contract to be 
ambiguous with respect to tax liability for the last six years of 
the executory period. It found that the parties' conduct 
(particularly the fact that Wade voluntarily paid his taxes in 
accordance with the agreed upon basis for the first four years) 
demonstrated an intent to allocate the taxes based on the relative 
amount of acreage owned by each party. It also found that the 
parties had orally agreed to so allocate the taxes or had orally 
agreed to modify the written contract in order to so allocate the 
taxes. 
Wade disagrees with these findings. He believes that, despite 
his actions to the contrary for the first four years, the tax 
allocation should be based on the value of the parcels and not the 
size of the parcels. Wade, therefore, has filed this appeal 
alleging that the trial court erred in reaching its conclusions. 
RELEVANT FACT8 
As a preliminary matter, Stangl objects to all of Wade's 
factual assertions that were not part of the evidence introduced at 
trial. Exhibits A, B, E, I and K to Wade's brief are documents 
that were neither introduced into evidence at trial nor considered 
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by the judge in reaching his conclusions. These exhibits, together 
with all arguments based on or supported by these exhibits, must be 
disregarded by this Court* Pilcher v. State, 663 P. 2d 450, 453 
(Utah 1983) ("Matters not admitted in evidence before the trier of 
fact will not be considered here.") Ebbert v. Ebbert. 744 P. 2d 
1019, 1023 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Matters not admitted in evidence 
before the trier of fact will not be considered on appeal to this 
Court."). 
1. Pursuant to a written installment land contract dated May 
16, 1978, Wade agreed to buy, and Stangl agreed to sell, 6.87 acres 
of real property for the price of $2 06,100. The balance of the 
purchase price was payable to Stangl in 79 equal monthly 
installments. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Exhibit A, 
Finding No. 2) [Hereafter "Finding No. "] 
2. The property sold (hereafter "Wade's Property") contained 
6.87 acres and was part of a larger tract of land owned by Stangl 
containing 9.63 acres. Stangl retained ownership of the remaining 
2.76 acres. (Finding No. 3) 
3. The parties' installment land contract (Wade's Exhibit F) 
does not expressly specify how the property tax liability is to be 
allocated during the seven-year executory period following the year 
of the closing, but it does state that taxes for the year 1978 are 
to be "prorated at the closing" and that "the parties shall prorate 
all taxes and assessments relating to the Property in accordance 
with the latest tax and assessment bills." See Wade's Exhibit F, 
§§ 6, 7.3. Consequently, the trial court found the contract to be 
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ambiguous with respect to the payment of property taxes, (Finding 
Nos. 7 and 9; Trial Transcript, Exhibit D, at pp. 122, 124) 
[Hereafter "Tr. pp. "] 
4. The taxing authority failed to segregate the two parcels 
of property for assessment purposes. Stangl was taxed for the 
entire 9.63-acre consolidated tract because no conveyance of title 
to Wade's Property had taken place, nor was any conveyance yet 
required under the terms of the installment land contract (which 
had a 6%-year executory period). (Finding No 6[A]1) 
5. For the first four years of the executory period the 
parties voluntarily allocated the tax assessment between them 
according to the relative amount of area owned by each of them. 
Thereafter, Wade refused to pay any of the taxes on the jointly 
assessed property. (Finding No. 6[B]; Tr. pp. 89-90) 
6. The primary reason for the parties' agreement to allocate 
the taxes based on the amount of area owned by each party was that 
both parties would pay less under that method than they would pay 
if their parcels were separately assessed and taxed. This was also 
the primary reason for Wade's continued payment of his share of the 
taxes on that basis over a four-year period. (Finding No. 7; Tr. 
pp. 12-14) 
7. In 1980, the parties orally agreed to split the tax 
liability for the consolidated tract according to the proportionate 
*Note that two of the trial court's findings were mistakenly 
numbered as "6." For purposes of clarification, such findings are 
hereafter referred to as 6[A] and 6[B], respectively. 
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amount of land own€»d by each party. This oral agreement 
prospectively resolvesd the issue of tax liability allocation 
between the parties. This oral agreement was either a separate and 
subsequent agreement by the parties concerning property tax 
allocation, or was an oral clarification or modification of the 
ambiguous written agreement. The oral agreement also reflected the 
prior conduct of the parties from and after 1978 with respect to 
property tax apportionment. (Finding No. 7) 
8. Even if there was no subsequent oral agreement concerning 
tax apportionment, the* parties' intent at the time of execution of 
the written agreement and thereafter was that the taxes should be 
apportioned based on the respective amount of land owned by each 
party. (Finding No. 8) 
9. Under either of these alternative findings, the parties 
conclusively agreed that the property taxes would be allocated 
according to the amount of land owned by each party. (Finding No. 
9) 
10. In order to avoid loss of the property through a tax 
sale, Stangl paid the property taxes assessed against the entire 
consolidated tract and is entitled to reimbursement from Wade for 
Wade's proportionate share of the taxes, together with prejudgment 
interest thereon at the legal rate. The amount of said taxes and 
interest has been stipulated to by the parties. (Finding Nos. 10, 
11) 
11. It is appropriate that acreage apportionment of the 
property taxes extend beyond the time when Wade completed his 
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installment payments and continue until the time the parties' 
parcels were severed and separately assessed and taxed (i.e., 
through the 1990 tax year) because of: (1) Wade's failure, despite 
an appropriate discovery request, to produce or identify relevant 
documents that he claimed to have drafted; (2) Wade's failure to 
communicate in a reasonable and timely manner with his attorney or 
attorneys (or with opposing counsel and/or the trial court if Wade 
had no attorney); and (3) Wade's overall failure to involve himself 
in the lawsuit he initiated. (Finding No. 13) 
12. Stangl's Counterclaim against Wade, filed December 21, 
1988, has never been answered. Therefore, Wade is in default. The 
Counterclaim seeks dismissal of Wade's Complaint with prejudice, 
reimbursement of Wade's share of the property taxes and interest 
thereon at the legal rate, and attorneys' fees and costs. Stangl 
is entitled to such relief. (Finding No. 15) 
13. The issue before the trial court was not the proper basis 
for taxation of a person's property, but allocation of taxation 
between multiple owners of a jointly assessed property. That the 
government assesses taxes based on the value of a property does not 
mean that jointly assessed owners must use the same theory for 
dividing the taxes. (Tr. p. 12 2) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
For the reasons explained herein, Stangl requests that the 
trial court's judgment be affirmed in all respects and that he be 
awarded attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this 
appeal. 
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None of the arguments raised by Wade are meritorious. The 
trial court relied on several alternative grounds for its ruling. 
Wade is required to» show reversible error in each of the 
alternative grounds in order to prevail, and he has not done so. 
This entire appeal can and should be dismissed because Wade 
has never answered the counterclaim against him and is therefore in 
default, as the trial court so found. The trial court expressly 
found that Stangl is entitled to the relief awarded to him because 
of Wade's default. This finding eliminates the need to address the 
issues raised by Wade in his appeal. 
To the extent that the merits of Wade's appeal are relevant, 
Wade's allegation of judicial bias can and should be summarily 
dismissed. Previous decisions of this Court prohibit Wade from 
claiming prejudicial error on appeal because he failed to object to 
the trial court's alleged expressions of bias. The details of 
Wade's claim of judicial bias, to the extent they are relevant, 
fail to establish judicial bias and amount to little more than an 
argument that the judge must have been biased because he ruled 
against Wade. 
The trial court did not err in allowing evidence at trial of 
an oral agreement becciuse Waide failed to object to such evidence. 
It is irrelevant that the evidence of an oral agreement was 
introduced for the first time at trial because Wade both impliedly 
and expressly consented to the trial of that issue. Wade had a 
full and fair opportunity to argue the merits of the issue, and it 
is too late now for him to complain on appeal that the issue never 
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should have been raised. The court ruled correctly in rejecting 
Wade's attempt to raise the defenses of statute of frauds and 
statute of limitations because they were waived through Wade's 
failure to answer the counterclaim against him. In addition, the 
judge properly deemed it unfair to allow these defenses to be 
raised midway through the trial for the first time by a party who 
never bothered to file an answer. 
Regardless of the evidence concerning oral agreements, the 
court also properly found that the parties' intent with respect to 
the written agreement was to apportion the taxes based on the 
amount of area owned by each party. In reaching this factual 
finding, the court relied on the testimony of both parties, the 
credibility of the parties' testimony, documentary evidence, the 
parties' conduct at and after the time of the written agreement 
(particularly Wade's voluntary payment of his share of the taxes 
based on the acreage apportionment method for the first four years 
after the agreement was signed) , and testimony that the parties had 
previously handled property tax apportionment the same way in a 
similar prior transaction. 
Wade has failed to marshal the evidence in support of this 
finding, and has instead focused on what little factual support 
exists for his belief as to how the court should have found while 
neglecting all other evidence considered by the court. Wade's 
failure to marshal the evidence is, by itself, a sufficient basis 
for affirming the trial court's judgment. However, even when the 
evidence in favor of the court's judgment is marshalled, it is 
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clear that there is at least a reasonable basis to support the 
court's findings. 
In addition, the doctrine of practical construction 
conclusively establishes, based on the parties' subsequent conduct, 
that there was a mutual intent to apportion tax liability in 
accordance with the amount of area owned by each party. Therefore, 
Wade was obligated to pay his share of the taxes in the manner 
determined by the court regardless of the propriety of the court's 
finding of a subsequent oral agreement. 
Wade's argument that the trial court was bound by a prior 
supreme court order to allocate tax liability based solely on the 
doctrine of equitable conversion is inapplicable because that 
theory was not argued by the parties at trial. Contractual 
obligations were the issues tried to the court. No objection was 
raised by Wade concerning the scope or basis of the legal argument. 
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure negates Wade's 
present assertion that the parties were precluded from raising the 
theories that the court relied on in reaching its decision. 
Similarly, Wade never raised this issue below and he cannot raise 
it now for the first time on appeal. 
Even if Wade's argument could be heard on appeal, there is no 
merit to it because when an appellate court vacates a summary 
judgment without directing judgment, the effect of that action is 
to simply leave the cause standing as it did before the summary 
judgment was entered. That is precisely what happened in this 
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case, and the parties thereafter proceeded to properly resolve the 
matter by a trial on the merits. 
Because Stangl prevailed at the trial below and was awarded 
attorneys' fees in accordance with the parties7 stipulation, he is 
also entitled to the same if he prevails on this appeal. 
Therefore, if Stangl prevails in this matter he should be awarded 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT'8 JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD IN ALL 
RESPECTS BECAU8E WADE WAS FOUND TO BE IN DEFAULT 
Before addressing the merits of the various errors alleged in 
Wade's opening brief, it must be pointed out that this entire 
appeal can and should be dismissed because Wade has never filed a 
responsive pleading to the allegations against him and is therefore 
in default, as the trial court so found. 
Although Wade initiated this action, Stangl filed a 
counterclaim and Wade has never answered that counterclaim. 
Accordingly, the trial court found that: 
15. The Counterclaim against Wade, filed 
December 21, 1988, has never been answered. 
Technically, therefore, Wade is in default. 
The Counterclaim seeks dismissal of Wade's 
Complaint with prejudice, reimbursement of 
Wade's share of the property taxes and 
interest thereon at the legal rate, and 
attorneys fees and costs. Stangl is entitled 
to such relief. 
(Findings No. 15) 
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Wade's share of the property taxes, interest thereon, and 
applicable attorneys' fees were determined by the trial court and 
identified in the court's findings and in its Judgment dated 
November 1, 1991 (see Exhibit B) . Wade did not challenge at trial, 
nor has he challenged (nor can be challenge) in this appeal, the 
trial court's finding that Stangl is entitled to this relief on the 
separate basis of Wade's default. Therefore, in accordance with 
the trial court's findings, the judgment against Wade should be 
affirmed in all respects because of Wade's failure to reply to the 
counterclaim against him.2 
II. 
NO PREJUDICIAL BIAS WAS SHOWN BY 
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE 
Wade's allegation of judicial bias should be summarily 
dismissed, as this Court has previously recognized. Wade failed to 
object to the trial court's alleged expressions of bias. He 
therefore may not claim prejudicial error on appeal. Ebbert v. 
Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
As to the merits of Wad€»'s allegation, Wade tries to create 
judicial bias from the facts that: (1) the trial judge recused 
himself from ruling on a motion to set aside an earlier judgment, 
(2) the judge commented at trial that he had experienced 
difficulties with Wade's prior counsel, (3) the judge allegedly 
2Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides for the amendment of pleadings when issues not raised 
therein are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, is 
not applicable because Wade has no responsive pleading to deem 
amended. 
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made incorrect decisions during the course of the trial, and (4) 
the judge considered Wade's contemporaneous fraud conviction in 
discrediting Wade's testimony at trial. Wade's allegations amount 
to little more than an argument that the judge must have been 
biased because Wade lost at trial. 
As explained below, none of Wade's assertions demonstrate 
judicial bias. The courts of this state apparently have not 
specified the standard of proof for establishing prejudicial bias 
by a trial court judge. Generally, however, a party asserting bias 
on the part of a trial judge must establish that the judge had a 
substantial bent of mind against him or her. The record must 
establish such bias clearly, and mere speculative statements and 
conclusions are insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof. 
People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1249 (Colo. 1988). 
With regard to Wade's first ground (Judge Murphy's recusal), 
it should be noted that over 166 pleadings have been filed in this 
action since its commencement in 1987. Judgement against Wade has 
been entered four times, three times by summary or default 
judgments (that have been vacated for one reason or another) and 
once after a trial on the merits. The last non-trial judgment was 
entered on December 12, 1990, after both Mr. Wade and his counsel 
of record failed to appear at a final pretrial conference before 
Judge Murphy. The written pretrial notice and Judge Murphy's 
comments during a previous telephonic scheduling conference made it 
clear that failure to appear at the pretrial conference would 
result in default. Wade and his counsel nevertheless failed to 
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appear. A default judgement against Wade was entered two months 
later. 
Wade failed to file an appeal of this judgment by the 
applicable deadline. Instead, he subsequently filed a motion to 
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. Affidavits from 
Wade and his counsel were submitted in support of this motion. In 
those affidavits Wade's counsel attempted to explain why no one had 
appeared as ordered at the pretrial conference. For various 
reasons explained more fully in Judge Murphy's Summary Decision and 
Order dated January 22, 1991, Judge Murphy concluded that Wade's 
counsel had essentially lied to the court and had apparently 
backdated certain pleadings. As required by the Code of Judicial 
Conduct,3 Judge Murphy reported this conduct to the Utah State 
Bar.4 Wade thereafter obtained new counsel, who immediately 
brought a motion to set aside the judgment under Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A hearing on the motion to set aside judgment was held on 
March 1, 1991. At the beginning of the hearing Judge Murphy 
announced, sua sponte, that, even though Mr. Wade had new counsel, 
3Canon 3(B)(3) states: "A judge should take or initiate 
appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for 
unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware." 
4The actions by Wade's counsel clearly constituted misconduct 
under Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Thus, 
contrary to Wade's allegation, Judge Murphy's action had nothing to 
do with being "affronted" by Mr. Schwenke's assertion of bias. In 
fact, while the judge in his Summary Decision and Order questioned 
the conduct of three of Wade's previous counsel (Jamis Johnson, 
Bruce Udall and Paul Schwenke) , it is clear that Mr. Udall, and not 
Mr. Schwenke, was the primary focus of the judge's concerns. 
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he (Judge Murphy) was recusing himself with regard to a ruling on 
the 60(b) motion, but not from the rest of the case. Judge Murphy 
referred to his previous difficulties with Mr. Wade's counsel and 
his having referred their misconduct to the Bar. Judge Murphy 
explained that, regardless of what his decision might have been on 
the Rule 60(b) motion, he felt that both sides might have concerns 
about his ruling (i.e., that Wade might feel he was at a 
disadvantage in connection with the 60(b) motion because of his 
previous counsel's misdeeds, and that Stangl might have concerns 
that the court was bending over backwards to overcome the 
difficulties experienced with prior counsel). (Tr. pp. 2-3) Thus, 
the judge made it clear that his recusal was limited to a single 
motion and was for the benefit of both parties. 
Accordingly, the motion to set aside judgment was argued to 
Judge Rokich, who ultimately set aside the judgment upon various 
conditions to be met by Mr. Wade. The parties then prepared for 
trial. 
At the beginning of the trial, both parties expressly agreed 
that Judge Murphy should and would serve as the trial judge. (Tr. 
p. 3) This agreement was made with full knowledge of all prior 
events. Wade thereby waived any right he might have had to 
complain about judicial bias by Judge Murphy prior to and during 
the course of the trial.5 
5f,A litigant who proceeds to a trial or hearing before a judge 
despite knowing of a reason for potential disqualification of the 
judge waives the objection and cannot challenge the court's 
(continued...) 
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Regarding Wade's second ground, it is true that the court 
experienced difficulties with Wade's prior counsel. However, Judge 
Murphy was under an obligation to do exactly as he did in referring 
the matter to the Bar/ and such action by the court cannot be the 
basis of an allegation of judicial bias. State v. Mata. 789 P.2d 
1122, 1125-26 (Haw. 1990); State v. Case, 676 P.2d 241, 243-44 
(N.M. 1984). 
Furthermore, those difficulties had nothing to do with the 
merits of Wade's case at trial. Prior to the trial, Judge Murphy 
had never even seen Mr. Wade. Wade was represented by new and 
competent counsel at trial. Before the trial began, Wade expressly 
agreed that Judge Murphy should preside. There is simply no 
evidence that the misconduct of Wade's previous counsel led to 
prejudice against Wad€» at the subsequent trial. 
Likewise, with regard to Wade's third ground, the fact that a 
party disapproves of the outcome of the trial or the rulings made 
by the judge during the course of the trial does not constitute a 
showing of judicial bias. The correctness of Judge Murphy's 
decisions is addressed in the points below. But even if errors of 
5(. ..continued) 
qualifications on appeal." Buckley v. Snapper Power Equip. Co. . 
813 P.2d 125, 129 (Wash. App. 1991). The Utah Supreme Court is in 
agreement: "A Party who has a reasonable basis for moving to 
disqualify a judge may not delay in the hope of first obtaining a 
favorable ruling and then complain only if the result is 
unfavorable. Not only is such a tactic unfair, but it may evidence 
a belief that the judge is not in fact biased." Madsen v. 
Prudential Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n, 767 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 
1988) . 
6See supra note 3. 
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law are made by the trial judge, those errors cannot amount to 
judicial bias. State v. Case, 676 P.2d 241, 244 (N.M. 1984) (bias 
cannot be based on unfavorable rulings); Riva Ridge Apartments v. 
Robert G. Fisher Co., Inc., 745 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Colo. App. 1987) 
("The rulings of a judge, even if erroneous, numerous, and 
continuous [, ] are not sufficient in themselves to show bias or 
prejudice."). If such were not the case, nearly every trial court 
judgment could be appealed by the losing party on the basis of 
alleged judicial bias. 
As for the trial court's consideration of Wade's 
contemporaneous fraud conviction in assessing his credibility as a 
witness (Wade's final ground), it is perfectly appropriate for a 
judge to consider such evidence in deciding which of two 
conflicting witnesses to believe. Wade himself brought up his 
fraud conviction in the course of explaining why he had 
intentionally failed to produce relevant documents. (Tr. pp. 90-
92) No objection was ever raised by Wade in connection with this 
testimony. Wade's fraud conviction was only one of the reasons 
cited by the court for its decision to disbelieve Wade's testimony. 
(Tr. p. 125) And it was not just the fact that Wade had been 
convicted of fraud, but also the way Wade blamed his conduct on 
everyone else's actions, which the court judged to be indicative of 
a noncredible witness. (Tr. pp. 125-26) 
Wade apparently perceives bias in Judge Murphy's act of 
explaining the reasons for his ruling, particularly the explanation 
concerning fraud. The Utah Supreme Court, however, has clearly 
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established that such an explanation by the judge does not indicate 
bias. "The fact that a judge may have an opinion as to the merits 
of the cause . . . does not make him biased or prejudiced." Haslam 
v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1948). "The fact that a judge 
on summation states that he does not believe a witness . . . does 
not show bias. Similar remarks have been made thousands of times 
by English and American judges and they are quite in order if the 
judge desires to state his reasons for coming to a certain 
conclusion." Id. at 525. Similarly: 
Although litigants are entitled to a judge who 
will hear both sides and decide an issue on 
the merits of the law and the evidence 
presented, they are not entitled to a judge 
whose mind is a clean slate. Each judge 
brings to the bench the experiences of life, 
both personal and professional. A lifetime of 
experiences that have generated a number of 
general attitudes cannot be left in chambers 
when a judge takes the bench. 
Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n. 767 P.2d 538, 546 
(Utah 1988).7 
Faced with conflicting evidence, the court simply chose for 
various reasons to credit Stangl's testimony and to discredit 
Wade's testimony. "The opinion of the trial judge, after hearing 
the testimony, that the testimony of witnesses favorable to the 
defendant was not worthy of belief is not evidence of prejudice." 
7Accord Smith v. District Court, 629 P. 2d 1055, 1057 (Colo. 
1981) ("Prejudice must be distinguished from the sort of personal 
opinions that as a matter of course arise during a judge's hearing 
of a cause. The general rule of law is that what a judge learns in 
his judicial capacity is a proper basis for judicial observations, 
and that the use of such information is not the kind of matter that 
results in disqualification."). 
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State v. Little, 431 P.2d 810, 813 (Or. 1967). There is nothing to 
suggest that the court discredited Wade's testimony because of 
judicial bias. 
MA trial judge is presumed to be free of bias or prejudice." 
State v. McCall. 770 P.2d 1165, 1175-76 (Ariz. 1989). The burden 
is on Wade to show bias by the court. Wade has not done so, and 
his allegation of judicial bias is without merit. 
III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
OF AN ORAL AGREEMENT OR AN ORAL MODIFICATION 
OF THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT 
Wade argues that the court erred in allowing evidence of an 
oral agreement regarding tax allocation and evidence of an oral 
modification of the parties' written agreement. Wade's argument is 
without merit, and even if there is merit to the argument it does 
not matter because the court also found the parties' agreement to 
be based on grounds other than an oral agreement or an oral 
modification of the written agreement. (See Point IV, infra.) 
For at least three reasons, there is no basis for Wade's 
argument that the court erred in allowing evidence of an oral 
agreement or an oral modification of the written agreement. 
A, Wade Failed to Object to Such Evidence. 
The entire issue can and should be dismissed because Wade 
failed to object at trial to the evidence regarding an oral 
agreement, and he cannot raise the matter now for the first time on 
appeal. Huber v. Newman, 145 P.2d 780, 783 (Utah 1944). 
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At trial, Stangl testified without objection: that at the 
time of the closing in 1978 the parties prorated the taxes based on 
the respective square footage owned by each party; that each of the 
parties paid their respective share of the taxes on that basis; 
that after the taxing authority failed to segregate the two parcels 
the parties orally agreed in 1980 to modify the written agreement 
and continue paying the taxes on that basis in order to avoid a 
higher tax assessment for each of them; that Wade did in fact pay 
on that basis for the first four years pursuant to the oral 
agreement; and that when the two parcels were finally taxed 
separately the taxes did in fact increase for each party. (Tr. pp. 
10-16) The court found this testimony to be credible and to be the 
basis of a subsequent oral contract or, alternatively, a subsequent 
oral amendment to the written agreement (Finding No. 7) It was 
only after all this testimony came in that Wade's counsel objected 
on the basis of the statute of frauds and statue of limitations. 
(Tr. p. 17) 
A party cannot complain on appeal about evidence that was 
received during the trial without objection. Huber, 145 P. 2d at 
783. It is too late for Wade to complain about admission of the 
evidence supporting the finding of a subsequent oral agreement. 
B• It is Irrelevant that Evidence of An Oral Agreement Was 
Introduced for the First Time at Trial, 
Wade argues that the issue of an oral agreement or an oral 
modification of the written agreement was never raised in the 
pleadings prior to the trial and accordingly should not have been 
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allowed at trial. In doing so, Wade attempts to circumvent the 
provisions of Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
That rule states: "When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings." 
This Court has explained that under Rule 15(b) issues not 
raised by the pleadings may be tried by the express or implied 
consent of the parties and shall be treated as if raised in the 
pleadings. Colman v. Colman, 743 P. 2d 782, 785 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) . "If a theory of recovery is fully tried by the parties, the 
court may base its decision on that theory and deem the pleadings 
amended, even if the theory was not originally pleaded or set forth 
in the pleadings or the pretrial order." Id. 
This issue was fully tried by the parties. Wade's counsel 
failed to object to the evidence regarding oral contracts until 
after it had come in, even though the evidence clearly related to 
oral agreements made by the parties subsequent to the written 
contract. (Tr. pp. 10-16) Wade never did object to the nature of 
the evidence regarding oral contracts, nor did he ever object on 
the basis that an oral contract had not been pleaded. He objected 
only to the admissibility of the evidence under the statute of 
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frauds and the statute of limitations (Tr. p. 17) ,8 and that 
objection was raised well after the evidence had already come in. 
Even then, Wade's counsel conceded that the evidence regarding 
oral agreements should be excluded only if the defenses (statute of 
frauds and statute of limitations) had been raised previously,. 
Specifically, after raising the objection Wade's counsel explained:; 
MR. NELSON: I have no problem with Mr. 
Crockett proceeding. I simply wanted to raise 
those issues. If they have been raised 
appropriately previously, then I will go into 
them later. 
(Tr. p. 20; emphasis added) The defenses had not been raised 
previously and Mr. Nelson did not go into them later, although the 
court invited him to do so.9 (Tr. p. 20, lines 8-12) 
The Colman decision expressly states that implied consent to 
try an issue may be found where evidence is introduced without 
objection. Colman, 743 P. 2d at 785. The evidence that Wade 
complains about came in without objection, and was thus tried with 
Wade's implied consent. Furthermore, Wade's counsel expressly 
stated that he had no problem with proceeding to continue taking 
evidence regarding oral agreements, and that if the defenses had 
8The lack of merit of the objection to the admissibility of the 
evidence on these bases is addressed in the next section of this 
brief. 
Similarly, Wade's counsel stated: 
MR. NELSON: I don't know if Mr. Schwenke 
pled it [an affirmative defense] or not. If 
he did, I would like to raise it at this 
point. 
(Tr. p. 20; emphasis added) 
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been raised previously he would go into them later, (Tr. p. 20) 
The defenses had not been raised previously, and Wade's counsel 
never spoke of them again throughout the rest of the trial. Wade's 
counsel, however, did continue to elicit testimony regarding oral 
agreements. (E.g., Tr. pp. 64-67) Wade's delayed objection was at 
best conditional, and the basis for his objection was never 
subsequently established (or even attempted to be established). 
Wade elicited additional testimony regarding oral contracts, rested 
his case, provided a closing argument that included a discussion of 
oral agreements, and allowed the court to render its decision, 
without ever mentioning the issue again. Thus, the evidence that 
Wade complains about was also tried with his express consent. 
It is true that, under Colman, the pleadings cannot be deemed 
amended unless "the opposing party had a fair opportunity to 
defend." 743 P.2d at 785. Wade, however, had a fair opportunity 
to defend the evidence of an oral agreement. Wade and Stangl were 
the only witnesses to testify at trial. They were also the only 
persons present when the oral agreements were made. (Tr. pp. 12, 
64, 66, 67) Wade's counsel had full opportunity to and did examine 
Stangl regarding the oral agreements. (Tr. pp. 54-56) Wade 
himself testified regarding each of the three relevant discussions 
he had with Stangl, and testified repeatedly that there never was 
any oral agreement. (Tr. pp. 64-67) In closing argument, Wade's 
counsel argued that there was no oral agreement. (Tr. pp. 114-15) 
In the end, the judge simply chose to credit Stangl's testimony 
over Wade's testimony. 
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The issue of an oral agreement was fully and intentionally 
argued by both parties. Any allegation that evidence of an oral 
agreement was inadmissible because it was not previously raised in 
the pleadings is barred by Rule 15(b). 
C. In Any Event, the Evidence Regarding Oral Agreements was 
Not Precluded by the Statute of Frauds or the Statute of 
Limitations. 
In any event, the court ruled correctly in rejecting Wade's 
attempt to raise the defenses of statute of frauds and statute of 
limitations for the first time during the trial and after the 
crucial evidence had already come in. Both the statute of frauds 
and the statute of limitations are affirmative defenses that must 
be pleaded in the answer or they are waived. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) 
and 12(h); Phillips v. JCM Development Corp. , 666 P. 2d 876, 884 
(Utah 1983) (statute of frauds); Staker v. Huntington Cleveland 
Irrigation Co. . 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983) (statute of 
limitations). 
Wade could not possibly have raised these defenses in answer 
to Stangl's counterclaim because, in the two years and ten months 
prior to trial, Wade never filed any answer to Stangl's 
counterclaim. The judge properly exercised his discretion to deem 
it unfair to allow these technical defenses to be raised midway 
through the trial for the first time by a party who never bothered 
to file an answer and who failed to object to the evidence until 
after the fact. Indeed, Wade's counsel was in agreement with this 
ruling at the time of trial. Wade's counsel conceded that the 
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defenses were applicable only if they had been raised previously 
(Tr. p. 20) , which they had not. The court did not abuse its 
discretion in rejecting the untimely proffer of these defenses,10 
(Tr. pp. 19-20) 
IV. 
REGARDLESS OF THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING ORAL AGREEMENTS, 
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND IN THE ALTERNATIVE THAT THE 
PARTIES/ INTENT WITH RESPECT TO THE WRITTEN 
AGREEMENT WAS TO APPORTION THE TAXES BASED 
ON THE AMOUNT OF AREA OWNED BY EACH PARTY, 
Regardless of the evidence concerning oral agreements, the 
trial court specifically found that, even if there were no 
subsequent oral agreements concerning tax apportionment, certain 
documents and the parties' subsequent conduct demonstrated an 
intent that the taxes should be apportioned based on the respective 
amount of land owned by each party. (Finding No. 8) The court 
found this evidence to be important and determinative in resolving 
the ambiguity concerning future tax apportionment in connection 
with the written agreement. (Finding No. 9) Wade, on the other 
hand, argues that this finding is clearly erroneous. 
Findings are "clearly erroneous" only if they are against the 
clear weight of the evidence or if they support a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made. Southern Title Guaranty 
Co., Inc. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The 
10Stangl has elected not to lengthen this brief with a 
discussion of the merits of these defenses or their applicability 
when applied to the facts of this case. Stangl will be prepared to 
address the merits and applicability of these defenses at oral 
argument if the Court deems that information relevant. 
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trial court's findings are entitled to a presumption of 
correctness, and on appeal the evidence is surveyed in the light 
most favorable to the findings. If there is a reasonable basis in 
the evidence to support the findings, they will not be overturned. 
This is the standard whether the evidence is based on oral or 
documentary evidence. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); College Irrigation 
Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irrigation Co. . 780 P.2d 1241, 
1244 (Utah 1989). 
Recognizing the significance of the trial court's factual 
findings with regard to the parties' intent, Wade acknowledges, as 
he must, that intent under a contract is normally a question for 
the trier of fact, but argues (based on a 1909 North Carolina 
decision) that the interpretation of documentary evidence passing 
between the parties is a question of law. From this argument Wade 
concludes that this Court is not required to defer to the trial 
court's findings of fact. 
Of the many fallcicies of this argument,11 the most important 
is that the trial court considered and evaluated much more than a 
few pieces of documentary evidence passing between the parties. It 
also considered the demeanor and credibility of the two parties as 
they both explained the circumstances behind the documents. It 
uFor example, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) expressly 
states: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
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also considered the parties' motives for doing as they did. It 
also considered the parties' conduct at and after the time of the 
written agreement. It also considered Wade's four-year history of 
paying the taxes in accordance with the documentary evidence. It 
also considered testimony that the parties had previously handled 
property tax apportionment the same way in a similar prior 
transaction. (Tr. pp. 35-36) In short, the trial court considered 
a wide range of information in making its factual determinations; 
it did not simply interpret documents, in a vacuum, as Wade seems 
to imply. 
Wade is required to marshal all of the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's factual 
determinations, the evidence (including all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom) is insufficient to support the court's findings. 
Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989); College Irrigation Co., 780 P.2d at 1244; Harline v. 
Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986). Wade has not marshalled 
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings. Instead, he 
has focused on what little factual support exists for his position, 
and has neglected all other evidence considered by the trial court. 
Wade's failure to marshall the evidence is, by itself, a 
sufficient basis for affirming the trial court's judgment. College 
Irrigation Co., 780 P.2d at 1244; Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 
69, 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 327 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hurt v. Hurt, 793 P.2d 948, 950 n.4 (Utah Ct. 
STGL\105.wr 
-31-
App. 1990) . However,, even when the evidence in favor of the 
court's judgment is marshalled it shows that there is at least a 
reasonable basis to support the court's finding of an intent to 
apportion tax liability in accordance with the amount of area owned 
by each party. 
Wade's only real argument is that one of the court's findings 
regarding the parties' original intent12 conflicts with another 
finding that the parties meant for their taxes to be apportioned 
based on the respective amount of land owned by each party.13 
12The court found that: 
6 [A] . The parties intended and assumed 
that they would be separately taxed on their 
respective parcels following the year of the 
closing (1978) . The county taxing 
authorities, however, continued to assess and 
tax Stangl for the entire 9.63-acre 
consolidated tract and did not individually 
tax the parties' separate parcels because no 
conveyance of Wade's Property had taken place, 
nor was any conveyance yet required under the 
terms of the installment land contract (which 
had a 6%-year executory period). 
(Finding No. 6[A]; emphasis added) 
13The court found that: 
8. The letters and other documents 
contained in Exhibit P of the parties' 
Stipulation were sent and received by Wade or 
someone on Wade's behalf. Even if there was 
no subsequent oral agreement concerning tax 
apportionment, the documents in Exhibit P of 
the Stipulation reflect the parties' intent at 
the time of execution of the written agreement 
and thereafter that the taxes should be 
apportioned based on the respective amount of 
land owned by each party. 
(Finding No. 8; emphasis added) 
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However, these two findings do not negate or contradict each other. 
Wade is required to show that all of the evidence in support of the 
findings, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 
fails to support the court's findings. Grayson Roper Ltd. 
Partnership, 782 P. 2d at 470. It is obvious from the record and 
from the court's findings that the parties expected to have to 
prorate property taxes only for 1978, but that if necessary they 
would continue the same procedure until the parcels were separately 
assessed. The parties' subsequent conduct and their explanations 
at trial demonstrated to the court that they ended up doing just 
that when the taxing authority failed to separately assess the two 
parcels and the parties affirmed that the continuation of a non-
segregated assessment would be cheaper for both of them. 
Accordingly, Wade voluntarily paid his share of the taxes for the 
years 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981, as documented by a series of 
letters explaining the basis of the tax apportionment. (Finding 
Nos. 6[A]-9) 
In his brief Wade argues that one party cannot foist upon the 
other a contractual intent and then bind the other party by his 
silence. Stangl agrees with that statement of the law. Wade, 
however, was not silent. In addition to the documentary evidence, 
there were ongoing communications about the matter (Tr. pp. 10-16, 
54-56, 64-67), which led to an oral agreement or an oral 
modification of the written agreement. (Finding No. 7) There were 
also Wade's affirmative acts of paying on that basis for the first 
four years. (Finding No. 6[B]) Wade, in fact, admitted that he 
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knew exactly what he was doing in continuing to pay his share of 
the taxes based on the proportionate amount of land owned by each 
party. At trial, Wade testified as follows: 
Q. In each of those four years your property 
taxes were calculated on an allocated 
basis, based on the square footage; is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. And in fact you paid it on 
that basis? You knew you were paying it 
on that basis, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the letters you received from the 
Stangls or Mrs. Stangl indicated that you 
were pciying on that allocated square foot 
basis, did they not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So there was never a time that you 
believed you were being charged on 
anything other than a square footage 
basis; is that also correct? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr. pp. 89-90) Furthermore, as the court also found, Wade had a 
strong pecuniary reason for agreeing and doing as he did: The* 
arrangement saved Wade money. After hearing both parties' 
testimony, the court concluded that the primary reason for Wade's 
agreement to the acreage apportionment method of allocation was 
that it would result in lower taxes to him (and to Stangl) than 
would be the case if the two parcels were segregated and separately 
assessed and taxed. (Finding No. 7) In short, this is not a 
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situation where Wade had no involvement and where his concurrence 
is evidenced by nothing more than silence• 
The trial court's findings, which were based on the evidence 
marshalled above, are adequately supported by the record. They are 
also supported by the doctrine of practical construction. The 
parties' installment land contract (Wade's Exhibit F) does not 
expressly specify how the property tax liability is to be allocated 
during the seven-year executory period following the year of 
closing, but it does state that the taxes for the year 1978 are to 
be "prorated at the closing" and that "the parties shall prorate 
all taxes and assessments relating to the Property in accordance 
with the latest tax and assessment bills." (Wade's Exhibit F, flfl 
6, 7.3; emphasis added) 
The parties intentionally prorated the taxes based on the 
proportionate amount of acreage owned by each party for the first 
four years of the executory period. (Finding No. 6[B]) Under the 
doctrine of practical construction, this conduct resolves any 
dispute as to the appropriateness of the acreage apportionment 
method of allocating the property taxes. "This rule of practical 
construction is predicated on the common sense concept that 
'actions speak louder than words.'" Bullouah v. Sims, 400 P.2d 20, 
2 3 (Utah 1965). In Bullough, the losing party argued that the 
terms of a written contract were unambiguous and that extrinsic 
evidence could not therefore be used to alter or change the 
contract. Id. at 22. The supreme court responded: "This is 
generally true, but there are exceptions; one of which is that when 
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the parties place their own construction on it and so perform, the 
court may consider this as persuasive evidence of what their true 
intention was." Id,14 
As in Builough. Wade's prior actions speak louder than his 
present argument. The court found that Wade intentionally paid his 
share of the taxes based on the proportionate amount of acreage he 
owned in order to benefit from a lower tax assessment. (Finding 
l4The trial court specifically found the parties' written 
agreement to be ambiguous with respect to the payment of property 
taxes because the contract expressly addressed tax liability only 
for the year 1978 and did not specify how tax liability would be 
apportioned for the rest of the seven-year executory period. (Tr. 
pp. 122, 124; Finding Nos. 7 and 9) 
Even if the contract was not ambiguous on its face, the 
parties' subsequent actions created the ambiguity necessary for the 
doctrine of practical construction to be applicable. In Bullouah. 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
even if it be assumed that the words standing 
alone might mean one thing to the members of 
this court, where the parties have 
demonstrated by their actions and performance 
that to them th€> contract meant something 
quite different, the meaning and intent of the 
parties should be enforced. In such a 
situation the parties by their actions have 
created the "ambiguity11 required to bring the 
rule into operation. If this were not the 
rule the courts would be enforcing one 
contract when both parties have demonstrated 
that thev meant and intended the contract to 
be guite different. 
400 P. 2d at 23 (quoting Crestview Cemetery Ass'n v. Dieden, 356 
P.2d 171 (Cal. I960)) (emphasis added); accord Bullfrog Marina, 
Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 1972). 
Furthermore, no objection was ever raised at trial to the 
court's determination that the contract was ambiguous with regard 
to taxes or to the admission of parol evidence to resolve the 
ambiguity. 
STGL\105.wr 
-36-
Nos. 6[B] and 7) Wade admitted that he knew what he was doing. 
(Tr. pp. 89-90) After weighing all the evidence the court 
specifically found that, although the parties may have assumed that 
they would be taxed separately after 1978 (and for that reason 
failed to specify apportionment procedures beyond 1978), their 
intent at the time of the execution of the written agreement and 
thereafter was that the taxes should be apportioned based on the 
respective amount of land owned by each party. (Finding No. 8) 
This finding is separately justified by the doctrine of practical 
construction. This finding and Wade's conduct preclude his present 
argument that he had no such intent.15 
This court defers to the trial court when it comes to weighing 
the evidence. Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P. 2d 162, 165 (Utah 
1981). Appellate review begins with the trial court's findings of 
fact, not with an appellant's view of the way the trial court 
should have found. Christensen v. Munns, 812 P. 2d 69, 7 3 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). Where, as here, an ambiguous contract is involved and 
the court bases its construction on extrinsic evidence of intent, 
15In addition to Builough, other Utah cases have similarly and 
consistently applied the doctrine of practical construction. See 
Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981) 
("Though arguably clear on its face, where the parties demonstrate 
by their actions that to them the contract meant something quite 
different, the intent of the parties will be enforced."); Zeese v. 
Estate of Sieael, 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah 1975) ("Under the doctrine 
of practical construction, when a contract is ambiguous and the 
parties place their own construction on their agreement and so 
perform, the court may consider this as persuasive evidence of what 
their true intention was. The parties, by their action and 
performance, have demonstrated what was their meaning and intent; 
the contract should be so enforced by the courts."). 
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the construction is reviewed as a question of fact and appellate 
review is "strictly limited,,11 Craig Food Industries, Inc. v., 
Weihina, 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). There is at least 
the necessary "reasonable support" in favor of the judgment below, 
notwithstanding Wade's attempt to selectively point to evidence 
that was considered but rejected by the finder of fact. Because 
the court's findings with regard to intent are supported by 
reasonable evidence, they are not clearly erroneous. 
The trial court specifically indicated that this finding was 
an alternative basis for its determination that the parties 
conclusively agreed to apportion the property taxes based on the 
amount of land owned by each party. (Finding Nos. 8 and 9) There-
fore, Wade was obligated to pay his share of the taxes in the 
manner determined by the court regardless of the propriety of the 
court's finding of a subsequent oral agreement. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT LIMITED TO RELIANCE ON THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION 
IN RESOLVING THIS DISPUTE 
Wade argues that the trial court was bound by a prior supreme 
court order to allocate tax liability based solely on the doctrine 
of equitable conversion. 
By way of background, it should be noted that the only reason 
the doctrine of equitable conversion was ever raised in the prior 
pleadings is because Wade originally denied any responsibility 
whatsoever for property taxes during the seven-year executory 
period. (See Exhibit C, Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's First 
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Request for Admissions and First Set of Interrogatories, Response 
to Interrogatory No. 2 (Trial Exhibit BB) ; Tr. pp. 93-95) In a 
previous motion for summary judgment this doctrine was argued in 
order to establish Wade's responsibility for the taxes after 1978 
(which years are not addressed in the written agreement) as a 
matter of law because Wade denied any obligation (contractual or 
otherwise) to pay any taxes on his property. It was several years 
later before Wade finally admitted any tax liability. 
Equitable conversion, however, was not the theory argued by 
the parties at trial. Contractual obligations (both written and 
oral) were the issues tried to the court. No objection was raised 
by Wade concerning the scope or basis of the legal arguments. As 
discussed in Point III.B above, Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure negates Wade's present assertion that the parties 
were precluded from raising the matters that the trial court relied 
on in reaching its decision. 
Similarly, Wade never raised this issue below and he cannot 
raise it now for the first time on appeal. Kohler v. Garden City. 
639 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1981); State v. Rodriguez. 200 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 64, 65 n.l (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1992). This is true even 
if the issue is deemed to be a matter of law. Zions First Nat'l 
Bank v. Nat'l Am. Title Ins. Co.. 749 P.2d 651, 654, 657 (Utah 
1988). Wade cannot complain now that the theories he intentionally 
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argued at trial were improper, or that theories he failed to argue 
at trial should now be debated on appeal.16 
As for Wade's assertion that he should not have to pay any 
taxes after 1985 when he finished making his installment payments 
(Wade's brief pp. 27-28), the trial court specifically found: 
13. It is appropriate that acreage 
apportionment of the property taxes extend 
beyond the time when Wade completed his 
installment payments and continue until the 
time the parties' parcels were severed and 
separately assessed and taxed (i.e., through 
the 1990 tax year) because of: (1) Wade's 
failure, despite an appropriate discovery 
request, to produce or identify relevant 
l6Even had the matter been raised below, it would have lacked 
any merit. The supreme court's order, dated October 5, 1989, 
vacated an earlier summary judgment against Wade. The one-page 
order stated that "material facts are in dispute" and that summary 
judgment was therefore not appropriate. The court's brief 
explanatory comments did not amount to findings of fact or 
conclusions of law and did not resolve the existing factual and 
legal disputes. Instead, the case was remanded to the trial court 
for the taking of evidence and for further proceedings as 
appropriate in light of that evidence. The parties thereafter 
proceeded to resolve the matter by a full trial on the merits. 
The supreme court's brief dicta regarding contractual 
obligations and Wade's concession that he is obligated to pay taxes 
under the doctrine of equitable conversion do not constitute a 
binding decision on the merits of this case. The order—which was 
not an opinion from an appeal but was an order in response to a 
motion (for summary disposition)—is nothing more than a ruling 
that a factual dispute exists precluding summary judgment. 
Hornbook law provides that: "On appeal from a summary judgment for 
the plaintiff, the only question for appellate review is whether 
the allegations of the defendant's answer were such as to raise a 
material or genuine issue of fact." 5 Am Jur.2d Appeal and Error 
§ 853 (1962). When an appellate court vacates a summary judgment 
without directing judgment, the effect of that action is to leave 
the cause standing as it did before the summary judgment was 
entered. Hutchins v. State, 603 P.2d 995, 999 (Idaho 1979). 
The court acted properly in proceeding—with Wade's approval— 
to resolve this dispute by a full trial on the merits. 
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documents that he claimed to have drafted; (2) 
Wade's failure to communicate in a reasonable 
and timely manner with his attorney or 
attorneys (or with opposing counsel and/or 
this Court if Wade had no attorney); and (3) 
Wade's overall failure to involve himself in 
the lawsuit he initiated. 
(Finding No. 13) 
Wade has not even attempted to marshal 1 the evidence in 
support of this finding, and his assertion should be dismissed for 
that reason. College Irrigation Co.. 780 P. 2d at 1244. 
Furthermore, the similar assertion that Stangl "caused 'a delay in 
conveyance' which excused Wade's payment of taxes" was never raised 
below and cannot be raised now on appeal. Kohler v. Garden City, 
639 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1981). 
Finally, with regard to Wade's last argument that tax 
allocation can be based only on value, the trial court correctly 
determined that the issue to be resolved was not the proper basis 
for taxation by the government, but was the allocation of taxation 
between multiple owners of a jointly assessed property. (Tr. p. 
122) The court specifically explained that, while the government 
assesses taxes based on the value of a property, jointly assessed 
owners are not required to follow the same theory for dividing the 
taxes. (Id.) 
Even Wade admits in his brief that jointly assessed owners can 
mutually agree to any method of allocation they deem appropriate. 
Here, on several alternative grounds, the trial court specifically 
found that the parties had mutually agreed to allocate the taxes 
based on the area owned by each party. (Finding Nos. 7-9) Wade 
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has neither marshalled the evidence in support of these findings 
nor shown them to be clearly erroneous. His argument must 
therefore fail. College Irrigation Co., 780 P. 2d at 1244. 
VI. 
STANGL IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES AND CQ8TS 
INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH THI8 APPEAL 
At trial, the parties stipulated that the successful party 
would be entitled to attorneys' fees. (Tr. p. 4) No objection to 
the award of attorneys7 fees was raised by Wade below, and the 
issue of attorneys' fees is not (and cannot be) raised by Wade in 
this appeal. Stangl prevailed at trial and, accordingly, was 
awarded attorneys' fees and costs by the trial court. 
A party who was awarded attorneys' fees and costs below is 
also entitled to the same if that party prevails on appeal. Mgmt. 
Services Corp. v. Development Assocs.. 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 
1980); Brown v. Richards, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 41 (Utah Ct. App. 
Aug. 24, 1992); Schuhman v. Green River Motel, 835 P.2d 992, 998 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) . Therefore, if Stangl prevails in this matter 
he should be awarded attorneys' fees and costs incurred in 
connection with this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Stangl respectfully requests that 
the trial court's judgment be affirmed in all respects and that he 
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be awarded attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with 
this appeal.17 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ] ^ day of December, 1992. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Daniel A 
Attorneys for De Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF 8ERVICE 
This is to certify that on this ii day of December, 1992, four true and correct copies of the foregoing document were hand-
delivered to: 
James I. Watts, Esq. 
124 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
17Wade has asked this Court to order Stangl to convey Wade's 
property to him. It should be noted that the trial court has 
already made such a finding (Finding Nos. 10 and 20) and entered 
such an order in its Judgment dated November 1, 1991 (Exhibit B). 
Stangl is expressly required in the Judgment to convey Wade's 
property as soon as Wade pays his designated share of the taxes, 
interest and attorneys' fees. Upon full payment of these amounts 
Stangl is ready, willing and able to convey Wade's property to him 
as directed in the Judgment. 
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OCT 3 1 1991 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY L. WADE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
F. C. STANGL III, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C-87-357 
judge Michael R. Murphy 
This matter came on regularly for a bench trial before the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge, on the 4th day of 
October, 1991. Plaintiff Stanley L. Wade was present and was 
represented by his counsel of record, Bruce J. Nelson. Defendant 
F.C. Stangl III was present and was represented by his counsel of 
record, Stephen G. Crockett and Daniel A. Jensen. The Court having 
reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having received sworn 
testimony, exhibits and other evidence at trial, and being fully 
advised in the premises, hereby makes and enters the following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both plaintiff (hereafter "Wade") and defendant 
(hereafter "Stangl") are residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. The 
contract or contracts involved in this dispute were entered into 
by the parties in Salt Lake County, Utah. The real estate which 
was the subject of this dispute is located within Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
2. Pursuant to a written installment land contract dated May 
16, 1978, Wade agreed to buy, and Stangl agreed to sell, 6.87 acres 
of real property for the price of $206,100. The balance of the 
purchase price was payable to Stangl in 79 equal monthly 
installments. While the contract references an attached Exhibit 
A describing the property purchased by Wade, no such exhibit was 
ever attached to the contract. 
3. The property sold (hereafter "Wade's Property") consisted 
of a parcel of land located at approximately 9200 South, 700 East, 
Sandy City, Utah. The 6.87 acres comprising Wade's Property were 
part of a larger tract of land owned by Stangl containing 9.6 3 
acres. Stangl retained ownership of the remaining 2.76 acres. As 
depicted on the County Recorder's plat attached hereto as Exhibit 
A, Wade's Property is generally situated behind Stangl's retained 
property with respect to 700 East Street, and is accessed by a 50-
foot wide strip of land which also serves as a non-exclusive right-
of-way for access to Stangl's property. Wade's Property, which 
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includes the underlying fee to the right-of-way tract and totals 
6.87 acres, is described more particularly in Exhibit B hereto. 
4. Pursuant to the written 1978 contract, Wade eventually 
paid Stangl the agreed-upon purchase price of $206,100. 
5. Paragraph 6 of the 1978 written contract provides that 
H[r]eal property taxes for the year 1978 shall be prorated at the 
closing." The parties did in fact prorate the 1978 taxes based on 
(1) the number of days of the year each party owned the property, 
and (2) the area (square footage) owned by each party as compared 
to the total area of the 9.63-acre consolidated tract. 
6. The parties intended and assumed that they would be 
separately taxed on their respective parcels following the year of 
the closing (1978) . The county taxing authorities, however, 
continued to assess and tax Stangl for the entire 9.63-acre 
consolidated tract and did not individually tax the parties1 
separate parcels because no conveyance of Wade's Property had taken 
place, nor was any conveyance yet required under the terms of the 
installment land contract (which had a 6%-year executory period). 
6. During the years 1979, 1980 and 1981, the parties 
continued their practice of apportioning the property taxes based 
on the square footage or acreage owned by each party as compared 
to the total amount of land within the consolidated tract. 
Beginning with the year 1982, Wade failed and refused to pay any 
amount for taxes on the subject property and has at all times since 
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failed and refused to pay any amount toward the appurtenant 
property taxes. 
7. In 1980, the parties orally agreed to split the tax 
liability for the consolidated tract according to the proportionate 
amount of land owned by each party. This oral agreement 
prospectively resolved the issue of tax liability allocation 
between the parties. The primary reason for the parties1 oral 
agreement was that doing so would result in lower taxes for each 
party than would be the case if the two parcels were segregated and 
separately assessed and taxed. This 1980 oral agreement was either 
a separate and subsequent agreement by the parties concerning 
property tax allocation, or was an oral clarification or 
modification of the 1978 written contract which was ambiguous in 
that it addressed only the taxes for 1978 (the first year of a 6%-
year executory contract). The oral agreement also reflected the 
prior conduct of the parties from and after 1978 with respect to 
property tax apportionment. 
8. The letters and other documents contained in Exhibit P 
of the parties' Stipulation were sent and received by Wade or 
someone on Wade's behalf. Even if there was no subsequent oral 
agreement concerning tax apportionment, the documents in Exhibit 
P of the Stipulation reflect the parties' intent at the time of 
execution of the written agreement and thereafter that the taxes 
should be apportioned based on the respective amount of land owned 
by each party. 
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9. Therefore, either (1) the 1980 oral agreement was an 
amendment to the earlier written contract or was a subsequent 
contract which in either case prospectively resolved the issue of 
property tax apportionment (which oral agreement was not subject 
to the Statute of Frauds because it involved no transfer of an 
interest in land but only effected a resolution of property tax 
responsibility), or (2) the documents contained in Exhibit P of the 
parties' Stipulation reflect the intent of the parties1 written 
agreement that tax apportionment would be based on the area owned 
by each party, and such evidence of intent is important and 
determinative in resolving the ambiguity concerning future tax 
apportionment in the written contract. Under either of these 
alternative findings, the parties conclusively agreed that the 
property taxes would be allocated according to the amount of land 
owned by each party. The Court did not rely on evidence submitted 
by Stangl that the taxes did in fact increase for each party when 
the parties' parcels were finally segregated and separately 
assessed in 1991. 
10. Until the 1991 tax year, the consolidated 9.63-acre tract 
of land was never separately assessed to establish individual taxes 
for Wade's 6.87 acres and Stangl's retained 2.76 acres. Instead, 
Stangl has been taxed each year for the consolidated property as 
a single, undivided parcel. In order to avoid loss of the property 
through a tax sale, Stangl has paid the property taxes assessed 
against the entire consolidated tract each year since 1978 except 
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for the years 1990 and 1991, which taxes have not yet been paid. 
Stangl has agreed and is responsible to pay the full amount of said 
1990 taxes on the consolidated property provided that Wade first 
satisfies in full the judgment entered by this Court, which 
judgment includes apportionment of the 1990 taxes. Beginning with 
the 1991 tax year, the two parcels will be separately taxed and the 
parties will be individually responsible for payment of the taxes 
assessed against their respective parcels for each year from and 
after 1991. 
11. Stangl has been paid in full by Wade for Wade's 
proportionate share of the 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981 taxes. Wade 
is, however, liable to Stangl for Wade's proportionate share of the 
taxes for 1982 through 1990, together with prejudgment interest 
thereon at the legal rate. The amount of said 1982-1990 taxes and 
interest was stipulated by the parties to be $74,652, as indicated 
in Exhibit C hereto. Exhibit C accurately sets forth the 
apportioned property taxes for the tax years 1982 through 1990 
based on the acreage owned by each party and the equal division of 
acreage beneath the right-of-way. For the 1991 tax year, the two 
parcels will for the first time be taxed separately. Therefore, 
no apportioned amount is included in Exhibit C for the year 1991. 
Exhibit C also accurately sets forth the prejudgment interest on 
Wade's proportionate share of the taxes in accordance with Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2) . As reflected by Exhibit C, the total amount 
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of taxes and prejudgment interest owed by Wade to Stangl is 
$74,652. 
12. In August of 1989, Stangl engaged Strategis Asset 
Valuation and Management Company to appeal the amount of taxes 
assessed to the consolidated property for 1989. Strategis 
succeeded in lowering the 1989 taxes from $27,029.80 to $11,752.02, 
a savings of $15,277.78 to both parties. Strategis' fee for such 
action was 33.3% of the reduction amount of $15,277.78, or 
$5,087.50. This amount is properly considered a tax-related 
expense inuring to the benefit of both parties and was therefore 
properly added to the tax amount for 1989 to be apportioned between 
the parties along with the tax for that year as shown in Exhibit C. 
13. It is appropriate that acreage apportionment of the 
property taxes extend beyond the time when Wade completed his 
installment payments and continue until the time the parties' 
parcels were severed and separately assessed and taxed (i.e., 
through the 1990 tax year) because of: (1) Wade's failure, despite 
an appropriate discovery request, to produce or identify relevant 
documents that he claimed to have drafted; (2) Wade's failure to 
communicate in a reasonable and timely manner with his attorney or 
attorneys (or with opposing counsel and/or this Court if Wade had 
no attorney); and (3) Wade's overall failure to involve himself in 
the lawsuit he initiated. 
14. The Court generally credited Stangl's testimony and 
discredited Wade's testimony because of, inter alia, Wade's 
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admitted fraudulent activities that took place contemporaneously 
with this lawsuit. Wade's insistence that he at all times relied 
entirely on Stangl in connection with all relevant issues is 
indicative to the Court of fraudulent conduct and of an attempt by 
Wade to alter or withhold the truth. 
15. The Counterclaim against Wade, filed December 21, 1988, 
has never been answered. Technically, therefore, Wade is in 
default. The Counterclaim seeks dismissal of Wade's Complaint with 
prejudice, reimbursement of Wade's share of the property taxes and 
interest thereon at the legal rate, and attorneys fees and costs. 
Stangl is entitled to such relief. 
16. Paragraph 15 of the parties1 1978 written agreement 
provides that, in the event of a default under the agreement, the 
prevailing party shall recover from the losing party reasonable 
attorneys fees and costs. There is no requirement in the agreement 
for notice of said default in order for the right to attorneys fees 
to attach. Even if notice of default was required to receive 
attorneys fees, trial Exhibit CC reflects that Wade was given 
notice of his default. Because Wade failed thereafter to pay his 
share of the property taxes, said default was never cured. 
Stangl*s 1988 Counterclaim, of which the Court takes judicial 
notice, is further notice to Wade of his default under the 
contract. Furthermore, at the beginning of the trial the parties 
stipulated that their dispute focused on said written agreement and 
that the prevailing party is entitled to attorneys fees. Stangl 
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is the prevailing party and is therefore entitled to reasonable 
attorneys fees and costs, evidence of which is to be submitted to 
the Court by affidavit in accordance with Rule 4-505 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration* 
17. F.C. Stangl Construction Company check No. 55499, payable 
to Stanley L. Wade in the amount of $52,776.00, was hand-delivered 
to A. Paul Schwenke, the attorney of record and the attorney in 
actuality for Wade, on behalf of and as agent for Wade. A 
withdrawal of counsel A. Paul Schwenke, purportedly executed on 
March 7, 1989, was never filed with the Court and was not served 
on opposing counsel despite a certificate of service to the 
contrary. Even if the withdrawal had been filed, Mr. Schwenke 
continued to represent Wade by, for example, prosecuting a 
successful Motion for Summary Disposition with the Utah Supreme 
Court in July 1989 and by filing a Certificate of Readiness for 
Trial with this Court on May 24, 1990. The Court takes judicial 
notice of the fact that Mr. Schwenke continued to file numerous 
pleadings on Wade's behalf, the first one (a notice to submit for 
decision) dated only six days after the purported withdrawal of 
counsel. The only withdrawal of counsel by Mr. Schwenke was filed 
with the Court on January 9, 1991. Wade's sworn affidavit, 
acknowledged on March 25, 1990 (trial Exhibit Y) , expressly 
references an accompanying affidavit prepared by Wade's attorney, 
Mr. Schwenke. Mr. Schwenke1s affidavit itemizes costs and services 
rendered on Wade's behalf over a period exceeding one year 
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following Schwenke's purported withdrawal from the case on March 
7, 1989. Wade's affidavit convinces the Court that Wade was aware 
of Mr. Schwenke's ongoing representation. In light of the above, 
the unfiled withdrawal of counsel does not constitute a withdrawal 
from the case by Mr. Schwenke. The agency relationship between 
Wade and Schwenke therefore continued to abide until January 9, 
1991, when Schwenke formally withdraw as counsel. 
18. Alternatively, even if Mr. Schwenke did inform Wade that 
he was withdrawing as counsel, Wade failed to adhere to his 
obligation to timely communicate the withdrawal to this Court 
and/or to opposing counsel. Instead, Wade knowingly neglected this 
action from the date of Schwenke's purported withdrawal in March 
1989 until Wade engaged his present counsel in February 1991. 
Wade's complete failure to attend in any way to a pending 
proceeding justifies and excuses any and all good faith actions 
taken by opposing counsel during Wade's neglect of this matter. 
19. Accordingly, A. Paul Schwenke was, at the time said check 
was tendered to him, Wade's agent in law and in fact, by actuality 
and by appearance. The subsequent alteration of the check is 
deemed to be the act of Wade, and Wade is not entitled to any 
offset or credit with respect to said check or with respect to the 
funds represented by said check. Stangl is deemed to have repaid 
in full the sum he was obligated to repay to Wade by virtue of this 
Court's Order of November 21, 1989. 
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20. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment to be entered by 
the Court against Wade, Stangl is to convey to Wade the property 
described in Exhibit B, subject to the non-exclusive right-of-way 
described above, in accordance with the terms of the parties' 
written agreement. 
21. The Court wishes to note that Bruce J. Nelson, Wade's 
present counsel, was not associated in any way with Wade's prior 
counsel and had no involvement whatsoever with the fraudulent and 
unethical activities alleged by Wade to have taken place earlier 
in the course of this dispute. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has proper jurisdiction over the parties and 
the subject matter hereof. 
2. Stangl is entitled to a judgment from Wade, which 
judgment should be entered in accordance with the Findings and 
Conclusions herein. 
3. As explained in the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
property taxes attributable to the consolidated tract of land 
containing the parties' respective parcels should properly be 
allocated between the parties according to the proportionate amount 
of area owned by each party, as set forth in Exhibit C. 
4. Because of Wade's breach of the parties' written and/or 
oral agreement or agreements, Wade is liable to Stangl for Wade's 
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proportionate share of the property taxes for the years 1982 
through 1990, together with prejudgment interest thereon at the 
legal rate, which sums amount to a total of $74,652.00. Stangl is, 
therefore, pursuant to his Counterclaim filed on December 21, 1988, 
entitled to a judgment in his favor of $74,652.00, plus post-
judgment interest at the legal rate, plus whatever amount of 
attorneys fees and costs the Court deems appropriate upon 
submission of evidence of same. Additionally, Wade's Complaint 
should be dismissed with prejudice. 
5. As the prevailing party, Stangl is entitled to reasonable 
attorneys fees and costs, evidence of which is to be submitted to 
the Court by affidavit in accordance with Rule 4-505 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration. 
6. At the time Stangl1 s check No. 55499 in the amount of 
$52,776.00 was tendered to A. Paul Schwenke, Mr. Schwenke was 
Wade's agent in law and in fact, by actuality and by appearance. 
The subsequent alteration of the check is deemed to be the act of 
Wade, and Wade is not entitled to any offset or credit with respect 
to said check or with respect to the funds represented by said 
check. Stangl is deemed to have repaid in full the sum he was 
obligated to repay to Wade by virtue of this Court's Order of 
November 21, 1989. 
7. Stangl is responsible to pay the full amount of the 1990 
:axes on the consolidated property, provided that Wade first 
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satisfies in full the judgment to be entered by this Court, which 
judgment will include apportionment of the 1990 taxes. 
8. Beginning with the 1991 tax year, the parties' properties 
will be separately taxed and the parties will be individually 
responsible for payment of the taxes assessed against their 
respective parcels for each year from and after 1991. 
9. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment to be entered by 
the Court against Wade, Stangl shall be obligated to convey to Wade 
the property described in Exhibit B, subject to the non-exclusive 
right-of-way described in said Exhibit. 
MADE AND ENTERED this 3/ day of (OrTn/^A . , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
/KJL^K 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
District Judge, State of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on th*c» )|4Uday of October, 1991, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand-delivered to: 
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq. 
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS 
215 South State, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
£ ^ MQ~*~ 
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Stephen G. Crockett (A0766) 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER 
136 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Daniel A. Jensen (A5296) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
a^qyifl 
STANLEY L. WADE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
F. C. STANGL III, 
Defendant. 
ihe>-9i-saux. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-87-357 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
This matter came on regularly for a bench trial before the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge, on the 4th day of 
October, 1991. Plaintiff Stanley L. Wade was present and was 
represented by his counsel of record, Bruce J. Nelson. Defendant 
F.C. Stangl III was present and was represented by his counsel of 
record, Stephen G. Crockett and Daniel A. Jensen. The Court having 
reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having received sworn 
testimony, exhibits and other evidence at trial, having heard 
arguments of counsel, having entered its Findings of Fact and 
STGL\083.vc 
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Conclusions of Law, having received appropriate affidavits in 
support of attorneys' fees, and being fully advised in the 
premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Defendant is entitled to judgment against plaintiff in 
accordance with the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. The amount of said judgment is as follows: 
Plaintiff's proportionate share of property 
taxes for 1982-1990 $54,835 
Pre-judgment interest thereon at the legal 
rate $19,817 
Attorneys' fees and costs $2^foJ7. <?o ^ JS^ 
TOTAL $/^ >Cjf 7. 7 0 l ^ 
Defendant is also entitled to post-judgment interest at the legal 
rate and costs incurred in satisfaction of said judgment. 
3. Upon full satisfaction of this judgment by plaintiff, 
defendant shall (1) pay the full amount of the 1990 taxes on the 
parties' consolidated property, and (2) convey to plaintiff the 
property described in Exhibit B to the Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, subject to the non-exclusive right-of-way 
described in said Exhibit. 
4. Beginning with the 1991 tax year, the parties shall be 
individually responsible for payment of the property taxes 
separately assessed against their respective parcels of land. 
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,is \*& day
 o f / ^ - A DATED this t *~ day of >_[ u -^ , 1991 
BY THE COURT: 
TUU^c "L > , 
i R. MURPHY / HONORABLE MICHAEL  Y~T 
District Judge, State of Utan 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this ^ ^ _ ^ d a y of October, 1991, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT was hand-
delivered to: 
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq. 
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS 
215 South State, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sk ?7V^ 
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PU/NT/FF'S 
I EXHIBIT A. Paul Schwenke 
Bruce J. Udall #3302 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
SCHWENKE & UDALL 
5295 South 320 West, Suite 540 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-5528 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY L. WADE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
F.C. STANGL III 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS 
TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
AND FIRST SET 
INTERROGATORIES \ 
Civil No. C87-357 
Judge Michael Murphy 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Stanley L. Wade, by and through 
counsel, and answers the Defendant's Request For Admissions and 
Interrogatories pursuant to rules 30 and 36 of the Utah Rules Of 
Civil Procedures. 
RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
REQUEST NO 1. Admit that plaintiff Wade claims ownership of 
the property that is the subject matter of this litigation and 
has so claimed such ownership from May 16, 1978 to the present. 
RESPONSE TO #1: Admit 
REQUEST NO 2. Admit the defendant paid the property taxes 
on the subject property by paying taxes on a larger parcel that 
included plaintiff's claimed property. 
RESPONSE TO #2: Plaintiff has insufficient knowledge to 
admit or deny this request and for this reason deny the same. 
REQUEST NO. 3. Admit that plaintiff has paid no property 
tax on the property in which plaintiff claims ownership for any 
of the time period between May 16, 1978 and the present. 
RESPONSE TO #3: Admit that the responsible party for 
property taxes during the contractual period was the defendant 
and not the plaintiff. 
REQUEST NO. 4. Admit that Defendant Stangl paid the taxes 
on the 9.632 total acre parcel of which Wade owned 6.87 acres and 
Stangl owned 2.762 acres. 
RESPONSE TO #4: Plaintiff is without sufficient information 
to admit or deny this request in that only defendant Stangl knows 
whether he paid taxes and for this reason plaintiff deny the 
same. 
REQUEST NO. 5. Admit that Wade is liable for 71.32 of all 
taxes paid by Stangl on the 9*632 acre parcel located at 9225 
South 700 East in Sandy, Utah. 
RESPONSE TO #5: Plaintiff objects to this request as calling 
for a legal conclusion without any basis in fact or law, and 
notwithstanding this objection and in no manner be construed as 
waiving this objection, plaintiff denies all of the allegations 
of request #5. 
REQUEST NO. 6. Admit that Stangl has provided Stanley Wade 
with various notices of taxes paid by Stangl on the property and 
has demanded that Wade pay his proportionate share. 
RESPONSE TO #6: Deny. 
REQUEST NO. 7. Admit that Wade owes Stangl 71.32%, along 
with interest as provided by law for the property tax paid by 
Stangl on the property. 
REPSONSE TO #7: Plaintiff incorporated by reference his 
objections under #5 and for the same reasons deny this request. 
DATED this /£- day of March, 1988. 
A.£/au<L^Schwenke, Esq. 
RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: If you denied any of Defendant's First 
Requests for Admissions set forth specifically for each denial: 
a. The complete factual basis upon which your denial 
is based; 
b. Identify any witnesses who have knowledge relating 
to the facts specified in subparagraph (a) and individually, with 
regard to each such witness, specify the knowledge held by that 
witness; and 
c. Identify all documents that disclose, relate, or 
you believe supports your denial. Specify the manner in which 
each such document supports your denial. 
RESPONSE TO #1: Plaintiff admited request for admission #1; 
#2 was denied because plaintiff has no knowledge whether 
defendant paid any taxes; #3 was admited; #4 was denied because 
only defendant can know if paid taxes; #5 and #7 was denied 
because it calls for a legal conclusion; and #6 was denied 
because it just did not happen. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Do you contend that you are 
responsible to pay any of the taxes for the years 1978 through 
1987 on the property that is the subject matter of the lawsuit? 
RESPONSE TO #2: Plaintiff contends that he is not 
responsible for property taxes during the contract period. 
Plaintiff admits being responsible for taxes after the contract 
period which taxes can not be discern so long as defendant 
continues to wrongfully withhold delivering of a warranty deed to 
plainti ff. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: If you answer was in the affirmative 
to Interrogatory No. 2 above, specify: 
a. The amount you contend you owe; 
b. The entity to which you owe such amount; 
c. The complete methodology you utilized for 
determining the amount you owe in taxes; and 
d. If your answer was in the negative to Interrogatory 
No. 2 above, please specify the factual basis upon which you base 
your contention that you have no obligation to pay any taxes on 
the subject property. Identify any witnesses who have knowledge 
that relates to your contention and individually with regard to 
each, specify the knowledge held by such individual. 
RESPONSE TO #3: Plaintiff do not owe any property taxes so long 
as defendant wrongfully refuses to deliver a warranty pursuant to 
the contract, so that the county assessor would segragate 
plaintiffs's property and assess the tax for it. ^ ^ ~-^ 
DATED this of March, 1988./^ / /7 ^ 
A./ Paul Schwenke, Esq. 
OATH 
Stanley L. Wade after being first duly sworn states that the 
facts contain in the responses to interrogatories herein are true 
and exact to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
dik^As z/ 7/MU 
SUBSCRIBED 
1988. 
Stanley'L. Wade 
RN TO BEFORE ME THIS / J ^ day of March, 
^ . 
f*=£fo*->~+-A^i_ > 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY L. WADE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
F. C. STANGL III, 
Defendant, 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
October 4, 1991 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
District Court Judge 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Attorney at Law 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Stephen G. Crockett 
Giauque, Crockett & Bendinger 
136 South Main Street, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
GAYLE B. CAMPBELL x 
SliiicD SHORTHAND REPORTER 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH ' 
1 Salt Lake City, Utah October 4, 1991 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: This is Wade v. Stangl, 
4 C87-347. Mr, Bruce Nelson here on behalf of the 
5 plaintiff, and Mr. Crockett here on behalf of the 
6 defendant. And is the plaintiff present with you? 
7 MR. NELSON: Yes, he is, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 MR. CROCKETT: Mr. Stangl is present. 
10 Mr. Dan Jensen is also present on behalf of Mr. Stangl. 
11 THE COURT: All right. One thing that I 
12 don't think the record may be entirely clear about at 
13 this time, and that is, that I recused myself on a 
14 specific issue in this case, and not in the case in its 
15 entirety. 
16 The specific issue being whether or not there 
17 should be relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). The 
18 reason why I recused myself was that the issues on that 
19 motion, I felt, might appear to be or could in fact be 
20 intrinsically intertwined with prior counsel for the 
21 plaintiff, and I had referred to the Utah State Bar 
22 some difficulties that I had with prior counsel for the 
23 plaintiff. And successor counsel — and I don't mean 
24 Mr. Nelson, but some other successor counsel before Mr. 
25 Nelson came along, had some difficulties also. And I 
2 
1 also just felt that those issues were so related that 
2 it may affect my judgment on the for relief from 
3 judgment, or at least appear to affect that. And 
4 really, regardless of what that decision had been, I 
5 felt that either side may have had some concerns. For 
6 example, Mr. Crockett's client could have had some 
7 concerns that I was bending over backwards to overcome 
8 some of the difficulties I'd had with prior counsel, 
9 and therefore viewed the issues in a more liberal way 
10 toward the plaintiff. 
11 Anyway, that is all over now. I don't have 
12 any problem proceeding with the remainder of the case, 
13 and I need to see if either of you have any problems. 
14 MR. NELSON: On behalf of the plaintiff, 
15 we have no problem with your continuing, Your Honor. 
16 MR. CROCKETT: On behalf of the 
17 defendant, we have no problem, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: All right. I have read the 
19 stipulation. Go ahead. 
20 MR. CROCKETT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
21 Maybe we ought to put on the record some things we did 
22 in chambers before, so that we have a record of what we 
23 are going to be trying today, and what we are not. I 
24 think the issue is going to be the methodology for 
25 determining the property taxes on the property in 
3 
1 question. 
2 We are reserving issues as to attorney's fees 
3 for the court to later decide by affidavit or however 
4 the parties determine is most appropriate. 
5 There will also be somewhat of a dispute on a 
6 check for $52,776.00. Finally, if the court decides 
7 that apportionment is not an appropriate method, the 
8 court will decide how to proceed from here. 
9 It may be that plaintiff's counsel has 
10 indicated you ought to appoint a special master. I 
11 suppose we'll deal with that once we get past step one, 
12 and see what is required for step two. 
13 THE COURT: All right. On the issue of 
14 attorney's fees, as I understand it, that if it's 
15 appropriate, just the legal issue whether or not 
16 attorney's fees are appropriate for either side will be 
17 presented today, but the amount of those fees will be 
18 set aside for another time. 
19 MR. NELSON: That's correct. But 
20 perhaps we could dispense with some of that argument. 
21 The contract between the parties calls for attorney's 
22 fees for the successful party, and I think we are both 
23 claiming the right to entitlement to attorney's fees in 
24 the event of success, based on that contract. 
25 MR. CROCKETT: I think that's correct. 
4 
1 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
2 MR. CROCKETT: Okay. Your Honor, I'm 
3 going to dispense with an opening statement. You have 
4 heard the issues, and I think it would be simpler to 
5 call Mr. Stangl, if that's all right. 
6 THE COURT: All right. 
7 FRANZ STANGL 
8 having been duly sworn, was examined and testified on 
9 his oath as follows: 
10 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
11 BY MR. CROCKETT: 
12 Q Would you please state your full name 
13 for the record, please. 
14 A Franz Courtney Stangl III. 
15 Q And you go by the name "Shoe" Stangl, is 
16 that correct? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q Okay. Mr. Stangl, you are somewhat hard 
19 of hearing; is that also correct? 
20 A Yes, sir. 
21 Q If you don't hear me on something, tell 
22 me, and I'll be happy to speak up. I know from past 
23 association that sometimes in conversation we pass in 
24 the night. So if you don't hear something, or you're 
25 not sure, tell me and I'll be happy to speak up. 
5 
1 A Thank you. 
2 Q Mr. Stangl, would you briefly describe 
3 your business background. What I'm really concerned 
4 about now is going back to the 1978 - 1975 time frame, 
5 and the nature of your business activities. 
6 A Yes, sir. When I first moved to Utah 
7 in 1960 I started in the real estate business, and I 
8 continued in the real estate business. And during the 
9 1970's, 1970 to the present I have been a real estate 
10 developer. 
11 That is to say that I buy land, build 
12 buildings on that land, rent those buildings to other 
13 people, and manage those properties. So that I'm a 
14 complete real estate developer, and have been since 
15 1970. 
16 Q Okay. In 1970 did you sell some raw 
17 land to Mr. Wade? 
18 A In mid-1970 I sold a parcel to Mr. Wade. 
19 It was up on about 23rd East and 70th South. And in 
20 1978 I sold a second parcel to Mr. Wade, and that was 
21 out at about 9925 South 700 East, in Sandy. 
22 Q And it's that second parcel that's the 
23 subject of this dispute; is that correct, sir? 
24 A Yes, sir. 
25 Q What is the size of the original parcel 
6 
1 that you sold to Mr. Wade? 
2 A In Sandy? 
3 Q Yes. Excuse me, no. The one on 7th 
4 East. Is that the one in Sandy? 
5 A The one on 7th East is in Sandy, yes. 
6 My recollection is 6.87 acres. 
7 MR. CROCKETT: Your Honor, we have 
8 stipulated, and I think the record ought to reflect, we 
9 have filed a stipulation with the court that contains 
10 certain exhibits. It's my understanding that with the 
11 exception of specific reservations in the stipulation, 
12 each of those exhibits may be admitted into evidence. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Nelson. 
14 MR. NELSON: That's correct, Your Honor. 
15 MR. CROCKETT: So we would offer 
16 Exhibits "A" through "Q" simply to save time. 
17 THE COURT: "A" through HQ" are received 
18 under the conditions set forth in the stipulation. 
19 MR. CROCKETT: Thank you. 
20 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Mr. Stangl, let me 
21 hand you a copy of that. This is Exhibit "A". This is 
22 the agreement you entered into with Mr. Wade; is that 
23 correct? 
24 A Yes, sir. 
25 Q Now, Exhibit "A" references certain 
7 
1 attachments which are not attached to Exhibit "A". Do 
2 you know if those attachments were ever prepared? 
3 A They were not prepared at the same time 
4 the agreement was prepared. And we later -- when I say 
5 "we" I should say me — later asked a surveyor to 
6 prepare a survey in anticipation of completing that. 
7 But they weren't attached at the time the agreement was 
8 done. 
9 Q Would you look at Exhibits "B" and "C", 
10 and can you tell me what those are, sir? 
11 A "B" is a legal description prepared by 
12 Bush & Gudgell on the 6.8 parcel, which is the 
13 description that I asked them to prepare to describe 
14 the parcel that I was selling to Stan Wade. 
15 Exhibit "C" is a pictorial map to show on 
16 this map the same shape of the parcel that's described 
17 on Exhibit "B", as well as two other parcels, Exhibit 
18 "lA" and M1BM, that are the other parcels that I kept, 
19 that I didn't sell to Stan Wade. 
20 Q During the course of this hearing the 
21 Firestone parcel may be referenced. Which one is that? 
22 A M1A", in the left hand side of Exhibit 
23 "CM, as I'm looking at it. 
24 Q Is it your testimony that the parcel you 
25 sold Mr. Wade would be the 6.87 acre parcel on the 
8 
1 right side of Exhibit "C\ along with the right of way. 
2 A Yes. That's correct. 
3 Q And Exhibit "IB". 
4 THE COURT: Isn't it along the left hand 
5 side? 
6 MR. CROCKETT: Yes. The right of way on 
7 the top portion of that. 
8 Q (By Mr. Crockett) What is currently on 
9 parcel IB, sir? 
10 A On IB I have built a building that is 
11 called Hancock Fabrics. It's toward the upper side of 
12 the drawing as you are looking at it. 
13 And all of the land in IB is improved with 
14 asphalt, except an area that's to the south of the 
15 Hancock building. That's about 11,000 square feet of 
16 area that has not yet been built on. But it's my 
17 expectation to build a building on that, as well. 
18 Q Okay. Is there anything on the portion 
19 of the extreme left of Exhibit HC"? Not Parcel 1A, but 
20 the remainder. 
21 A Is there anything on — 
22 Q Anything built? 
23 A On --
24 Q On this "L" shaped parcel? 
25 A That isn't included in the description 
9 
1 here. There's a building that's built on this now, 
2 that I built last year. It's called Wallpaper 
3 Warehouse. 
4 Q Thank you. Sir, would you look at 
5 paragraph 6 of this Exhibit "A". Now, paragraph 6 
6 provides --
7 A Wait a minute. I'm sorry. I was on the 
8 stipulation. Yes. 
9 Q Paragraph 6 provides real property taxes 
10 for the year 1978 shall be prorated at the closing. 
11 Did you do that? 
12 A Yes, sir. 
13 Q Did you participate in the closing? 
14 A Yes. I wasn't here in Salt Lake at the 
15 time that all happened, but I was a party to the sale 
16 of this property. 
17 Q Right. 
18 A So I participated. 
19 Q And one of the signatories. 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q And the proration at closing, was that 
22 done on a time or a square foot tax basis, or some 
23 other basis. 
24 A Both. The time and the square footage. 
25 Q What do you mean by time? 
10 
1 A If the property closed mid-year, half of 
2 the taxes for the year would be owed by the seller, and 
3 the other half would be owed by the buyer. Just to 
4 demonstrate. And if the property was a ten acre 
5 parcel, and the buyer bought six acres of it, and the 
6 seller sold four acres of it, the seller would be 
7 charged with 40% of the tax amount. And the buyer 
8 would be charged with 60% of the tax amount based upon 
9 the entire assessment for the entire property. That 
10 is, the values or the cost of the taxes would be 
11 apportioned that way. 
12 Q You have reviewed the record, and that 
13 was in fact what occurred in 1978; is that correct? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q All right. After 1978, what was the 
16 original anticipation that would happen with regard to 
17 payment of taxes for the parcels? 
18 A We thought that the taxing authorities 
19 would bill each of us for our respective taxes, and we 
20 would each pay our respective taxes for our parcel. 
21 Q Did that in fact happen? 
22 A It did not. 
2 3 Q What happened instead? 
24 A The taxing authority, Salt Lake County, 
25 issued one tax assessment for the entire property, 
11 
1 covering both the Wade parcel and the parcel that I 
2 kept. 
3 And we then each paid our respective portions 
4 of that, based on the quantity of area that each of us 
5 had versus the amount that was billed by the County. 
6 Q Did you have a discussion with Mr, Wade 
7 about the apportionment of paying taxes? And when I 
8 use the term apportionment, what I mean is breaking it 
9 out by square footage and each paying your 
10 proportionate share. 
11 A I did. 
12 Q When did this discussion take place, 
13 sir? 
14 A Some time in about 19 -- during 1980. 
15 Q Who was present? 
16 A Stan Wade and me. 
17 Q Where did it take place? 
18 A In my office. 
19 Q To the best of your recollection, would 
20 you take us throucjh that decision. Who said what? 
21 A Yes. There were two or three issues we 
22 were talking about. But the issue as related to taxes, 
23 we had had the property in front of us, and the 
24 assessor had not divided the assessment for our 
25 properties. And we had one assessment. We had a bill 
12 
1 that needed to be paid. 
2 We discussed the common sense of taking the 
3 prorata share, the 60/40 relationship, to use round 
4 numbers. Actually, it was 6.87 acres versus two point 
5 whatever I kept. So he would pay a fraction of that, 
6 and I would also pay the other end of the fraction so 
7 that the 100% was a formula. 
8 We also discussed that it made sense to do 
9 that, because if we did divide the property, that each 
10 of us would pay a higher tax, and there was no sense 
11 penalizing either one of us since the taxing authority 
12 had already chosen the method to assess us that they 
13 had, and we would just participate and each pay our 
14 prorated share of the amount they billed us. 
15 Q What do you mean, that you would each 
16 pay a higher tax? 
17 A That if we separated the properties and 
18 the properties became less than ten acres, each then 
19 would be reassessed, and the assessment for a smaller 
20 parcel is generally higher per square foot than the 
21 assessment for an entire parcel per square foot. 
22 So that each of us would have an increased 
23 assessment. If we got an increased assessment, we 
24 would also get an increased tax to pay. 
25 Q Did you discuss that with Mr. Wade? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q All right- In 1991 the properties were 
3 broken out; is that correct? 
4 A Yes, sir. 
5 Q Now, I realize this is some ten years 
6 after the fact of the agreement and ten years after the 
7 discussion, but in 1991 when they were broken out, were 
8 each of the parcels taxed at a higher amount than 
9 before they were split up? 
10 A Yes, sir. 
11 Q What did the taxes on the Wade parcel go 
12 from and to? Do you understand my question? 
13 MR. NELSON: Before he answers, I have 
14 to object to this line of questioning. The fact that 
15 they had a conversation in 1980, and allegedly made an 
16 agreement, and that's the reason they made the 
17 agreement was subsequently borne out eleven years 
18 later, I just don't think that's relevant to what the 
19 agreement was in 1980. 
20 So I object on the basis of relevancy to any 
21 discussion about what the taxes are in 1991 to justify 
22 the 1980 agreement. 
2 3 MR. CROCKETT: I think it goes to 
24 weight, rather than admissibility. But it simply is an 
25 indication that the reasoning they discussed for this 
14 
1 agreement they are going to dispute was correct, and in 
2 fact that did happen. 
3 THE COURT: Anything else? 
4 MR. NELSON: No. 
5 THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
6 I do think it goes to the weight. 
7 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Maybe we can do this 
8 by stipulation, rather than Mr. Stangl trying to 
9 interpret the tax notices. We have looked at those, 
10 and let me proffer that in 19 — where we have it 
11 written down in 1991, the parcel sold to Mr. Wade went 
12 from $8,640 in 1990 to $13,812 in 1991. The 
13 differential — would you stipulate that's what the 
14 records would show if we put them in? 
15 MR. NELSON: I'm afraid you are 
16 comparing apples and oranges. The properties weren't 
17 separated until 1991. You are comparing the large 
18 parcel assessment in 1990 to just Mr. Wade's portion in 
19 '91. 
20 MR. CROCKETT: No, we are comparing the 
21 apportionment in 1990 to what Mr. Wade's parcel was 
22 obligated in terms of taxes versus what was actually 
23 assessed in 1991 after the breakout. 
24 THE COURT: It assumes the apportionment 
25 theory. 
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1 MR. NELSON: Based on that assumption, 
2 and if you stick to that, yes, I — 
3 THE COURT: I understand you don't agree 
4 with apportionment. 
5 MR. NELSON: Thank you. 
6 MR. CROCKETT: Okay. 
7 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Mr. Stangl, I cut you 
8 off there. What was said in that conversation, if 
9 anything, that you had with Mr. Wade at that point in 
10 time? 
11 A We felt with the location of the right 
12 of way, where it would be against the north side of the 
13 property, or through the center of my property in the 
14 front, and with the improvements to be added to that 
15 right of way in the future. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Did you conclude 
17 your discussions with an amendment to the contract that 
18 you had in 1978 with Mr. Wade? 
19 A Yes, sir. 
20 Q Did you ever, to your knowledge, make 
21 that position known to Mr. Wade, that you viewed that 
22 as amending the contract. 
23 A I think through letters from my office 
24 to him, yes. 
25 MR. CROCKETT: Okay. Your Honor, we 
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1 would call your attention to Exhibit "P", and the court 
2 will note that there are several letters included in 
3 Exhibit "P". It is a packet of letters that went from 
4 — or that was put in the mail to go from Mr. Stangl to 
5 Mr. Wade. 
6 There is no stipulation he actually received 
7 it, but the stipulation -- if called to testify, the 
8 testimony would be that these letters were placed in 
9 the mail and sent to Mr. Wade in the ordinary course of 
10 Mr. Stangl's business; is that correct? 
11 MR. NELSON: That's correct. 
12 MR. CROCKETT: All right. 
13 MR. NELSON: For purposes of the record, 
14 may I just indicate that there may be a statute of 
15 frauds or statute of limitations issue here. I don't 
16 mean to waive that by not objecting to all the 
17 questions. I would like to reserve that until we see 
18 where this line of questioning goes, if I may. 
19 THE COURT: Well, wait a minute. Let's 
20 get to the statute of frauds issues right away. Are 
21 you saying that the written agreement is clear and 
22 unequivocal as to taxes? 
23 MR. NELSON: The agreement certainly 
24 doesn't say anything about taxes, other than the 1978 
25 taxes would be prorated. Mr. Stangl just indicated he 
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1 believed that they amended the contract. It's my 
2 position that any amendment to the contract would have 
3 to be in writing. 
4 MR. CROCKETT: The contract doesn't 
5 provide that, number one. And I don't believe we have 
6 a statute of frauds problem. There's never been one 
7 pled in this case. I think that is going to who owes 
8 what obligations on taxes, and does not go to 
9 transferability of property, which would require a 
10 statute of fraud. I think that's possibly why it 
11 hasn't been asserted. 
12 MR. NELSON: I'm not sure there has been 
13 a reply to the counterclaim in the file. As I was 
14 reviewing the file last night, I noticed there are some 
15 allegations in one of the pleadings, maybe a court 
16 order based upon the fact there is no reply to the 
17 counterclaim which has been filed. So I don't know 
18 whether it was raised, or not. I would like it raised 
19 now, if it hasn't been raised before. I don't believe 
20 you can amend the contract without writing. 
21 THE COURT: Let me ask this: Assuming 
22 you are correct, how then does one go about resolving 
23 the primary issue in this case, and that is, the 
24 allocation of taxes? 
25 MR. NELSON: The contract. 
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1 THE COURT: The contract doesn't say 
2 anything, 
3 MR. NELSON: Then I guess you go by what 
4 the standard is in the industry, in the valley. And 
5 you go by statute, Your Honor, which requires property 
6 taxes to be based upon its fair market value. When you 
7 apply that statute to this contract, I think it's clear 
8 how you do it. 
9 MR. CROCKETT: You are going to hear 
10 some evidence on that. 
11 THE COURT: Doesn't the statute of fraud 
12 void or make voidable a contract if it is subject to 
13 the statute of frauds, and the statute of frauds is not 
14 adhered to? Isn't that the relief under the statute of 
15 frauds problem? 
16 MR. CROCKETT: Void or voidable if it's 
17 subject to the statute? 
18 THE COURT: Right. 
19 MR. CROCKETT: I agree. 
20 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to take Mr. 
21 Crockett's representation at face value, unless you can 
22 point out to me something different. And that is, that 
23 the statute of frauds has not been pleaded and there is 
24 an affirmative obligation to plead that. And 
25 therefore, it would be inapplicable as being waived. 
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1 And there would be prejudice to allow it to be brought 
2 in at this time because the defendants do not have any 
3 notice that that would be a factor in resolving the 
4 underlying issue of how you allocate taxes. 
5 MR, NELSON: I don't know if Mr. 
6 Schwenke pled it or not. If he did, I would like to 
7 raise it at this point. 
8 THE COURT: Then what you are going to 
9 have to do, since there are two volumes here, if you 
10 believe that there are papers in there indicating that 
11 he did timely raise it, you are going to have to bring 
12 it to my attention for the purposes of the record. 
13 But beyond that, it is my understanding that 
14 the statute of frauds is for the purpose of determining 
15 whether a transaction in its entirety is void or 
16 voidable. 
17 And if there is failure to adhere to the 
18 statute of limitations under circumstances where it is 
19 applicable, then the person raising that has to bite 
20 the bullet on whether or not they want the transaction 
21 voided. 
22 MR.. NELSON: I have no problem with Mr. 
23 Crockett proceeding. I simply wanted to raise those 
24 issues. If they have been raised appropriately 
25 previously, then I will go into them later. 
26 THE COURT: Then the statute of 
1 limitations issue is resolved as I indicated, and that 
2 is, alternatively on the waiver ground or on the ground 
3 that it's inapplicable. And now you also raised the 
4 statute of limitations issue. 
5 MR. NELSON: I'm sorry. I just 
6 understood you to address the statute of limitations 
7 issue, but I believe the response is the same to the 
8 statute of limitations and the statute of frauds. 
9 THE COURT: It certainly would be on the 
10 pleading aspect, but I don't understand as to the 
11 applicability. 
12 MR. NELSON: He testified that in 1980 
13 they made an agreement to apportion taxes based on 
14 square footage. He brought his counterclaim in 1987. 
15 THE COURT: I see. 
16 MR. NELSON: It is my position that, if 
17 raised previously, is that he is too late to raise 
18 those issues. 
19 THE COURT: I could rule on the waiver 
20 issue and on that now, and that ruling is consistent 
21 with what I indicated on the statute of limitations. 
22 However, as to the merits of that, I don't think that I 
23 could rule on that until there is further evidence, if 
24 any, as to whether or not that statute — and I may be 
25 using the wrong term here — was either tolled or 
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1 waived by the actions of the party. 
2 MR. CROCKETT: I think that you will 
3 find that as the testimony unfolds Mr. Wade's taxes 
4 during the early portion of this and the statute of 
5 limitations doesn't come into play. 
6 THE COURT: All right. 
7 MR. CROCKETT: It's only subsequent to 
8 that. But let's get that evidence out and you will see 
9 the time frame. 
10 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Mr. Stangl, you 
11 indicated that you made -- or to your knowledge it was 
12 made known to Mr. Wade that you viewed this as an 
13 amendment to the agreement. You cited a letter to Mr. 
14 Stangl, and I'll cite to the court Exhibit "P-10", 
15 which were the letters that went from Mrs. Stangl to 
16 Mr. Wade. 
17 Now, Mrs. Stangl has subsequently passed 
18 away, has she not? 
19 A That's correct. 
20 MR. CROCKETT: And in these letters, 
21 Your Honor, I would point out, just to give you an 
22 example, on the letter dated December 8, 1980, part of 
23 Exhibit "P", it goes through and it indicates the 
24 property taxes. It does it on a square footage basis, 
25 setting forth the apportionment of the method we are 
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1 arguing for now. Then the final paragraph goes, after 
2 it's added up the property taxes, "May we please have 
3 your check for $8,174.34 made payable to Franz C. 
4 Stangl, III, at the above letterhead and within thirty 
5 days in order to correct your existing default and 
6 conclude your obligation as per the purchase 
7 agreement." 
8 Each of the letters has language effectively 
9 like that. Each of the letters is in the early time 
10 frame, and is eventually marked "Paid" on the property 
11 taxes, and we have -- part of our stipulation is that 
12 the fact that it is marked paid, that if called to 
13 testify, Mr. Stangl or someone else from Mr. Stangl's 
14 office would indicate under their normal business 
15 record keeping system that meant that Mr. Wade actually 
16 paid that amount and sent it to Mr. Stangl. 
17 Is that our stipulation? 
18 MR. NELSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
19 MR. CROCKETT: All right. 
20 Q (By Mr. Crockett) So where did we get 
21 to, then, Mr. Stangl. For the first four years after 
22 this agreement Mr. Wade did pay as per the 
23 apportionment; is that correct? 
24 A That's correct. 
25 Q During that four year period did Mr. 
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1 Wade ever tell you anything such as, "This is not part 
2 of the agreement," or, "I have no agreement to pay 
3 that." 
4 A No, he did not. 
5 Q Now, during that 1978 through 1981 time 
6 period, you first paid the taxes, then Mr. Wade 
7 reimbursed you; is that correct? 
8 A That's correct. 
9 Q All right. Mr. Wade quit paying you 
10 after 1981; is that correct? On the taxes? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q Now, did you continue to pay the taxes? 
13 A Yes, sir. 
14 Q Have you paid the taxes every year 
15 except 1990? 
16 A That's correct. 
17 MR. CROCKETT: Your Honor, one of the 
18 deficiencies of the stipulation which we noticed is 
19 that as per the stipulation, upon being awarded a 
20 judgment, Mr. Stangl would pay the 1990 taxes, because 
21 those figures are included in there, and since it 
22 wasn't broken out. 
23 I have talked to Mr. Nelson, and he 
24 understood the relevance of it is that if Mr. Stangl is 
25 awarded a judgment and collects the money, he will pay 
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1 the taxes. 
2 I want to put that money portion in there. 
3 MR. NELSON: That's correct, Your Honor. 
4 MR. CROCKETT: Okay. And besides paying 
5 the taxes, I want to call your attention to paragraph 
6 13 of the stipulation, the last sentence, Judge. You 
7 will see that the last sentence is stricken out. That 
8 was one portion we were not able to agree on, so I want 
9 to put some evidence on. It's on page 7. And it's the 
10 last sentence of paragraph 13. 
11 Now, that sentence says, "This amount should 
12 properly be considered a tax-related expense inuring to 
13 the benefit of both parties, and therefore, added to 
14 the tax amount for 1989 to be apportioned between the 
15 parties, along with the taxes for that year." 
16 That's the Strategis. 
17 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Let me show you what 
18 has been marked as the exhibit next in order, Exhibit 
19 "RM. 
20 THE COURT: The record should indicate 
21 that this Exhibit "R" is not part of the stipulation. 
22 MR. CROCKETT: That's correct, Your 
23 Honor. 
24 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Mr. Stangl, I've 
25 handed you what's been marked as Exhibit "R", Can you 
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1 identify that document for the court. 
2 A At the top of Exhibit "R" it indicates 
3 "Strategis, asset valuation and management." It has me 
4 listed as a client, has the location of a property as 
5 775 East 9300 South, and then has on it calculations 
6 where they have calculated what the original value of 
7 the land was, what the adjusted value is after they 
8 appeal the value of the land to Salt Lake County, had 
9 the adjusted amount, had the amount of the original tax 
10 and the amount of the adjusted taxes after they refined 
11 it. 
12 Q You're going a little too far right now. 
13 What I would like you to do is to explain to the court 
14 what happened with regard to Strategis. 
15 A Strategis is a professional tax 
16 protesting company, and they will, for a percentage of 
17 the amount they get the property tax reduced, take to 
18 the County taxing authority your position and attempt 
19 to get those taxes reduced for you. 
20 They did that for us on this combination of 
21 Wade and Stangl property, for this year in question, 
22 and did get a reduction for us. They charged us 1/3 of 
23 the amount they saved us. They saved us $15,000, and 
24 they charged us $5,087 for doing it. 
25 Q And that $5,087 they charged you for 
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1 saving that $15,000 in taxes, did you add that to the 
2 money you deem Mr. Wade owes you. 
3 A His prorated share of it, yes. 
4 Q Just his prorated share? 
5 A Yes. 
6 MR. CROCKETT: All right. Now, I don't 
7 believe that the calculation is disputed. The only 
8 question is legally whether or not we are entitled to 
9 have that added in; is that correct? 
10 MR. NELSON: That's correct. 
11 MR. CROCKETT: We would offer Exhibit 
12 "R" on that basis. 
13 MR. CROCKETT: I have no objection. 
14 THE COURT: "R" is received. 
15 MR. CROCKETT: So in the stipulation the 
16 figures include the prorated share of the tax reduction 
17 to the entire property. And if necessary, we can argue 
18 the legality of that particular portion right there. 
19 THE COURT: All right. 
20 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Mr. Stangl, over the 
21 years you have improved various portions of that 
22 property; is that correct? 
23 A Yes, sir. 
24 Q And as those portions have been 
25 improved, the tax picture changes; is that correct? 
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1 A Yes, sir. 
2 MR. CROCKETT: Part of our stipulation, 
3 I think, is that Mr. Nelson recognizes that as those 
4 properties were improved, they were withdrawn from the 
5 taxing pool. So we only compared raw land to raw land. 
6 Is that correct, Mr. Nelson? 
7 MR. NELSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
8 MR. CROCKETT: That will save some time. 
9 If that's clear to the court. Okay. I have no further 
10 questions, Your Honor. 
11 CROSS EXAMINATION 
12 BY MR. NELSON: 
13 Q Good morning, Mr. Stangl. 
14 A Likewise. 
15 Q If I don't speak loud enough for you, 
16 please let me know. 
17 A Thank you. 
18 Q With respect to Exhibit "R", which you 
19 just identified, could you tell me if, prior to the 
20 hearing today, and as far as the attempt to lower the 
21 taxes, did you discuss that situation with Mr. Wade? 
22 A I did not. 
23 Q Did not obtain his approval to hire that 
24 company to do that job? 
25 A That's correct. 
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1 Q Could you tell me why you didn't do it 
2 yourself? 
3 A Why I didn't do the job myself? 
4 Q Yes. 
5 A In my opinion, Strategis was probably 
6 better qualified to do this job than I was, 
7 Q Why? 
8 A They are in that business. I still have 
9 them do work for me, and I don't do all of my own work. 
10 In certain instances, I think they are better qualified 
11 because they are once removed from the ownership of the 
12 property, and they are representing to the taxing 
13 authorities as an independent party what the values 
14 are, and they aren't emotionally charged with whether 
15 or not you, as the taxing authority, are charging me 
16 too much money. 
17 I think it's a fair way to establish the 
18 value for whatever service they did, because their 
19 agency is accepted in the community as a professional 
20 in doing this. The price they charge is accepted as a 
21 fair price for that. 
22 And because of that, I think it was a fair 
23 approach all the way around. That's why I did it. 
24 Q You indicated that you think the price 
25 they charged was a fair price. What do you base that 
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1 upon? 
2 A What charge other people in the industry 
3 that do the same thing that they do charge for their 
4 work. 
5 Q Do you believe you could have hired 
6 someone else and done it cheaper? 
7 A I think I may have hired someone else, 
8 but someone else of the same qualifications would have 
9 charged the same price. They have a fairly standard 
10 pricing in the industry, and these people follow that 
11 fairly standard pricing. 
12 Q Have you ever personally filed an appeal 
13 yourself on any property that you own? 
14 A I have. 
15 Q Have you been successful in doing so? 
16 A I have been both. I have been 
17 unsuccessful, and I have also lost. 
18 Q So you do have some experience in doing 
19 that yourself? 
20 A I do. 
21 Q Let's go back to the first part of your 
22 testimony and work towards the end. With respect to 
23 this closing that you testified that occurred in 1978 
24 at the time you sold the property to Mr. Wade. 
25 A Yes, sir. 
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1 Q Do you know where that closing took 
2 place? 
3 A I don't. 
4 Q Do you know that a formal closing in 
5 fact took place? 
6 A I know a formal closing did take place. 
7 I was not there. I was out of the country the day the 
8 property closed. 
9 Q Have you seen a closing statement? 
10 A I'm sure I have. 
11 Q I noticed that none of the exhibits your 
12 counsel has introduced consist of any of the closing 
13 documents, other than the contract itself. My question 
14 to you, sir: Have you seen other documents, other than 
15 the contract? 
16 A I have seen literally hundreds of 
17 documents. I don't know for sure what you mean. 
18 Q Let me rephrase the question. With 
19 respect to this closing that you testified took place, 
20 a formal closing, what other documents, other than the 
21 contract, which is Exhibit "A", were executed as part 
22 of that closing? 
23 A I don't recall that. If you want to 
24 show me some and have me look at them, I would be glad 
25 to do that. But I don't have a recollection of it. 
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1 Q You testified Mr. Wade took a portion of 
2 the taxes at that closing based upon the square footage 
3 of the property, as opposed to the fair market value of 
4 the respective parties, 
5 How do you know he agreed to that? 
6 A I'm not really sure that that's what my 
7 testimony was. I don't know that I said that at 
8 closing he agreed to do that. 
9 Q Well, let me -- could you look at 
10 paragraph 6 of Exhibit "A". Perhaps I misunderstood 
11 your testimony. Do you have that, Mr. Stangl? 
12 A I do. 
13 Q That's a paragraph that indicates that 
14 the 1978 taxes will be prorated at closing, does it 
15 not? 
16 A That's correct. 
17 Q And I thought I understood your 
18 testimony to say that the taxes were prorated based 
19 upon square footage, rather than fair market value for 
20 purposes of this paragraph. 
21 A I think that's true. 
22 Q How do you know that's true? 
23 A I think I have reviewed some place, some 
24 time in the last nine years, that this has been in 
25 issue, things that related to the closing of this 
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1 property and purchases of property by Stan, I think at 
2 the time I determined that the property taxes were 
3 apportioned like this contract says. 
4 MR. CROCKETT: The first letter in 
5 Exhibit "PM breaks out the closing. You have to get 
6 the tax notice at the end of the year. 
7 MR. NELSON: I appreciate the help, but 
8 I guess what I would like to do is ask what documents 
9 he has reviewed. I thought I heard him say that he was 
10 certain that was the way it was done. 
11 Q (By Mr. Nelson) Did you not? Earlier 
12 with Mr. Crockett asking the question? 
13 A I said that I thought the tax had been 
14 apportioned the way this contract called for it, yes. 
15 Q Would you tell me where it says in the 
16 contract that the property should be assessed on a 
17 square footage basis, as opposed to a fair market 
18 value? 
19 A I don't think it says in the contract. 
20 I think what Steve asked me is whether or not the taxes 
21 were apportioned the way this contract says. And I 
22 think I said yes. And he then asked me whether they 
23 were apportioned by the year, and by the proportionate 
24 amount. And I think I answered yes to that, and I 
25 think that's what got done. 
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1 Q So not to belabor the point, but did you 
2 say you think it was done that way, or you are certain 
3 it was done that way, 
4 A I'm relatively certain. 
5 Q Could you tell me when any improvements 
6 were made on the property that you retained? 
7 A If you will describe for me what you 
8 mean by any improvements. They were done over a period 
9 of time, and I'll do the best I can from recollection 
10 to tell you which time which improvement was made. 
11 Q At the time you sold the property to Mr. 
12 Wade and retained a portion, was it all vacant 
13 property? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q When was the first time any improvement 
16 was made on the property that you retained? 
17 A If you've got something to prompt my 
18 memory, I'll be glad to use it with you. 
19 Q I don't. 
20 A We did a building for Firestone on a 
21 portion of the property toward the front, and I think 
22 that building was done in about 1988 or 1989. 
23 Q Were there any other improvements made 
24 on the property that you retained as part of this 
25 transaction? 
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1 A Yes, sir. After that I built another 
2 building for Hancock Fabrics, and I did that in about 
3 1990, I think. And there was on-site work relative to 
4 that which was also done at the same time. 
5 Q And that's the building you testified to 
6 previously? 
7 A Yes, sir. 
8 Q Were there any other improvements made 
9 on the property that you retained as part of this 
10 transaction? 
11 A I don't think so. 
12 Q I want to make sure I understand what 
13 your agreement was with Mr. Wade. Do I understand your 
14 testimony correctly to say that prior to the time you 
15 signed the contract, Exhibit "A", there had been no 
16 agreement between you and Mr. Wade as to how the 
17 property taxes would be apportioned? Is that correct? 
18 A I think that's accurate. 
19 Q And if I understand what you said 
20 earlier, you testified that the first time you made 
21 such an agreement with Mr. Wade was in 1980 in this 
22 conference in your office; is that correct? 
23 A Yes. I think that's correct. 
24 Q Had there been any other discussions 
25 between you and Mr. Wade wherein he confirmed his 
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1 alleged agreement to that manner of apportioning taxes? 
2 A He had taken actions that led me to 
3 believe that he had previously agreed to doing the same 
4 type of thing, on other property that I sold him at 
5 70th South and 23rd East. 
6 Q Subseguent to 1980, Mr. Stangl. Let's 
7 confine it to this property. And subseguent to the 
8 conversation in your office in 1980, did he have any 
9 conversations wherein he agreed that that was the 
10 proper way to apportion the taxes? 
11 A Stanley and I did not discuss things 
12 really between the two of us. Especially as it related 
13 to the property tax. My wife handled the property 
14 taxes. And between Stan and me, Stan and I, we met to 
15 determine what things she and he and I would agree to, 
16 what we did agree to, and I told my wife what the 
17 agreement was, and my wife administered the agreement 
18 that Stan and I had with each other. Stan and she 
19 would do so in letters back and forth between Stan and 
20 I and Stan and my company. 
21 Q But other than this 1980 conversation 
22 that you had with Mr. Wade, did you have any other 
2 3 conversation wherein he allegedly reconfirmed that was 
24 the proper arrangement or apportionment? 
25 A Not that I can recall. 
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1 Q Are you aware of any written documents 
2 executed by Mr. Wade wherein he agreed that that was 
3 the proper way to apportion taxes? 
4 A I think each of the checks that Stan 
5 Wade sent back, each of the times that he sent them 
6 back, were ratification or written proof that he was 
7 agreeing to that. And he did that more than once. 
8 Q All right. Are there any other written 
9 documents that you can call to my attention, other than 
10 the checks that were sent to you? 
11 A Not that I recall. 
12 MR. NELSON: Your Honor, I believe 
13 that's all the cross examination I have of Mr. Stangl. 
14 I intend to call him as a witness myself, but I'll get 
15 into those issues when I do that. 
16 THE COURT: All right. 
17 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
18 BY MR. CROCKETT: 
19 Q I have just a moment of redirect here, 
20 Your Honor. 
21 Mr. Stangl, the first page of Exhibit HPM is 
22 the actual calculation for the property tax that would 
23 apply during 1978, the year that Mr. Wade brought the 
24 property; is that correct? 
25 A Yes, sir. 
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1 Q And that shows it by square footage, 
2 does it not? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q Also by time, does it not? 
5 A It does. 
6 MR. CROCKETT: I would also point out, 
7 Your Honor, in paragraph 11 of the stipulation, the 
8 stipulation -- and also as evidenced by the documents 
9 attached as Exhibit "P", the amount paid by Wade during 
10 the above listed years, and that was '78 through '81, 
11 and were based on the acreage or square footage of the 
12 land owned by Mr. Wade, as compared to the total amount 
13 of land in the consolidated transaction. I don't think 
14 that was a disputed issue in terms of how that was 
15 done. 
16 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Sir, you say you 
17 didn't discuss this very much with Mr. Wade. Why was 
18 that? 
19 A Stan didn't like to return telephone 
20 calls, and has some aversion to talking to people over 
21 the telephone. All the time I have tried to get in 
22 touch with him, he wouldn't take the call. Or didn't. 
23 Q Were there various times you tried to 
24 get in touch with him? 
25 A Many. 
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1 Q Prior to this meeting you testified 
2 about, did you wait on the telephone for an extended 
3 period of time for him to come to the phone? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Is that one of the reasons that caused 
6 you to remember the meeting so well? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Why don't you describe what happened in 
9 that telephone conversation so that we will understand 
10 why it sticks out in your mind. 
11 A It's probably one of the more memorable 
12 ones I ever had. I had tried several times to get hold 
13 of Stan, and I finally thought that the best time to 
14 get hold of someone who is so difficult to get hold of 
15 would be early in the morning. Early in the morning is 
16 relative, but I tried at 6:30, 7:00 o'clock. And one 
17 last time I called at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning 
18 and asked for him, and he was in the shower. And I 
19 said, "Then I'm — this was his wife that answered the 
20 phone, and I told her that I was going to continue to 
21 hold on that phone until he finally got out of the 
22 shower, that it was important that I meet with him and 
23 that I talk with him, and that I wasn't going to leave 
24 the phone until I finished talking to him. 
25 And I waited on that phone for well over an 
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1 hour, maybe as much as an hour and a half, before that 
2 shower was finished and Stan took my call. And when 
3 Stan came to my office and talked to me about it, I 
4 told him from that minute forward he and I were going 
5 to have to meet and talk face to face, rather than over 
6 the phone. And if he ever called me I was going to be 
7 in the shower. And that he could come to my office and 
8 visit me at my office, instead of that. 
9 It took place -- I remember that as vividly 
10 as I can remember anything. 
11 Q Did you in fact ever say you were in the 
12 shower when he called your office? 
13 A He did call the office and I did 
14 instruct my office secretary to tell him that I was in 
15 the shower, and if he wanted to come to my office and 
16 see me, he could. 
17 MR. CROCKETT: Nothing further, Your 
18 Honor. 
19 MR. NELSON: Nothing. 
20 THE COURT: All right. You may step 
21 down, Mr. Stangl. Thank you for your testimony. 
22 MR. CROCKETT: We would rest, Your 
23 Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Nelson? 
25 MR. NELSON: Your Honor, I'm going to 
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1 call Mr, Stangl now as my witness. But before we do 
2 that, one of the things I'm going to question him 
3 about, or that we might potentially question him about 
4 is the refund check of approximately $52,000 that was 
5 paid in the fall of 1989. 
6 I believe that counsel and I can stipulate to 
7 some of the matters and save a few minutes. 
8 THE COURT: Now, am I correct in 
9 assuming that there are no technical pleadings on this 
10 fifty thousand some odd dollar check? There may be 
11 some figures on it, but that by stipulation you are 
12 agreeing that that issue is to be resolved? 
13 MR. CROCKETT: The issue being that Mr. 
14 Nelson claimed that offset, so we ought to resolve it 
15 now. That's correct. 
16 THE COURT: Is that correct? 
17 MR. NELSON: I do. 
18 MR. CROCKETT: I think so, too. 
19 MR. NELSON: It was money that was paid 
20 as a result of a court order that taxes were owing. So 
21 it's on this exhibit issue, and the question is whether 
22 the money was ever refunded and should therefore apply 
23 to what is owing. Is that correct? 
24 MR. CROCKETT: I think that's correct. 
25 Whether or not the fifty-three thousand some odd 
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1 dollars should be credited. 
2 MR. NELSON: Your Honor, I believe 
3 counsel can stipulate that pursuant to Check No. 55499, 
4 dated November 28, 1989, in the amount of $53,776.00, 
5 F. C. Stangl Corporation made this check to Stanley L. 
6 Wade. 
7 I believe it can be further stipulated that 
8 that check was delivered to A. P. Schwenke on the 29th 
9 day of November, 1989, who executed a receipt therefor, 
10 signed "A. P. Schwenke on behalf of Stanley L. Wade." 
11 And I believe it can be further stipulated that Mr. 
12 Schwenke subsequently altered the check and placed 
13 additional payee information on it after the word 
14 "Stanley Wade," and he has apparently typed, "or A. 
15 Paul Schwenke, his attorney," and that subsequent to 
16 such action the check was deposited and cleared the 
17 bank and the deposit was signed on the back of the 
18 check, "For deposit only, A. Paul Schwenke." 
19 MR. CROCKETT: I have no objection to 
20 its introduction as an exhibit. With regard to the 
21 stipulation, the only difficulty I have is our 
22 stipulating that Mr. Schwenke is the one who modified 
23 the check. We will stipulate that the check was 
24 modified. Since we weren't there, I can't — 
25 THE COURT: Otherwise you will stipulate 
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1 as represented by Mr. Nelson. 
2 MR. CROCKETT: Yes, I will. 
3 THE COURT: Well, do we furthermore have 
4 a stipulation that at the time the check was issued, 
5 that as part of this report and in the file, as a 
6 practical matter, Mr. Schwenke was a lawyer in this 
7 litigation for and on behalf of Mr. Stanley Wade? 
8 MR. NELSON: We do not. 
9 MR. CROCKETT: You're going to hear some 
10 testimony on that, Your Honor. One other thing — but 
11 I think that part of the stipulation ought to be that 
12 the check was given to Mr. Schwenke by our firm at that 
13 point in time. 
14 THE COURT: Let me ask you this, so that 
15 I don't have to be poring through these two volumes of 
16 pleadings. Is there a stipulation that as of the date 
17 of the check there had been no withdrawal by Mr. 
18 Schwenke from the lawsuit in accordance with Rule 4-506 
19 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
20 MR. CROCKETT: A very interesting 
21 document has come to light in the last couple of days. 
22 There was a notice of withdrawal signed by Mr. 
23 Schwenke, dated March 7, 1989, that we would testify 
24 and that's what they stipulated to in chambers, that if 
25 called to testify he would testify that one was never 
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1 delivered to me. 
2 I don't know if one is in the court file. I 
3 know Mr. Nelson was going to check that. Our position 
4 is that none was given to me. Further, that within ten 
5 days of this purported notice there were other 
6 pleadings that were filed by Mr. Schwenke in this case, 
7 and in fact, after this date the very pleas that went 
8 to the Supreme Court that resulted in the refund are 
9 signed by Mr. Schwenke. That ought to be noted because 
10 it's part of the record in this case. 
11 MR. NELSON: Your Honor, I can't 
12 stipulate as to what pleadings were subsequently signed 
13 by Mr. Schwenke, but obviously the record would reflect 
14 that. 
15 THE COURT: I'm going to ask the clerk 
16 at this time to call up the docket sheet on this case 
17 and to focus on the period of time from the first of 
18 March, 1989, forward, and tell me if that sequence or 
19 docket sheet indicates at any time there was a 
20 withdrawal of counsel filed. If so, the date. And 
21 whether we can tell from that who was making the 
22 withdrawal. That will be a quicker way to see. While 
23 she is doing that, will you refresh my memory? When 
24 was the Notice of Appeal filed? Approximately when? I 
25 note that the Supreme Court decision is dated — well, 
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1 I guess technically the Supreme Court is --
2 MR. CROCKETT: 6/14/89. So it would be 
3 June 14, 1989, which postdates the purported 
4 withdrawal. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. And the remittitur 
6 issued in this case from the Supreme Court, October 5, 
7 1989, it was forwarded to Mr. Schwenke. I guess I 
8 should also note that for some reason -- it's not 
9 something that would even be a part of the file, 
10 because it is a handwritten note by me, but this is on 
11 the remittitur, stating, "Received by hand delivery 
12 from Chief Justice law clerk, 10/25/89." 
13 MR. NELSON: Are you indicating that the 
14 remittitur is part of the record, Your Honor? 
15 THE COURT: It is. All right. We will 
16 proceed while she is looking for that. 
17 MR. NELSON: I think that is all the 
18 stipulation, but I would offer Exhibits "S", "T", "U", 
19 and "V", which is the purported Notice of Withdrawal. 
20 THE COURT: Is there any objection to 
21 "S", which appears to be the original check --
22 MR. CROCKETT: Do you have the original? 
23 Could I see the exhibits for a moment? I pulled them 
24 from their exhibit list, but I don't know which one 
25 we're talking about. 
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1 MR. NELSON: Exhibit "S" is the 
2 photocopy of the check. 
3 MR. CROCKETT: No objection, Your Honor. 
4 MR. NELSON: Exhibit "T" is the receipt 
5 signed by Schwenke. 
6 MR. CROCKETT: No objection. 
7 MR. NELSON: Exhibit MUM is the check 
8 and endorsement as altered. 
9 MR. CROCKETT: No objection. 
10 MR. NELSON: And Exhibit "V" is the 
11 document purportedly signed by Mr. Schwenke and dated 
12 March 7, 1989 as his Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel. 
13 MR. CROCKETT: No objection 
14 THE COURT: US", "T", "U" and "V" are 
15 received. 
16 MR. NELSON: Would you like me to 
17 proceed, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Let me just ask this. I 
19 haven't had a lot of success so far, but let me try it 
20 again. Counsel will stipulate that following the date 
21 of Exhibit "V", the withdrawal, that there were filings 
22 made by Mr. Schwenke in this case; correct? 
23 MR. NELSON: I cannot stipulate. I 
24 haven't reviewed the record. The court can tell me 
25 what is in the record, if it is relevant. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, let me just indicate 
2 that I'll take judicial notice that there were 
3 subsequent filings by Mr. Schwenke. 
4 MR. NELSON: Between the date of March 
5 7, 1989 and the date of the check, November 28, 1989. 
6 THE COURT: Yes. And I'm looking at one 
7 right now called Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and 
8 Authorities in Response to Defendant's Memorandum and 
9 Motion for Imposition of Sanctions, dated the 13th of 
10 November, 1989. I'm assuming there are more. That's 
11 just an example. 
12 MR. CROCKETT: We'll be putting a couple 
13 of others on as evidence, too, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: All right. 
15 THE CLERK: He filed a Notice on January 
16 14, 1991. That's when the other counsel made his 
17 appearance. 
18 MR. CROCKETT: So the record is correct, 
19 did I understand that the only record that the court 
20 clerk could find was the notice of withdrawal on 
21 January 14, 1991. 
22 THE CLERK: Right. 
23 THE COURT: Well, just while we are 
24 doing this, I think some elaboration on that is 
25 necessary because my memory is being jogged a little 
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1 bit. There was an affidavit of plaintiff representing 
2 on representation of Mr. Schwenke, isn't there? 
3 MR. CROCKETT: There is, Your Honor. 
4 That's part of what I was going to do with Mr. Wade 
5 when he testifies about this matter. 
6 THE COURT: That is referenced from this 
7 summary decision and order of January 22, 1991. All 
8 right. In pieces some of this is going to come back to 
9 me. All right. Go ahead, Mr. Nelson. 
10 MR. NELSON: I would like to call Mr. 
11 Stangl to the stand. 
12 F. C. STANGL 
13 having been previously sworn, was examined and 
14 testified on his oath as follows: 
15 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
16 BY MR. NELSON: 
17 THE COURT: You realize you are still 
18 under oath, don't you? 
19 MR. STANGL: Yes. 
20 Q (By Mr. Nelson) Mr. Stangl, you earlier 
21 testified that you moved to Utah in 1960, and since 
22 that time you have been a real estate developer; is 
23 that correct? 
24 A Yes, sir. 
25 Q How many properties have you 
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1 individually in your name, would you guess, have you 
2 bought and sold in the last 31 years? 
3 A More than 100. 
4 Q Would there be additional properties 
5 with which you were involved that may be in the names 
6 of other parties or corporations? 
7 A Yes, sir. 
8 Q Would it be fair to say that you are 
9 fairly familiar with the mechanics of buying and 
10 selling real estate in Utah? 
11 A I still get lessons daily, but I'm 
12 familiar with it, yes. 
13 Q You are familiar, are you not, with the 
14 way in which real estate is taxed within the State of 
15 Utah? 
16 A I still get lessons on that daily, but 
17 I'm relatively familiar with it, yes. 
18 Q And you are aware, are you not, that 
19 property in Utah is taxed based on its fair market 
20 value, are you not? 
21 A That's what they say. I don't 
22 necessarily agree with the taxing authorities on 
23 whether they say fair market value as fair market 
24 value. That's my position to do that. I know on the 
25 assessment that I see, that's what they write on it. 
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1 Q I'm not asking you whether you agree 
2 with their assessment. I'm asking you if you 
3 understand that the way they attempt to assess 
4 properties is by an alleged fair market value. That's 
5 correct, is it not? 
6 A That's what they state, yes. 
7 Q In all the properties that you have 
8 bought and sold in your individual name, have you 
9 personally ever paid taxed based on square footage, 
10 other than this parcel we are talking about today? 
11 A I'm sure I have. 
12 Q Would it not be fair to say that in the 
13 vast majority of the cases, properties that you have 
14 owned you have paid taxes based upon the alleged fair 
15 market value, rather than the size of the parcel; is 
16 that true? 
17 A What you are doing is separating the 
18 normal conditions from an abnormal condition. And 
19 while it's a fact that most of the properties that I 
20 pay taxes on, I pay based on the assessment that I get 
21 from the assessor. If that's the case, then all of the 
22 time that's all based on what the assessor puts on the 
23 value, based on the fair market value. 
24 But when there is an apportioning of a 
25 property, you have to do it some other way, and the way 
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1 we did it on the property we are talking about was 
2 apportioning that property based on the square footage, 
3 how much is owned by one person and how much is owned 
4 by the other. 
5 Q If I understand you correctly, you're 
6 telling me that it is normal to pay based upon the 
7 alleged assessment, but in this particular case you 
8 made a different deal. Is that what you're telling me? 
9 A I said what I said, and I think that may 
10 have been what I said. 
11 Q Thank you, Mr. Stangl. Could you tell 
12 me, if you know, who drafted Exhibit "A", the sales 
13 contract, wherein you sold property to Mr. Wade? 
14 A I believe Dennis Morrell from the firm 
15 of Prince, Yeates drafted it. 
16 Q Was he your attorney at that time? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q When did you acquire the entire 
19 consolidated parcel, and by that I mean the property 
20 you retained and the parcel that you sold to Mr. Wade? 
21 Do you recall? 
22 A Sometime prior to 1987. Not too very 
23 long before that. Maybe as close to it as a year. 
24 Maybe less than a year. 
25 Q Mr. Stangl, did you acquire this 
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1 consolidated parcel of property from individuals named 
2 Ralph Tolman and Betty Tolman? 
3 A That's correct. 
4 Q Did you enter into a purchase agreement 
5 with them to purchase that property? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q I would like to show you what we have 
8 had marked as Exhibit "A", and ask you if you can tell 
9 me if that is the document by which you purchased that 
10 property? 
11 A It looks like it is. 
12 Q What's the date of that purchase? 
13 A The date on the front of the agreement 
14 is December 29, 1977. 
15 Q Is that the approximate date, to the 
16 best of your memory, that you purchased the property? 
17 A I think so. 
18 Q That would be approximately six months 
19 before you resold part of it to Mr. Wade, would it not? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q And what was the purchase price for 
22 which you paid or agreed to pay to the Tolmans? 
23 A The amount stated in the agreement under 
24 paragraph 1 is $457,000. That fits with what I 
25 remember. 
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1 Q Do you recall the amount of the purchase 
2 price on Exhibit "A" to Mr. Wade? If you have it in 
3 front of you, you are welcome to --
4 A It's about two hundred three thousand, 
5 two hundred six thousand. 
6 THE COURT: It's two hundred sixty one 
7 
8 MR. NELSON: I believe $200,100; is that 
9 correct? 
10 THE WITNESS: It does. Paragraph 1. 
11 Q (By Mr. Nelson) Do you have any 
12 knowledge as to whether the property of this 
13 consolidated piece had increased in value between the 
14 time you purchased it and the time you sold it to Mr. 
15 Wade during that six month period? 
16 A I — I don't think so. I think it was 
17 about the same. 
18 Q All right. And so if my math is 
19 correct, you purchased property in December of 1977 for 
20 $457,000 and you sold part of it to Mr. Wade six months 
21 later for $206,100; is that correct? 
22 A That's correct. 
23 Q And as a result, differences between the 
24 purchase price of the consolidated piece and the piece 
25 that you sold to Mr. Wade was $251,000 approximately; 
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1 is that correct? 
2 A If your math is correct, yes, 
3 Q Was that, to the best of your knowledge, 
4 the approximate fair market value of the parcel you 
5 retained? 
6 A I don't know that I -- I must have 
7 thought so at the time. I don't know what fair market 
8 value has to do with anything. Two people decide what 
9 they will do with each other. I decided I would sell 
10 Stan property for $206,100. Tolman decided he would 
11 sell me property for $457,000, and we both thought 
12 those were correct. 
13 Q At the time you sold the property to Mr. 
14 Wade did you still believe that the remainder parcel of 
15 property that you retained had a value of at least 
16 $251,000? 
17 A Yes, sir. 
18 Q In light of the fact that your property, 
19 your retained property, was worth more than the Wade 
20 parcel, and in light of the fact that you've testified 
21 that you were aware of the way property taxes are 
22 assessed in Utah, based upon the alleged fair market 
23 value, can you tell me why you want to make an 
24 agreement with Mr. Wade to have him pay more than you 
25 are in tax, more than you are paying? 
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1 A I don't think I made an agreement so he 
2 would pay more taxes than I would pay. What I did was 
3 I made an agreement that would save us both money, that 
4 if we divided those two properties, his was probably 
5 worth more than what he was paying for it, and he would 
6 have had a new assessment, I would have had a new 
7 assessment, and we would have both been charged more 
8 money. 
9 There was no reason to do that. We had 
10 assessments that were already established and 
11 established what the values of the property were at the 
12 time. That assessment, if my memory is correct, is 
13 less than what the purchase price was, which also shows 
14 that fair market value doesn't have a heck of a lot to 
15 do with it. 
16 Q I'm not asking the question — 
17 MR. CROCKETT: Objection. I think he's 
18 responding, Your Honor. You have got to give him a 
19 chance to finish. 
20 MR. NELSON: I would be glad to let him 
21 finish, if he hasn't. 
22 THE COURT: Are you finished? 
23 THE WITNESS: What I was doing was 
24 something that was good for Stan and good for me. And 
25 that's what we did, and it made sense to do it that 
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1 way. 
2 Q (By Mr- Nelson) I beg your pardon, Mr. 
3 Stangl, but when your property is worth more than his, 
4 and taking the position with the court that he should 
5 pay 70% of the taxes of the consolidated parcel, I 
6 agree that is certainly to your benefit. 
7 But the question I'm not asking is, did he 
8 pay less taxes by doing it that way than he would have 
9 if you had split the parcels up. I'm asking why you 
10 felt it was fair to make an agreement at that point in 
11 time prior to the split up of the parcels that he 
12 should pay 70% of the tax when your property was worth 
13 more than his. 
14 A If you want me to go through the 
15 mathematics for you more completely than what I did, I 
16 will. I think I have already answered your question. 
17 But his share and my share were less, the way we did 
18 it, than they would have been had we gotten a fresh 
19 assessment, divided the properties and each paid the 
20 assessor the amount the assessor would have wished us 
21 to. 
22 Q You are, however, taking the position in 
23 court that Mr. Wade should be responsible for 70% of 
24 the tax — the assessed tax for that consolidated 
25 parcel, are you not? 
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1 A If that's what the county claims, yes. 
2 Q Have you received the 1991 tax notice on 
3 the parcel of property? 
4 A I don't know whether I have or not. I 
5 don't think I have. 
6 Q It would go without saying, then, that 
7 you haven't forwarded a copy of that to Mr. Wade for 
8 payment, have you? For 1991? 
9 A I believe what we did, in 1990, I think 
10 we filed -- we requested somehow from the assessor that 
11 they separate the assessments, and I think they did. 
12 And I think they may have sent that directly to Stan. 
13 If they didn't, I may have gotten it. I just 
14 simply don't know for sure what came to me. 
15 Q Let's talk about the dividing up of the 
16 property, Mr. Stangl. Let's talk for a moment about 
17 your attempt to divide the property into two taxing 
18 parcels. 
19 A Uh huh. 
20 Q You testified that at the time you sold 
21 the property it was taxed as one entire piece of 
22 property, thus creating this dilemma of how to 
23 apportion the taxes; is that correct? 
24 A That's correct. 
25 Q And did you make any attempt to split up 
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1 the property following the purchase by Mr. Wade so that 
2 they would be taxed as two separate parcels? 
3 A That's why Stan and I met and talked, 
4 was to discuss whether to do that or not. I did not do 
5 that on my own. 
6 Q Have you, subsequent to 1978, ever made 
7 an attempt to split up the property into two separate 
8 tax parcels? 
9 A Not in two separate tax parcels. What I 
10 have done since then is, when I sold the Firestone 
11 portion of the part that I owned, and filed a Quit 
12 Claim Deed to myself for that piece and a general deed 
13 for someone else when I sold it that separated the 
14 Firestone parcel from it. When I did the same thing 
15 relative to the piece of Hancock Fabric parcel and 
16 separated it from the parcel known as the Stan Wade 
17 parcel, and it's a remainder parcel now because of the 
18 fact the others were separated from it. 
19 Q Is it your testimony that the reason you 
20 never requested the properties be separated between 
21 yourself and Mr. Wade for taxing purposes was because 
22 of your fear that it would raise the property taxes? 
23 A That's one of the reasons. 
24 Q Could you have done so if you had wanted 
25 to? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q And it is your testimony that every time 
3 you sold off a piece of property you filed a Quit Claim 
4 Deed with the County Recorder in order to do that on 
5 those properties, did you not? 
6 A I don't know that I filed a Quit Claim 
7 Deed with the County Recorder. I did whatever the 
8 County Recorder required and what the lender required 
9 and what the buyer required to properly deed the 
10 property. 
11 Q Showing you Exhibit "X", Mr. Stangl, 
12 this purports to be a Quit Claim Deed signed by you on 
13 the 21st day of February, 1990. Does that deal with 
14 property which is the subject of this lawsuit? 
15 A I can tell that it deals with property 
16 that's at the ninety two and seventh east location. 
17 Whether it deals with property that's the subject of 
18 this lawsuit, I can't tell. I can't tell. It looks 
19 like a legal description what it's for. 
20 Q Regardless of what property that was, 
21 was it filed for the intent of splitting up one parcel 
22 into more than one parcel for tax purposes? 
23 A I believe it was. 
24 Q In fact, it states that on the deed, 
25 does it not? 
59 
1 A It does. 
2 Q And that deed is from yourself to 
3 yourself, is it not? 
4 A That's correct. 
5 Q So at least as of that date you knew how 
6 to split up the property into separate taxing parcels, 
7 did you not? 
8 A That's correct. 
9 Q Did Mr. Wade make all of his payments 
10 owing under the contract to you? 
11 A As far as I know. 
12 MR. NELSON: I believe, Your Honor, the 
13 stipulation which we've executed indicates that all 
14 those payments were made. 
15 Q (By Mr. Nelson) Mr. Stangl, do you know 
16 whether the payments were all timely made? 
17 A I know they weren't. 
18 Q What payments -- or could you explain to 
19 me by that what you mean when you say they weren't 
20 timely made? 
21 A Over the course of the contract he made 
22 the payments eventually and we got the money, but we 
2 3 never got it on time. 
24 Q Let me ask you if the contract was paid 
25 out on the date or paid by the time that it was 
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1 anticipated under the contract of 1979. 
2 A I don't know that for sure one way or 
3 another. 
4 Q If my calculations are correct, the last 
5 payment would have been made either in December of 1984 
6 or January of '85; is that correct? Does that square 
7 with your memory? 
8 A I don't know. You could be right. I 
9 have no reason to doubt it. 
10 Q Mr. Stangl, do you hold a real estate 
11 license? 
12 A I do. 
13 Q How long have you held that license? 
14 A Since about 1961. 
15 Q Have you had it continuously since that 
16 date? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q It's current now? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q With respect to the check that you gave 
21 to Mr. Wade, this refund check of $52,000 — 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Did it in fact clear your account? 
24 MR. CROCKETT: Objection. Just so he's 
25 clear, he gave it to us and we gave it to Mr. Schwenke 
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1 and he gave it to Mr. Wade. 
2 Q (By Mr. Nelson) Did that check in fact 
3 clear your account? 
4 A I think so. 
5 Q When is the first time you became aware 
6 that there might have been an alteration to that 
7 document? 
8 A When Stan Wade called me one day and 
9 asked me to pull the check out and look at it. And I 
10 did that. 
11 Q Would that have been about a year ago, 
12 in the fall of 1990? 
13 A It very well could have been. 
14 Q Prior to that time you had no idea that 
15 there had been an alteration to that check? 
16 A That's correct. 
17 Q Have you taken any steps to attempt to 
18 determine from the bank if they are willing to take any 
19 responsibility for the cashing of that check? 
20 A No. 
21 Q Have you done anything to attempt to 
22 determine if someone else should return the funds for 
23 that check? 
24 A I've had discussions with my attorney. 
25 But other than that, nothing. 
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1 MR. NELSON: I think that's all the 
2 questions I have, Your Honor. 
3 MR. CROCKETT: I have nothing. 
4 THE COURT: You may step down. Thank 
5 you, Mr. Stangl. 
6 MR. NELSON: I would like to call Mr. 
7 Wade to the stand. 
8 STANLEY L. WADE 
9 having been duly sworn, was examined and testified on 
10 his oath as follows: 
11 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 BY MR. NELSON: 
13 Q Would you state your full name, please, 
14 for the record. 
15 A Stanley Wade. 
16 Q Mr. Wade, did you execute a document in 
17 1978 which is in front of you as Exhibit "A", wherein 
18 you agreed to purchase some property from Mr. Stangl 
19 located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah? 
20 A I don't see Exhibit "A". Okay. Yes. 
21 Q Prior to signing that document did you 
22 ever have any discussion with Mr. Wade on the method 
23 upon which -- with Mr. Stangl — did you have any 
24 discussions with him as to the method that would be 
25 used to prorate taxes on the property? 
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1 A No, I did not. 
2 Q Did you ever have a discussion with Mr. 
3 Stangl on how the property taxes should be prorated? 
4 A Yes. There was approximately three. 
5 Q Could you tell me very briefly when the 
6 first of those three occurred. 
7 A Right when I received the tax notice, 
8 after the first year. 
9 Q Would that have been before or after 
10 this 1980 conversation that Mr. Stangl — 
11 A That would be after. 
12 Q Where did that occur? 
13 A At his office. 
14 Q Who was present? 
15 A Mr. and Mr. Stangl. 
16 Q Tell me briefly what was said by him. 
17 A Basically I said, "I don't quite 
18 understand these property taxes." I says, "You know 
19 they are based on square footage." And I says, "You 
20 know this is not acceptable. I thought it was supposed 
21 to be based on, you know, value." And he said, "Well 
22 — " And I said, "Why don't we break the parcel out. 
2 3 In other words, you know, I will pay my portion and you 
24 pay your portion." 
25 He said, "Well, I really don't want to do 
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1 that because what will happen is that we'll both end up 
2 paying more." 
3 Q All right. 
4 A And then basically he said, you know, I 
5 figure -- well, on a square foot — we had another 
6 reason also. We were negotiating -- he was planning on 
7 building on it, and I was planning on building and 
8 maybe possibly putting a development in the back, too. 
9 Q Mr. Wade, let me just ask you to relate 
10 the portions of the conversation that related to the 
11 method in which he and you wanted to apportion taxes. 
12 You just testified that he indicated that you made some 
13 objection to that method. 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q The method that he suggested. 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q And that he said he wanted to do it the 
18 square footage way? 
19 A Yes. He said that's the way he — yes. 
20 Q Did you agree at that time to do it on 
21 the square footage assessment? 
22 A No. 
23 Q When was the next conversation or the 
24 second conversation of the three you mentioned? 
25 A It was approximately — it was about 
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1 another six or seven months after that, 
2 Q Where did that conversation take place. 
3 A Same place. 
4 Q Who was present? 
5 A Me and Mr. Stangl. 
6 Q And again on this topic, tell me again 
7 what was said and by whom. 
8 A I basically said that the property taxes 
9 are not -- I won't accept them the way, you know, you 
10 are breaking them out. And he basically said, "If you 
11 don't like it, get out of the bank." 
12 Q Do you know what he meant by, "Get out 
13 of the bank"? 
14 A I don't know. And he said, "If you 
15 don't like the contract the way I'm doing it, get —" 
16 I guess -- discontinue it or whatever. And that's what 
17 he did. He sent me some documents saying that to -- to 
18 do something about — discontinuing the contract, or 
19 something like that. 
20 Q Did you, at that second meeting, which 
21 was actually the third meeting if you count the one Mr. 
22 Stangl testified to. 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Did you agree to pay taxes based on the 
25 square footage basis? 
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1 A No. 
2 Q Describe for me when the third meeting 
3 you just indicated took place. 
4 A It was approximately about another six 
5 or seven months, I guess. Approximately. After that. 
6 Q Did it take place in his office? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q You and he were present? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q And again, tell me what was said by 
11 either you or Mr. Stangl. 
12 A Basically the same thing. We talked 
13 about the property taxes again, because he said, "Well, 
14 the payments on the property taxes have not been 
15 adjusted correctly," and he said that his wife was 
16 handling that, and handling it in a certain way, and 
17 that he was -- there was a possibility of him 
18 separating it for tax purposes. 
19 Q At that meeting did you agree to pay 
20 taxes based upon square footage? 
21 A No. 
22 Q Mr. Wade, have you ever agreed with Mr. 
23 Stangl to apportion taxes on these properties based on 
24 a square foot tax apportionment? 
25 A No. 
1 Q Can you tell me then why the first year 
2 when he sent you a request based upon a square footage 
3 tax you paid it to him? 
4 A The reason I paid the taxes at that time 
5 is to eliminate the hassles. Because we were talking 
6 about developing the ground. And at that time I 
7 figured that it wouldn't be — you know, that something 
8 would happen in the next year, whatever, and I didn't 
9 want to argue with him anymore. 
10 Q Did you also believe that the property 
11 the next year could be split off into two separate 
12 taxing parcels? 
13 A Yes, I did. 
14 Q So then are you telling me that the 
15 reason you paid the amount he asked was just to avoid 
16 the hassle for that one year? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q And then you said it was paid the same 
19 way for the next two years. Why did you do that? 
20 A Same reasons. 
21 Q Did you ask him to separate it into two 
22 parcels? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Tell me when you asked him to do that. 
25 A I asked him the second time I talked to 
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1 him about the taxes. 
2 Q What did he say about that? 
3 A He said, "It wouldn't do you any good, 
4 because all they are going to do is raise the taxes and 
5 we are both going to end up paying more." And he says, 
6 "You don't want to do that." 
7 Q Did you agree with that? 
8 A No. 
9 Q Did you again ask him to split them off? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Did there ever come a time when you got 
12 a tax assessment and you asked him if he would please 
13 appeal the taxes? 
14 A No. I never received a tax assessment 
15 on the property. 
16 Q Did there ever come a time during the 
17 period they were asking for taxes that you asked him to 
18 appeal the taxes? 
19 A The assessment, yes. 
20 Q When did that occur? 
21 A Well, approximately the third 
22 conversation that I had with Mr. Stangl. 
23 Q Was that in 1980, '81 era? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q What did he say? 
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1 A He said he wasn't interested. He said 
2 that the taxes were figured about what he figured them 
3 to be, and if they got involved in any type of appeal 
4 they would probably just end up raising them. 
5 Q You entered into this transaction with 
6 Mr. Stangl, and at that time did he comment to you 
7 about the value of the property that he had remaining. 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q What did he tell you? 
10 A He told me and gave me a contract for 
11 the Tolman property that he was paying $50,000 an acre, 
12 and that he had no use for the back piece of property, 
13 and that I bought another piece of property from him 
14 and would I be interested in buying, you know, that 
15 piece. And I said yes, and he said, "Well, I'll sell 
16 it to you for $30,000 an acre." And I says, "Geez, 
17 that's a good price, but you said $50,000 an acre." He 
18 said, "Well, all 1 am interested in is the front 
19 footage. I'll put commercial buildings on the front 
20 commercial piece and it's worth that much more to me." 
21 Q On Exhibit "C" in front of you, Mr. 
22 Wade, if you will turn to that, that's the map showing 
23 the general relationship of the properties to each 
24 other. 
25 A Yes. 
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1 Q Do you see that? 
2 A Yes, 
3 Q And at the top there is this 
4 right-of-way piece of approximately half an acre? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Is it your understanding that you were 
7 purchasing the fee ownership of that parcel? 
8 A No. 
9 Q What is your understanding? 
10 A My understanding was that I would buy 
11 the back portion of the property based on $30,000 an 
12 acre, and that Stangl would provide a 50 foot 
13 right-of-way for me for that particular piece. 
14 Q This morning you and I calculated what 
15 $40,00 an acre would be for the 6.87 acre parcel in the 
16 back, and it turned that it comes out to about 
17 $206,100, does it not? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q Was it your understanding that you were 
20 to receive a right-of-way only across this half acre 
21 parcel at the top of Exhibit "C", or fee ownership? 
22 A Only a right-of-way. 
23 Q I notice that the exhibits in front of 
24 you, which are listed as Exhibits MBM and "D", purport 
25 to be legal descriptions prepared by Bush & Gudgell in, 
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1 I think, November of 1986. At least that's the date on 
2 the document. Do you see those? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q Did you participate in hiring Bush & 
5 Gudgell to do that? 
6 A No. 
7 Q To the best of your knowledge did the 
8 legal descriptions attached on Exhibit "BM and "D" 
9 accurately reflect the arrangement between yourself and 
10 Mr. Stangl? 
11 A I think so. 
12 Q And I note that on Exhibit "B", which is 
13 the property on the 6.87 acres, it then says, "subject 
14 to a 50 foot right-of-way." Were you involved in the 
15 drafting of that language? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Again, just for the court, what was your 
18 understanding about the right-of-way? Did you own a 
19 right-of-way, or fee simple title to it? 
20 A I owned a right-of-way. 
21 Q Who owns fee title to that, in your 
22 opinion? 
23 A Stangl. 
24 Q Mr. Wade, you have heard testimony 
25 regarding this check of $52,000 that was given by Mr. 
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1 Stangl to Mr. Schwenke* 
2 A Yes, 
3 Q Did you ever receive any of that money? 
4 A No. 
5 Q When was the first time you knew that 
6 the check had been tendered to Mr, Schwenke? 
7 A It was approximately, I think, in 
8 January of 1990 — or '91. 
9 Q This year? 
10 A Yes, I think so. Or December. 
11 Q So more than a year after the check had 
12 been tendered and allegedly cashed, you found out about 
13 it. 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And is it your testimony that you have 
16 received none of that money? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q That is your testimony? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Did you receive a credit with Mr. 
21 Schwenke for his receipt of that money? 
22 A No. 
23 Q Did you owe Mr. Schwenke any money on 
24 November 28, 1989? 
25 A No. 
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1 MR. NELSON: That's all the questions I 
2 have. 
3 CROSS EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. CROCKETT; 
5 Q Mr. Wade, I'll hand you what has been 
6 marked as Exhibit "Y" to this case. 
7 MR. CROCKETT: Your Honor, I would 
8 request the court to take judicial notice that we 
9 checked on Exhibit "Y" before, and Mr. Wade — there is 
10 a signed copy in the file by Mr. Wade as of that date. 
11 This was a copy Mr. Schwenke delivered to us 
12 with the Exhibit "S". We had an argument before Judge 
13 Rokich, Mr. Nelson and I both looked at the original, I 
14 showed him there was a signed copy in the file of this. 
15 Do you recall that? 
16 MR. NELSON: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I 
17 don't recall that. But I'm sure the file will speak 
18 for itself. Mr. Wade can testify whether he signed it. 
19 THE COURT: I'm going to take judicial 
20 notice of that based on the representation of Mr. 
21 Crockett. And so if that is incorrect, you're going to 
22 have to bring it to my attention. 
23 MR. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
24 MR. CROCKETT: Okay. 
25 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Sir, did you sign 
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1 Exhibit HYM? 
2 A I don't recall. I could have done. 
3 Q That's an affidavit to the court, and an 
4 affidavit is something, you know, where you put your 
5 credibility on the line; is that correct? 
6 A I probably did sign it. Like I say, I 
7 don't recall. This is too long ago. 
8 MR. CROCKETT: Okay. Your Honor, given 
9 the representation and subject to someone proving me 
10 wrong about signing, we'll offer Exhibit "Y", 
11 MR. NELSON: Based on what's been said, 
12 I have no objection, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Exhibit MYM is 
14 received. 
15 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Sir, Exhibit "Y" is 
16 an affidavit that you signed, which in paragraph -- or 
17 which was signed on or about March 25, 1990. In 
18 paragraph 8 you state that you have paid costs as 
19 itemized by your attorney in his affidavit in support 
20 of this motion for summary judgment. 
21 MR. CROCKETT: Your Honor, I would offer 
22 -- I would ask the court to mark Mr. Schwenke's 
23 affidavit. 
24 (Marked for identification) 
25 MR. CROCKETT: Which was submitted with 
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1 the same motion, Exhibit "S". This has now been marked 
2 as Exhibit "Z". 
3 THE COURT: Let's just make sure this is 
4 clear. 
5 MR. CROCKETT: All right, 
6 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Let me show you the 
7 original from the file, Mr. Wade, of Exhibit "Y". Tell 
8 me whether or not this is your signature. 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Maybe that would be best. Is that your 
11 signature? (Indicating) 
12 A That is my signature. It looks like it. 
13 I — 
14 THE COURT: The record should indicate 
15 that I have just shown Mr. Wade the original from the 
16 official court file of Exhibit "Y". 
17 MR. CROCKETT: Okay. 
18 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Sir, in your 
19 affidavit you indicate, as I pointed out, in paragraph 
20 8, that "I have also paid costs as itemized by my 
21 attorney in his affidavit in support of this motion for 
22 summary judgment, Exhibit HZ"." 
23 Is the affidavit of Mr. Schwenke which is 
24 submitted with the same motion that has attached to it 
25 attorney's fees and costs, and you have before you 
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1 Exhibit "Z", do you not? 
2 A This one here. 
3 Q Yes. 
4 A Okay. 
5 Q Is that the document you were referring 
6 to that you had reviewed, that you were swearing to the 
7 court you had reviewed? 
8 A No. I'm not — I don't — like I say, I 
9 — I don't remember this document. 
10 Q Is your testimony such that you did not 
11 review it? 
12 A No, I'm not denying it, or whatever. I 
13 don't know. I don't remember this document. 
14 Q You just don't remember either way; is 
15 that fair? 
16 A Correct. 
17 MR. CROCKETT: Your Honor, I would argue 
18 from this, but let me point out something to you, Mr. 
19 Wade. 
20 Q (By Mr. Crockett) If you look at the 
21 document that your affidavit says that you read, it 
22 includes services performed by Mr. Schwenke on your 
23 behalf that postdate the March date wherein he 
24 purportedly filed the Notice of Withdrawal, the one 
25 that we said we didn't get. 
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1 There are services postdating that which go 
2 through the end of 1990. Do you see that list of 
3 services there? 
4 A Okay. You've lost me. 
5 Q Let me — 
6 MR. CROCKETT: May I just point them out 
7 to him, Your Honor? I want to get his testimony on 
8 this. 
9 MR. NELSON: Do you want a stipulation? 
10 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Mr. Schwenke 
11 indicated -- or in this Notice of Withdrawal which was 
12 filed there is an indication it was mailed in March of 
13 1989, or served in March of 1989. 
14 After March of 1989 there are a number of 
15 services that Mr. Schwenke performed on your behalf; is 
16 that correct? 
17 A No. 
18 Q Didn't you authorize Mr. Schwenke to 
19 bring the appeal to the Supreme Court? 
20 A No, I did not. 
21 Q Did you know the appeal was going on in 
22 the Supreme Court? 
23 A I don't recall that I did. 
24 Q Would you like to change the result? 
25 A Pardon? Maybe. I don't know. I — 
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1 Q You're saying you didn't even know the 
2 appeal was going on? 
3 A That's correct. 
4 Q You knew as of March of 1989 that you 
5 had paid over $50,000 just on the one garnishment 
6 alone, didn't you? 
7 A No. 
8 Q You didn't know we had garnished your 
9 funds at the bank? 
10 A No. When was that? 
11 Q As of — Mr. Wade, we garnished your 
12 funds sometime prior to the appeal. The appeal 
13 resulted in Stangl being required to return to you the 
14 garnished funds. 
15 Are you testifying now that you didn't even 
16 know the funds were garnished? 
17 A I'm saying I don't recall that. That's 
18 correct. 
19 Q If you look at your — well, look at Mr. 
20 Schwenke's affidavit, which in your affidavit you say 
21 you read, and look at the last item in paragraph 9 
22 which says, "Lost interest from seizing funds, $5,750." 
23 What does that refer to that you verified? 
24 A I don't know. 
25 Q Why did you verify this document, if 
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1 you --
2 A I don't know if I verified that 
3 document. I cannot say that — I don't know that I've 
4 seen that document. I can't even say that's my 
5 signature, because Mr. Paul Schwenke has forged my 
6 signature on several documents, and approximately 
7 $3,000 checks. 
8 Mr. Schwenke has committed fraud in several 
9 things, and I have no knowledge. 
10 MR. CROCKETT: Would you mark these as 
11 the next exhibit in order, please. This is the later 
12 affidavit filed. 
13 THE COURT: The date of that affidavit. 
14 MR. CROCKETT: The date of that 
15 affidavit is January 15, 1990. 
16 THE COURT: 1990? 
17 MR,. CROCKETT: Excuse me. January 15, 
18 1991. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 MR. CROCKETT: That is Mr. Wade and, you 
21 have Mr. Udall's. We would offer Exhibit "Z", by the 
22 way, Your Honor, which is Mr. Schwenke — actually, I 
23 think the court can take judicial notice of it. It is 
24 a pleading in the file. Mr. Schwenke filed Exhibit 
25 "Z". But since we are referring to it, we would offer 
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1 it to make it easier should there be subsequent 
2 hearings on this matter. 
3 MR. NELSON: I have no objection to it 
4 being introduced as an exhibit. I assume that the 
5 court file would reflect that's been filed, since the 
6 exhibit is a conformed copy. And only to the extent it 
7 purports to be a conformed copy, I have no objection to 
8 its entry. 
9 THE COURT: This is "Z" you are talking 
10 about? 
11 MR. NELSON: That is "ZM. 
12 MR. CROCKETT: The affidavit of Mr. 
13 Schwenke. 
14 THE COURT: "Z" is received. Judicial 
15 notice is also taken of "Z" as a copy of the original 
16 document. And if there is not such an original 
17 document appearing in the court file, then you can 
18 bring that to my attention again. 
19 MR. CROCKETT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
20 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Mr. Wade, let me show 
21 you Exhibit "AA", and ask you if that is your 
22 signature. 
23 THE COURT: Now, this is a copy of the 
24 original? 
25 MR. CROCKETT: Yes. 
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1 THE WITNESS: I would say that is 
2 probably not my signature. 
3 Q (By Mr. Crockett) This is not your 
4 signature? 
5 A That's correct. 
6 MR. CROCKETT: Your Honor, this is the 
7 affidavit upon which Judge Rokich granted relief from 
8 the judgment that had previously been entered. 
9 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Do you have any 
10 information as to how this document purportedly ended 
11 up bearing your signature? 
12 A I have no idea. I'm not saying that's 
13 not my signature. I'm saying it's -- I don't recall 
14 ever seeing this affidavit. And I'm also recalling 
15 saying that doesn't look like my signature. 
16 MR. NELSON: To the extent counsel has 
17 indicated that this was the document that Judge Rokich 
18 relied upon, I will object. I don't think that's a 
19 correct statement. It may have been a document 
20 submitted, but I don't know that Mr. Crockett is aware 
21 of the reasons why Judge Rokich ruled. 
22 MR. CROCKETT: I think that's a fair 
23 comment, Your Honor. I would so modify it to that 
24 extent. 
25 Q (By Mr. Crockett) So it's your position 
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1 you don't recall ever even seeing Exhibit "AAM; is that 
2 correct? 
3 A Yes. That's correct. Absolutely. 
4 Q Who did you retain to represent you in 
5 this initially against Mr. Stangl? 
6 A Initially it was Paul Schwenke. 
7 Q Do you believe in March of 1989 Mr. 
8 Schwenke withdrew as your counsel? 
9 A Pardon? 
10 Q Did you believe in March of 1989 that 
11 Mr. Schwenke withdrew as your counsel? 
12 A Absolutely. He told me he did. Sent me 
13 a copy — 
14 Q Who did you get to replace him? 
15 A I didn't have any attorney. 
16 Q What did you do in order to protect your 
17 position in this case when you thought Mr. Schwenke had 
18 withdrawn? 
19 A I tried to talk to Mr. Stangl directly. 
20 Q Did you do anything other than try to 
21 talk to Mr. Stangl? 
22 A No. 
23 Q Did you do anything to keep track of 
24 what was going on with this case in this court? 
25 A No. 
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1 Q Are you telling us that the bank didn't 
2 even notify you when your funds were garnished? Is 
3 that correct? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Who is Rosemary Moffat? 
6 A (No response) 
7 MR. CROCKETT: Is that the name? 
8 MR. NELSON: Robin Moffat. 
9 THE WITNESS: I do not know who that 
10 is. 
11 Q (By Mr. Crockett) How did it come about 
12 that you decided you needed a lawyer in this case after 
13 March of 1989, as of the point in time that — I guess 
14 the first time that you knew you had actually hired 
15 somebody else is when you would have hired Mr. Nelson; 
16 is that correct? 
17 A That's correct. 
18 Q What event brought this to your 
19 attention? 
20 A What this event was, I had called and 
21 went down and met with Mr. Stangl again about these 
22 property taxes. Because I had someone that was 
2 3 interested in buying the ground. And the ground down 
24 there was — I needed a Warranty Deed and I wanted to 
25 get a deed to clear it up, and I wanted to get some 
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1 problems resolved. 
2 So I talked to Mr. Stangl about getting this 
3 property tax resolved, and he said, basically, "If you 
4 don't like the situation, get out of the bank." 
5 I mean, that's the way he treated me. So I 
6 sent another gentleman to talk to him, Enoch Valdista, 
7 and I asked him to talk to Mr. Stangl. 
8 Q Why didn't you just hire --
9 A That's what I'm trying to explain to 
10 you. 
11 Q Sure. 
12 A And so after I — first of all, I don't 
13 care for attorneys. I try to handle everything myself. 
14 And that's exactly what I was trying to do. And after 
15 Enoch Valdista came back to me and said, "Stangl isn't 
16 going to budge, you know, and you've got a problem." 
17 At that time I never sent Stangl any more checks on 
18 paying the property taxes, because they were in 
19 dispute. And at that time — so then I found an 
20 attorney through Enoch Valdista, and his name was Paul 
21 Schwenke. 
22 Q You are missing my question. 
23 A I'm sorry. 
24 Q We know Mr. Schwenke represented you 
25 from the beginning of this lawsuit up until when you 
1 contend was March of 1989, when he gave you this notice 
2 of withdrawal. 
3 A Okay. 
4 Q Then subsequent, at some point in time, 
5 Mr. Nelson was retained because he was sitting in the 
6 courtroom. 
7 A That's right. 
8 Q You had no knowledge of any lawyer 
9 representing you in between March of 19 — March of 
10 1989 and the time that Mr. Nelson came in to represent 
11 you in this case. 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Okay. What occurred when you finally 
14 hired Mr. Nelson, what occurred that made you decide 
15 maybe you had better get representation again? 
16 A Because I received a notice in the mail 
17 -- or I'm not sure. I just don't know. I think --
18 well, I'm not sure. 
19 Oh, I think I know what the problem was. 
20 Q If you can answer my question, please do 
21 so. 
22 A I think my answer is because I became 
23 aware of the $52,000. 
24 Q How did you become aware of that? 
25 A What happened was that the bank — we 
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1 had a CD in Deseret Federal Savings, and it was a five 
2 year CD. And Deseret Federal Savings was bought out by 
3 another bank. I'm not sure who it was. And at that 
4 time when they took it over they sent us a notice that 
5 we had a balance of about $2,500 in that account. 
6 So we notified the bank and told them that 
7 there must be a mistake here, "We have a CD in there 
8 that's over fifty some odd thousand dollars." 
9 And they said, well, I'm sorry, you know, 
10 it's missing. So we went back and talked to the bank 
11 and they traced it back and said that there was a 
12 garnishment made back at that time. 
13 That's how we found out about it. And when 
14 the garnishment was made we found the check, and that's 
15 when I called Stangl up on the phone and asked him 
16 about the check. And he said, "Well, I paid that 
17 back." Because we thought it was the IRS garnishment. 
18 And when I found out that Stangl had paid that back, 
19 then I contacted an attorney, which was Mr. Bruce 
20 Nelson. 
21 MR. CROCKETT: Your Honor, may I take a 
22 minute. I have to admit that some of this testimony 
23 comes as a complete surprise. I want to look at some 
24 documents here. 
25 THE COURT: All right. Do you want to 
87 
1 take a recess? 
2 MR. CROCKETT: Yes. It will not take 
3 more than 15 minutes to complete the examination, I 
4 don't think. If you will give me just a couple of 
5 minutes, I think that will do it. 
6 THE COURT: We'll be in recess for five 
7 minutes, or so. 
8 (Whereupon, court in recess from 11:55 a.m. 
9 to 12:10 p.m.) 
10 MR. CROCKETT: I have a suggestion that 
11 may save some time. Our position would be that it 
12 doesn't matter whether or not he signed the affidavit. 
13 Our position would be that as a litigant he had a 
14 responsibility beyond March of 1989 when Mr. Schwenke 
15 withdrew to do something. And unless he does something 
16 or unless he proves that we had notice of withdrawal, 
17 agency would still apply. 
18 If the court deems we are wrong in that, what 
19 I would suggest is that we go ahead and get hold of the 
20 notary public that signed on his signature on the 
21 affidavit, and various things like that, and see what 
22 evidence there is about his subsequent knowledge of the 
2 3 case. I think the testimony has come as a complete 
24 surprise to both Mr. Nelson and me, but I really think 
25 it does not go to the issue that's involved here. 
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1 But that's something the court has to decide. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Nelson. 
3 MR. NELSON: If that's offered by way of 
4 stipulation, I don't think that I agree with his legal 
5 arguments. But I have no problem handling it that way. 
6 THE COURT: All right. We'll handle it 
7 that way. 
8 MR. CROCKETT: Okay. 
9 THE COURT: I'm assuming, though, that 
10 there is going to be more elaborate argument on those 
11 legal theories when we get to that point. 
12 MR. CROCKETT: I think that's fair, Your 
13 Honor. 
14 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Mr. Wade, you paid 
15 your share of the taxes on the property for 1978, '79, 
16 '80 and '81; is that correct? 
17 A I think I paid more than my share. 
18 Q Well, I understand that's your position, 
19 but you paid property taxes for those years. 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q In each of those four years your 
22 property taxes were calculated on an allocated basis, 
23 based on the square footage; is that correct? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q All right. And in fact you paid it on 
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1 that basis? You knew you were paying it on that basis, 
2 didn't you? 
3 A Yes, 
4 Q And the letters your received from the 
5 Stangls or Mrs. Stangl indicated that you were paying 
6 on that allocated square foot basis, did they not? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q So there was never a time that you 
9 believed you were being charged on anything other than 
10 a square footage basis; is that also correct? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q Sir, did you ever object in writing to 
13 paying on anything other than a square foot basis? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And what is that writing? 
16 A My wife wrote -- I think there were two 
17 or three years to let Mr. Stangl know. 
18 Q Do you have those letters? 
19 A I think so. 
20 Q Why didn't you produce them? 
21 A I didn't know it was necessary. 
22 Q Well, we served a request for production 
23 early on in this case. Did you give all the documents 
24 you had to your lawyer? 
25 A No, I did not. 
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1 Q Why not? 
2 A Because I got some other problems. 
3 Q Your IRS problems? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q You were convicted of fraud; is that 
6 correct? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Is that conviction currently existing? 
9 A What do you mean? 
10 Q Well, was that upheld on appeal? What 
11 is the status? 
12 A It's on appeal. 
13 Q And that was in the federal court; is 
14 that correct? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q But did you intentionally withhold, 
17 then, some of the documents from your lawyer? 
18 A Absolutely not. 
19 Q You just didn't give them these letters 
20 you think your wife may have written contesting this. 
21 A First of all, I haven 't been here. So 
22 — there are some other problems. 
23 Q I'm not sure I understand you. 
24 A Well, I'm saying, I've given the 
25 documents that I thought — I'm sure there are other 
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1 documents that I've not given to the attorney. Okay. 
2 Q Okay. You say you asked Mr. Stangl to 
3 split the property? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Do you have before you anything in 
6 writing where you made such a request? 
7 A I think in one of the letters, yes. One 
8 of the letters that my wife wrote — well, wrote to 
9 Elizabeth Stangl, yes. 
10 Q Would this be one of the letters that 
11 you don't currently have and haven't provided? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Thank you. You bought another property 
14 from Mr. Stangl, didn't you? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q That other property had the same 
17 situation where it was rear footage and you had a 
18 right-of-way; is that correct? 
19 A No. 
20 Q Excuse me. The other property had rear 
21 footage and you had a strip of land over which Mr. 
22 Stangl had a right-of-way; is that correct? 
23 A No. 
24 Q Did you have any frontage on the other 
25 piece of property? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q Was the footage that you took the rear? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q So whether it was a right-of-way or 
5 something else, you obtained a corridor to get to your 
6 property in the rear; correct? 
7 A No. 
8 Q How did you get to your property? 
9 A Through the front. It fronted right on 
10 the street. 
11 Q The whole property was frontage? 
12 A Yes. 6895 South 2300 East. It was on 
13 23rd East. 
14 Q Sir, in this case you had previously 
15 taken the position that you need pay no taxes 
16 whatsoever, have you not? 
17 A No. 
18 Q You have always contended you owed 
19 taxes, but you just disagreed with how it was done? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Mr. Wade, I'm almost afraid to ask this, 
22 but I'm going to hand you some answers to 
23 interrogatories which you purportedly verified, which 
24 have been marked as Exhibit "BB". I will give a copy 
25 to Your Honor. 
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1 Which is Exhibit MBB". Now, this is during 
2 the period of time that you admit that Mr. Schwenke was 
3 acting as your attorney, and that is in 1988; is that 
4 correct? 
5 A That's correct. 
6 Q Does that bear your signature on the 
7 last page? 
8 A It looks like it, kind of. 
9 Q Sir, would you look at the response to 
10 interrogatory number 1, and to interrogatory number 2. 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q "Do you contend that you are responsible 
13 to pay any of the taxes for the years 1978 through 1987 
14 on the property that is the subject matter of the 
15 lawsuit?" 
16 Your response. Answer: "Plaintiff contends 
17 he's not responsible for property taxes during the 
18 contract period. Plaintiff might be responsible for 
19 taxes after the contract period, which taxes cannot be 
20 discerned as long as the defendant continues to 
21 wrongfully withhold delivering of a warranty deed to 
22 the plaintiff." 
23 Do you see that answer? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Well, that's your signature, or you said 
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1 it kind of looks like it. Do you recall verifying that 
2 answer as setting forth your position? 
3 A I do not. 
4 Q You deny that was your position? 
5 A I'm not denying that, no. 
6 Q You just don't know if it was your 
7 position? 
8 A That's correct. 
9 Q So you don't recall if the position you 
10 originally took in this case is that you don't owe any 
11 taxes, or that you owe some? 
12 A That's correct. 
13 MR. CROCKETT: Your Honor, we would 
14 offer Exhibits MAAM and "BB" . 
15 THE COURT: Objections? 
16 MR. NELSON: No. 
17 THE COURT: "AA" and "BB" are received. 
18 Q (By Mr. Crockett) Sir, you testified on 
19 direct that you believe you have fee ownership of the 
20 right-of-way. How is it — 
21 Well, strike that. Have you bought other 
22 properties? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q You are aware of the fact that rights-
25 of-way don't just spring into existence, that it takes 
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1 a document to do that, are you not? 
2 A No, I'm not aware of that. 
3 Q Do you think they just come into 
4 existence --
5 A They are apparently — they are just put 
6 on there. 
7 Q They are put on there with a deed or 
8 something, aren't they? 
9 A I'm not aware of that. 
10 Q I take it, then, if I asked you why you 
11 didn't get some sort of a document, if you contend the 
12 right-of-way was separate from the parcel you were 
13 buying, your answer is going to be that you just didn't 
14 think about it. 
15 A No. I probably — I may have asked 
16 Stangl about it. Stangl was handling this. He wrote 
17 up the contract. He's the one that did everything on 
18 it. He's the one that put the right-of-way where it 
19 was on the left — on the right, and Stangl told me 
20 everything to do. He told me what to do, when to do 
21 it, how to do it. I believed in him 100%. 
22 Q You bought that property to put an 
23 apartment building on it, didn't you? 
24 A No. 
25 Q Well, those were your plans, to put some 
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1 apartment dwellings there? 
2 A Maybe, eventually. 
3 Q You were aware, were you not, that you 
4 had to have frontage to put an apartment building 
5 there? 
6 A No. 
7 Q Did that ever come to your attention? 
8 A Sure. 
9 Q To put an apartment building up you had 
10 to have frontage, did you not? 
11 A No. 
12 Q I see. You are arguing that you don't 
13 need frontage to put up an apartment building. 
14 A That's correct. 
15 Q Have you done anything with the County 
16 to determine whether you need frontage? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q What? 
19 A Built a couple of buildings in the 
20 County. 
21 Q Where? 
22 A 4388 Highland Drive, 4370 Highland 
23 Drive, 2250 East 33rd South, and 6895 South 23rd East. 
24 Q Don't each of those properties have 
25 frontage? 
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1 A No. Well, it depends on what you call 
2 frontage. The one at 6895 South has relatively no 
3 frontage. It has -- when I say relatively no frontage, 
4 it kind of has a right-of-way that goes to the back. 
5 Is that what you mean? I don't understand what you are 
6 talking about. 
7 Q Do you own the frontage on that one? 
8 A Do I own -- pardon. 
9 Q Do you own the frontage? 
10 MR. NELSON: Objection. Mr. Crockett 
11 should define frontage. I'm personally confused as to 
12 whether he's talking about access or frontage. 
13 MR. CROCKETT: I'll call Mr. Stangl on 
14 that one, Your Honor. That way we'll be able to save 
15 some time. 
16 Q (By Mr. Crockett) After Mr. Schwenke 
17 purportedly told you he had withdrawn in March of 1989, 
18 did you make any efforts to get in touch with me or 
19 anyone else representing Mr. Stangl? 
20 A I tried to get in touch with Mr. Stangl. 
21 I always talked to — contacted another attorney, and 
22 his name was Dee Long on 33rd South. And he said that 
23 he had to do a little checking into it. 
24 And then he contacted me later and said it 
25 was too complicated for him. 
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1 Q That wasn't my question. My question 
2 was, did you do anything to get in touch with me or Mr. 
3 Stangl? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Did you in fact talk to Mr. Stangl? 
6 A Yes, I did. 
7 Q Did you ever tell me or Mr. Stangl that 
8 Mr. Schwenke was no longer representing you? 
9 A Yes, I did. 
10 Q When was that, sir? 
11 A That was — I think it was before March. 
12 Q Of 1989? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q So it was before the time you received 
15 the notice of withdrawal? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q How would you know that Mr. Schwenke was 
18 no longer representing you if it was prior to the time 
19 of your receipt of the notice of withdrawal? 
20 A Because he told me -- I requested that 
21 he withdraw because of the problems that we were 
22 starting to have. That I was starting to have with 
23 him. 
24 Q You're telling us that you told Mr. 
25 Schwenke in the first part of '89 that Mr. Schwenke no 
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1 longer represented you? 
2 A I didn't tell Mr. Schwenke. I told 
3 Stangl. 
4 Q You told Stangl that? 
5 A Yes. 
6 MR. CROCKETT: I have no further 
7 questions of this witness. 
8 MR. NELSON: I have none. 
9 MR. CROCKETT: I call Mr. -- I'm sorry, 
10 it's still your case. 
11 THE COURT: You may step down. Thank 
12 you for your testimony. 
13 MR. NELSON: At this point I guess we 
14 either need a stipulation of counsel or some direction 
15 from the court. We have presented an issue to the 
16 court as to how the property was to be valued for tax 
17 purposes. 
18 If the court rules that the parties had an 
19 agreement as to dividing that property tax assessment 
20 by square footage, then we don't need to get into the 
21 value of the property. 
22 If you rule that no such agreement existed, 
23 then you need to determine the values of the property 
24 for purposes of assessment, and I have to put on some 
25 evidence as to that. 
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1 I would suggest that we handle that by 
2 finishing this phase of the case, having you make a 
3 ruling before we determine whether the other evidence 
4 is necessary, 
5 MR. CROCKETT: I agree, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: All right. We will proceed 
7 in accordance with your suggestion. 
8 MR. CROCKETT: I call Mr. Stangl as a 
9 rebuttal witness. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Stangl, do you realize 
11 you are still under oath? 
12 MR. STANGL: Yes. 
13 F. C. STANGL, 
14 having been previously sworn, was examined and 
15 testified on his oath as follows: 
16 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
17 BY MR. CROCKETT: 
18 Q Mr. Stangl, did Mr. Wade, in 1989, or 
19 any time prior thereto, ever tell you that Mr. Schwenke 
20 did not represent him? 
21 A No. 
22 Q Did you have any kind of conversation or 
23 anything remotely like that? 
24 A No, sir. 
25 Q Thank you, sir. Is there any kind of a 
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1 requirement — you build a lot of apartment buildings; 
2 is that correct? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q Sir, is there any kind of a requirement 
5 for frontage when building an apartment building? 
6 A Yes. Especially in Sandy City. They 
7 have a requirement that you have to have frontage on a 
8 dedicated street or a permit for any type of dwelling 
9 of any kind. And Stan and I talked about that, and 
10 Stan knew that. And Stan knew that he had to have 
11 frontage on 700 East as it related to this property. 
12 That was the reason for the tongue, the 50 foot wide 
13 tongue that went onto 7th East. And we needed to 
14 retain a right-of-way for me over that property that I 
15 was selling him so that I could access the building and 
16 the property that I had left after I sold to him. 
17 Q To your knowledge, did you ever receive 
18 any kind of a writing from Mr. Wade objecting to a 
19 square footage apportionment of these property taxes? 
20 A I never did receive a notice. I never 
21 did. 
22 Q Had you received that kind of thing, 
23 would that have come to your attention? 
24 A It would have. 
25 Q The other property that you sold to Mr. 
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1 Wade, would you describe that property. 
2 A Yes, sir. I purchased a 20 acre parcel 
3 on the corner of 70th South and 23rd East. Something 
4 less than 20 acres, from a person by the name of Smith. 
5 I sold the smaller piece to Utah Power & 
6 Light. I kept some frontage on 70th South, and I 
7 created a right-of-way between me and the property that 
8 I sold to Stan Wade. 
9 That was contiguous, though, that 
10 right-of-way, and the part that I sold to him was on 
11 the north side of the right of way. That property had 
12 frontage — the property that I sold to Stan had 
13 frontage on 23rd East. Stan kept a piece of property. 
14 Salt Lake County created a right-of-way across his 
15 property, of his own, to his apartment in the back. 
16 But also had the right-of-way that was a right-of-way 
17 between his property and my property that accesses both 
18 his and mine. 
19 Q Okay. Sir, would you pull up the 
20 stipulation and look at Exhibit "F". Do you have that 
21 in front of you? 
22 A I do. 
23 Q Exhibit "F" is a property tax 
24 evaluation. 
25 A It is. 
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1 Q For what year? 
2 A For 1982. 
3 Q What does that put as the value of the 
4 property? 
5 A It puts the value at 9.63 acres, which 
6 was the total parcel that I originally purchased from 
7 Tolman. 
8 The total value, market value, $212,350.00. 
9 Q And was that substantially less than you 
10 paid Tolman for the same property? 
11 A That's less than half of what I paid 
12 Tolman for the same property. 
13 MR. CROCKETT: No further questions, 
14 Your Honor. 
15 CROSS EXAMINATION 
16 BY MR. NELSON: 
17 Q Could you define what you mean by 
18 frontage when you were discussing the answer to Mr. 
19 Crockett's question. 
20 A Yes. It's where the ownership in a 
21 person's possession is contiguous with a property 
22 that's a dedicated street. That's normally referred to 
23 as frontage for real property. 
24 Q And hypothetically, if you own the 
25 parcel that Mr. Wade owns and you own the right-of-way 
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1 property so that there's access to go over and cross 
2 that right-of-way, under your definition do you own 
3 frontage? 
4 A It's not necessarily what my definition 
5 is, as much as it is Sandy's definition. And Sandy 
6 defines it such that unless your ownership to the fee 
7 of your property is contiguous with the dedicated 
8 street, they will not issue a permit to you. 
9 Q I asked you to define what you meant by 
10 frontage. Are you telling me you define it the same 
11 way that Sandy City does? 
12 A I define it the way I just did. I gave 
13 you that definition. Read it back to me and tell me 
14 what I said. Basically it's consistent that if you own 
15 the fee to property and that fee is consistent with a 
16 dedicated — contiguous to a dedicated street, it's 
17 referred to as frontage property. 
18 Q Is it your understanding that a fee 
19 ownership to this parcel we have called a right-of-way 
20 property is to be transferred to Mr. Wade when you give 
21 him a Warranty Deed? 
22 A That's correct. 
23 Q Is that the way you've always understood 
24 it? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 Q Doesn't the agreement that you signed, 
2 Exhibit "A", indicate that he's paying $30,000 an acre 
3 for the property? 
4 A That's correct. 
5 Q And I guess I'll represent to you, Mr. 
6 Stangl, that if you times the 6.87 acres times $30,000 
7 you come up with $206,100.00. 
8 A I think that's accurate. 
9 Q How do you account for the fact that 
10 there is additional acreage in there and the purchase 
11 price is still $206,100.00? 
12 A I don't know what you mean by additional 
13 acreage. I don't think there is any. 
14 Q The right-of-way property, if you add 
15 that in, he's actually paying less than $30,000 an 
16 acre, isn't he? 
17 A I don't think so. 
18 Q Well, if 6.87 acres times $30,000 equals 
19 $206,100.00, that's the back parcel. Now you're 
20 telling us that in addition you think you should deed 
21 him the fee ownership to the right-of-way property. 
22 Doesn't that mean that he's actually paying less than 
23 $30,000 an acre? 
24 A You're telling me what you think I'm 
25 telling you. I'm telling you what I think I'm telling 
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1 you. I think I sold him 6.87 acres at $30,000 an acre, 
2 which extends to $206,100.00. And that's 6.87 acres 
3 plus a parcel that is to the extreme east end of the 
4 original parcel that I purchased from Tolman, and the 
5 access by way of a 50 foot wide tongue. And that area 
6 in that tongue, together with the property in the area 
7 totals 6.87 acres. 
8 Q Would you please open to Exhibit "C" so 
9 I can make sure I understand what you are telling me. 
10 Do you have that document, Mr. Stangl? 
11 A I do. 
12 Q Is it your testimony that the rear 
13 parcel that Mr. Wade acknowledges he's purchased, 
14 together with and added to the acreage of the 
15 right-of-way equals 6.87 acres? 
16 A That's correct. 
17 MR. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
18 That's all the questions I have. Thank you for 
19 explaining that. 
20 MR. CROCKETT: Nothing further, Your 
21 Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you for your 
23 testimony. You may step down. Mr. Nelson, anything 
24 further? 
25 MR. NELSON: No, Your Honor. 
107 
1 THE COURT: Oh, excuse me. You rested. 
2 Mr. Crockett, anything further in rebuttal? 
3 MR. CROCKETT: No, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Are you ready for argument 
5 now, or do you need a few minutes to assemble your 
6 notes and papers? 
7 MR. CROCKETT: I'm ready for argument 
8 now, Your Honor. 
9 MR. NELSON: I'd be glad to do it now. 
10 I don't know how long it will take or whether you want 
11 to do it after lunch, but — 
12 MR. CROCKETT: I don't expect it to take 
13 very long. I think I can do mine in ten minutes. 
14 MR. NELSON: Why don't we do it. 
15 MR. CROCKETT: Your Honor, this is 
16 really a fairly simple case. The issue before the 
17 court is — 
18 THE COURT: It used to be. 
19 MR. CROCKETT: It used to be. The issue 
20 before the court is what did the parties agree to 
21 regarding taxes? In this trial, albeit a different 
22 position than previously taken by Mr. Wade, he admitted 
23 an obligation to paying taxes. Further, Your Honor, 
24 it's absolutely clear from the testimony of Mr. Wade 
25 that for the first four years he paid taxes. 
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1 Now, you have a dispute of testimony at this 
2 point in time. He said he protested. Mr. Stangl said 
3 no such protest occurred. There is an agreement 
4 between them that's the first dispute that took place. 
5 And the court has to decide. 
6 If the court determines — well, frankly, 
7 I've got to tell the court that even if it's under 
8 protest, I don't think it makes any difference. One of 
9 the ambiguities in the original contract is what 
10 happens if taxes aren't taken care of in the following 
11 years. Now, what is going to happen? It is silent as 
12 to that. It gives a proration for the first year. And 
13 if we go back in time we take the gloss that lawyers 
14 and clients put on it now, we take that out of the 
15 case, and you look back at what the parties did back 
16 then. Because I think that's the best indication of 
17 what they actually intend. 
18 It's been agreed by Mr. Wade, and it's been 
19 stipulated to in the stipulation that they paid on a 
20 prorated basis of the acreage that was bought. They 
21 just did it. They did that for four straight years. 
22 After that Mr. Wade stopped paying his taxes, 
23 after those four straight years, and Mr. Stangl 
24 continued paying the taxes and paid them on the portion 
25 charged him. We are here, and that's the reason we are 
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1 here today. It's a very simple thing. If we are right 
2 that they agreed to the prorata, and you have an 
3 ambiguity. And as you look at the actions of the 
4 parties to define what really occurred, then the court 
5 should find that it's prorata. 
6 If you look at the other side of that and we 
7 actually have an express agreement here, Mr. Stangl 
8 testified about the agreement with Mr. Wade. Now, once 
9 again, we have directly opposite testimony. Mr. Wade 
10 says, "No, I didn't agree to it." But then he also 
11 states, "Well, I paid the property taxes anyway because 
12 I didn't want to create waves with Mr. Stangl. I 
13 didn't want to get into a fight with him, so I paid 
14 them." 
15 Mr. Stangl said they agreed to it on that 
16 kind of a basis. On this raw land that was out there. 
17 And frankly, I think under either the actual express 
18 agreement or the doctrine where you look and see what 
19 they actually did in terms of defining the limits of 
20 the contract, I think it's fairly clear that there was 
21 agreement reached and it was based on a prorata square 
22 footage situation. 
23 Let me switch gears here for just a moment, 
24 because one of the things that will come into play is 
25 credibility. We have also got this second situation 
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1 regarding the credibility of representations about the 
2 $50,000. We have perhaps the most bizarre situation 
3 that I've encountered practicing law. We have a 
4 litigant who is contending that he believes his 
5 attorney was out of the loop before March of '89, did 
6 nothing until 1991 on this case, didn't try — except 
7 he says he tried to talk to Mr. Stangl, which Mr. 
8 Stangl denies. Says he didn't know the garnishment 
9 took place, and says he didn't sign affidavits that 
10 were prepared by Mr. Schwenke, and then by Mr. Udall. 
11 A separate lawyer with a new notary public 
12 signed the second affidavit. He said that he didn't 
13 know about either of those, and denied them, because if 
14 he looks at them it's pretty clear that services were 
15 being performed. The truth of the matter, I just don't 
16 believe that Mr. Wade has any credibility at all, given 
17 his testimony. His story just doesn't make any sense. 
18 But even if he were telling the truth, even if in fact 
19 he believed in March of 1989 he was no longer 
20 represented in this case, then he had a responsibility 
21 to come forward and do something with regard to this 
22 court. He can't just sit back and let this action 
23 proceed. He has a responsibility to step in and take 
24 care of the problems that were created in this case. 
25 He simply didn't do that. He should have done that. 
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1 There is -- ethically we could not have done 
2 anything different than what we did, and it was Mr. 
3 Wade that put us in that position, Mr. Stangl, as was 
4 required by the Supreme Court, gave to us the check for 
5 delivery. It would be absolutely improper for us to 
6 contact the client without going through the lawyer. 
7 So we gave it to the lawyer that actually represented 
8 him in the Supreme Court. If there is any fault that 
9 lies there, it is with Mr. Wade. It is not with Mr. 
10 Stangl or with us in giving the check to Mr. Schwenke. 
11 And then not only that, but a long period of 
12 time goes by, no inquiry is made, nothing is followed 
13 up on, and they want us to bear the burden of that 
14 $50,000 expenditure. Your Honor, that simply doesn't 
15 make any sense whatsoever. 
16 I would submit, Your Honor, that under the 
17 facts of this case, given the testimony, given the 
18 credibility issues that are there, given the fact that 
19 if you look at the document's practical construction 
20 wherein the courts say that the best indicator of what 
21 the parties intended is not what they say they intend, 
22 but what they actually did. If you look at that four 
23 year period where he paid on a prorata basis on the 
24 acreage, that being to both of their advantages, and 
25 when you look at what happened in 1991 when the 
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1 property tax almost doubled once it was split out, then 
2 we would submit that we are entitled to the relief that 
3 we are seeking in this case. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Nelson? 
5 MR. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
6 Utah law under Section 59-2-101 requires that the 
7 various Counties in the State assess property based 
8 upon its fair market value. 
9 Mr. Stangl acknowledged that that's the way 
10 it is done, even though he doesn't agree with the 
11 assessment, as we all don't on occasion. Mr. Stangl's 
12 attorneys drafted the document, which was somewhat 
13 ambiguous, or didn't even cover the situation on taxes. 
14 He testified he made a subsequent verbal agreement to 
15 solve that problem. I submit to the court that it was 
16 he who created the problem by his draftsman not 
17 addressing it in the document, and I also submit to the 
18 court that he could have solved that problem any time 
19 he wanted by simply deeding the property to himself in 
20 two parcels, as he did in 1991 — or in 1990, in order 
21 to get an assessment split off. 
22 He created the problem; he refused to solve 
23 it. He also benefitted by it. The testimony is that 
24 at least at the time the contract was signed his front 
25 parcel was worth approximately $50,000 more than the 
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1 parcel they gave to Mr. Wade, and yet he is taking the 
2 position that Mr. Wade ought to pay 70% of the tax 
3 assessment because they want to do it on a square 
4 footage basis. 
5 Now, certainly that -- I guess he indicated 
6 the reason to do that was for the benefit of both 
7 parties. I can certainly see how it benefitted Mr. 
8 Stangl, because he was receiving that subsidy from Mr. 
9 Wade. Now, with respect to the agreement, neither Mr. 
10 Stangl nor Mr. Wade have come up with any written 
11 document that they can show that there was any 
12 agreement. Mr. Stangl says he had a conversation 
13 wherein that was the agreement. Mr. Wade says he never 
14 had a conversation wherein that was the agreement. 
15 In asking Mr. Wade questions, then, regarding 
16 the taxes, his testimony under oath — his testimony 
17 was that, one, he didn't want to create any waves. And 
18 number two, he believed that it was a one year problem 
19 on each year, because Mr. Stangl was going to split the 
20 property off. 
21 If the court finds that there was an 
22 agreement, I submit to the court that that agreement 
23 should not extend beyond the time when the contract was 
24 paid off, which was the end of '84 or the first of '85. 
25 It makes absolutely no sense whatsoever to have Mr. 
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1 Wade subsidize Mr. Stangl's property after the contract 
2 had been completed between the parties. So I submit to 
3 the court that there never was an agreement proven that 
4 they should divide the property that way. But if the 
5 court finds there are, it certainly shouldn't extend 
6 that beyond the time of the contract. Otherwise Mr. 
7 Stangl just received a subsidy from Mr. Wade. 
8 Your Honor, with respect to the $50,000 check 
9 and the credit situation, I have not had access to the 
10 file, and you have taken judicial notice of documents 
11 in the file. It is our belief that Mr. Wade should be 
12 credited with that payment. He never received it. As 
13 far as he knew, his counsel was not representing him. 
14 He's testified that he believed he was unrepresented. 
15 And just because a gentleman goes and tells someone 
16 else he is representing him without that authority, 
17 it's our position that that shouldn't create an agency 
18 relationship. 
19 Mr. Wade never got the funds and should be 
20 entitled to a credit on it. Further, we submit, Your 
21 Honor, that with respect to the attorney's fees matter, 
22 in order for Mr. Stangl to be entitled to attorney's 
23 fees, the contract requires that some notice be given 
24 of default, and I would submit that not only was there 
25 no evidence that such notice was given subsequent to 
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1 the time of the taxes being paid, but that no notice 
2 was given. 
3 And finally, Your Honor, I would like to 
4 refer to one document that is in Exhibit "BB". 
5 THE COURT: The counterclaim notice. 
6 MR. CROCKETT: It's also in the 
7 stipulation. We covered that. 
8 MR. NELSON: Your Honor, if the 
9 stipulation solves that problem, then obviously I'll 
10 retract that argument. I simply observed no evidence 
11 today. I don't have it in the stipulation. No 
12 evidence today was presented that there was a notice to 
13 start that time period. 
14 The document will reflect whatever that 
15 stipulation was. Your Honor, I would like you to refer 
16 to one of the letters in Exhibit "PM, written by 
17 Elizabeth Stangl, and — 
18 THE COURT: Which one? 
19 MR. NELSON: It is -- let me find it. 
20 It is toward the back of those letters. It is the 
21 January 4, 1982 letter, and it is about four pages from 
22 the back of Exhibit "B". 
23 THE COURT: January 4? 
24 MR. NELSON: January 4, 1982. 
25 THE COURT: Okay, I have it. 
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1 MR. NELSON: Do you find that? I'm 
2 looking at the third full paragraph, approximately in 
3 the middle of the page. And I don't know why she 
4 raises that issue, but she indicates that, "Apparently 
5 you did not understand how the 1981 property tax 
6 proration was achieved." I assume that, but there's no 
7 evidence that Mr. Stangl — there must have been an 
8 objection expressed, and then this writing to explain 
9 it. It seems to me, Your Honor, that that would show 
10 there was some confusion in everyone's mind as to 
11 exactly how the prorations had been figured for those 
12 prior three years. 
13 I remind you the date of this letter is 
14 January 4, 1982. I submit to the Court that without 
15 some writing or other evidence that there's an 
16 agreement, the only — the law and custom of our State 
17 requires the property assessed based on fair market 
18 value and not square footage, and absent some agreement 
19 to the contrary, that's the way it should be done. 
20 Thank you, Your Honor. 
21 MR. CROCKETT: Since we have the burden, 
22 I have the last few minutes. Your Honor, the 
23 counterclaim constitutes notice that the Court deems 
24 that we need to do that. I thought the stipulation 
25 covered it. I haven't read it to see* We have a 
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1 letter dated November 24, 1986, informing him that he 
2 was in default. I don't think that that ought to be a 
3 disputed fact because --
4 THE COURT: Was there a letter that's an 
5 exhibit? 
6 MR. CROCKETT: That's number 3. It's 
7 one of those that was not stipulated. But it was sent. 
8 The testimony would be that it was sent to him. 
9 THE COURT: Where do you find that 
10 letter in the documents? 
11 MR. CROCKETT: In our exhibit list 
12 number 3. 
13 THE COURT: But not introduced today? 
14 MR. CROCKETT: Not introduced today. 
15 What I'm saying is that that becomes — 
16 THE COURT: Who's the author of that 
17 letter? 
18 MR. CROCKETT: It is Mr. Stangl, F. C. 
19 Stangl, to Mr. Wade. 
20 THE COURT: Are you offering that at 
21 this time? 
22 MR. CROCKETT: I would if there's any 
23 question about putting him on notice. I would offer it 
24 because I think that Mr. Stangl, if called to testify, 
25 would recall that he did send that. 
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1 THE COURT: I think there's a question 
2 because the question has been raised. 
3 MR. CROCKETT: May I reopen, then. 
4 THE COURT: Do you have any objection to 
5 reopening? 
6 MR. NELSON: Well, I do. This is a 
7 pretty technical argument, but I guess I need to make 
8 it. If they haven't put on their evidence on notice of 
9 default, then I'm just raising that issue, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Well, the 
11 potential in this case is that it could be a 
12 trifurcated procedure with the potential for subsequent 
13 hearings on attorney's fees, the potential for — 
14 MR. NELSON: I agree we did make that 
15 indication today that my party feels that they are 
16 entitled to it, and we feel a subsequent hearing is 
17 necessary. I submit to the court that if we get to 
18 that point I have no problem with him submitting that 
19 evidence. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. NELSON: I probably -- Your Honor, I 
22 probably shouldn't have even raised it since we 
23 stipulated that attorney's fees matters would be 
24 handled separately. And I guess I would suggest we do 
25 handle that separately. 
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1 MR. CROCKETT: Okay. Then I don't know 
2 what that means, but I would offer it as the next 
3 exhibit. If called, Mr. Stangl would testify it's a 
4 letter he sent to Mr. Wade. The date is — 
5 THE COURT: November 26. Your objection 
6 is noted. That is exhibit number what? 
7 MR. CROCKETT: That will be Exhibit 
8 "CC", Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
10 That exhibit is received. The objection is overruled 
11 for the following reasons, number one, there is 
12 potential that this case could be tried, if not in two 
13 sections, perhaps in three, because there may be a 
14 necessity to take evidence as to market values for each 
15 year since 1977 or 1978 forward. Furthermore, there is 
16 potential for further evidence on the amount of 
17 attorney's fees. And so it's not as if the statement 
18 of the party that they rest has all that much 
19 importance or significance. Furthermore, there is case 
20 law from the Supreme Court indicating that if you are 
21 in the midst of a bench trial and if the evidence 
22 that's the subject of a motion to reopen is in the 
23 courtroom and ready to be presented, it's an abuse of 
24 discretion not to allow counsel to reopen. 
25 MR. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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1 MR. CROCKETT: Okay. Your Honor, one 
2 final comment. We simply rely on the provisions of the 
3 contract for attorney's fees. We reserve the rest of 
4 that for when we go down the road. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Anything else, 
6 Mr. Nelson? 
7 MR. NELSON: No, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Can I see that exhibit, 
9 "CC"? I am prepared to rule at this time, counsel, and 
10 let me just indicate to you that the case is composed 
11 of two volumes of pleadings. It is a case that 
12 probably I have had more involvement in as a judge, 
13 proportionately, than any — well, than most other 
14 cases that come along. 
15 And as a result I was acquainted with the 
16 case beforehand. I have become better acquainted with 
17 the case as the issues were presented today. For me to 
18 take this under advisement would be misleading to you, 
19 and that is, that it would mislead you into at least 
20 perhaps believing that I was not able to make up my 
21 mind at this time, and I think I have heard the 
22 argument of counsel and all the evidence that I can. 
23 And I think the appropriate result is fairly 
24 straightforward here. Before I get into reciting 
25 specific findings, let me just indicate this: It is 
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1 true that taxing authorities generally in the State of 
2 Utah, which are the Counties, tax based upon market 
3 value. But the question before the court is not 
4 taxation, but allocation of taxation, which does not 
5 necessarily follow that one allocates a tax based upon 
6 the same theory that the taxing authorities tax. 
7 With respect to construing the contract 
8 against the drafter, that is absolutely true. However, 
9 it does not apply in this case because we are not 
10 construing the contract. The contract on its face is 
11 ambiguous. I don't think the standard that requires 
12 the court to construe the contract against the drafter 
13 means that you do an allocation of fault, and because 
14 the drafter may have caused an ambiguity, then on all 
15 subsequent issues that you somehow make an assessment 
16 of fault and creation in the ambiguity in the 
17 determination of issues outside the construction of the 
18 agreement. 
19 Because those two issues were presented to 
20 me, I thought I needed to address them specifically 
21 before I go forward. Additionally, it's been suggested 
22 that that letter within Exhibit "PM, dated January, 
23 1982, references a possible or apparent 
24 misunderstanding on the part of Mr. Wade. It's not 
25 determinative for the following reasons: Number one, 
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1 if it references a misunderstanding, it is talking 
2 about a unilateral misunderstanding rather than a 
3 mutual understanding. Furthermore, what it only does 
4 is appears to make a reference to what is likely an 
5 oral statement made by either Mr. Wade or someone on 
6 his behalf, and in explaining exactly what the 
7 calculations were, assuming that there was such an 
8 understanding. 
9 Now, I find that there was an agreement, an 
10 oral agreement in 1980 which resolved the issue finally 
11 and prospectively that the taxes would be allocated in 
12 proportion to the square footage holdings. That that 
13 agreement reflected the conduct of the parties before 
14 and after 1978. 
15 I furthermore find that the letters 
16 referenced in Exhibit MPM were sent. It is 
17 unreasonable for me to believe that they were not 
18 received either by Mr. Wade or someone with the right 
19 to act on his behalf. That even if there was not an 
20 agreement in 1980, that these letters reflect the 
21 conduct of the parties, and that that conduct reflects 
22 the intent of the parties at the time of the execution 
23 of the agreement and at all times after that. So I 
24 guess what I'm saying is that there are two alternative 
25 bases, and that is, number one, that there was an 
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1 amendment of the contract, or a further contract, in 
2 1980, an oral one, which is not subject to the statute 
3 of frauds because it does not transfer real property. 
4 Failing that, that the letters in Exhibit MP" 
5 reflect the intent of the parties at and after the 
6 execution of the agreement in question. That intent is 
7 important in a case where there is an ambiguity which 
8 does exist in the agreement in question. 
9 I did not in any way rely on the evidence 
10 that there was an increase in the taxes on the smaller 
11 separate parcels in either 1990 or 1991 as a result of 
12 the severance of the two. There was a benefit to both 
13 parcels as a result of the tax work done from 
14 Strategis, the billing for which is reflected in 
15 Exhibit "RM. And that billing should be absorbed in 
16 accordance with the same prorata allocation on a square 
17 footage basis as the taxes should be calculated from 
18 1978 to the date of the completion of the contract. 
19 And from the date of the completion of the contract to 
20 the date when the tracts were severed for tax purposes. 
21 It doesn't make sense to me that the agreement ends 
22 just when all the payments have been completed under 
23 the contract in question. 
24 What exists throughout this case is Mr. Wade 
25 speaking when he wishes, in the manner in which he 
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1 wishes, and instead of coming forward and meeting his 
2 responsibilities, such as to provide the court and 
3 provide counsel all documents which relate in any way 
4 to this. 
5 There is nothing before me to create a belief 
6 by me that there are documents that somehow object to 
7 the allocation of the taxes. I'm assuming that Mr. 
8 Wade's testimony is that there are perhaps some 
9 response to those letters, Exhibit "P". I can hardly 
10 credit any of those when I don't have those in front of 
11 me. This failure to be involved in the appropriate 
12 manner and by the appropriate evidence in this case 
13 continued even after all the payments were made under 
14 the contract in question. 
15 I believe that was completed some time in 
16 1982. And so that the cutoff on this allocation should 
17 not be at that date, but instead should be at the later 
18 date, and that is the date when they were severed for 
19 tax purposes. 
20 One thing that I was affected by in choosing 
21 to credit the testimony of Mr. Stangl and discredit the 
22 testimony of Mr. Wade is the interplay of two items: 
23 Number one, it is very clear that Mr. Wade has gone 
24 through a proceeding involving fraud. Mr. Wade also 
25 testified that he did everything in strict accordance 
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1 with whatever Mr. Stangl said. 
2 Mr. Stangl ran this ship, even though he only 
3 owned about a third of it. And the words that Mr. Wade 
4 used on the stand in talking about the control by Mr. 
5 Stangl are the types of words that judges frequently 
6 hear in fraud cases. And it could very well be that 
7 Mr. Wade heard those types of words or testimony in the 
8 fraud proceedings that he has testified about, and now 
9 seeks to use that same type of theory and the same type 
10 of words to change what appears to me was an agreement 
11 between the parties here. 
12 That is some part of my thinking, and I was 
13 listening to the testimony in determining who should be 
14 credited and who should not be credited in this case 
15 concerning testimony. 
16 Now, I'm not suggesting that what I've just 
17 stated constitutes the totality of the Findings of Fact 
18 and Conclusions of Law. It's merely a skeleton, and 
19 I'm going to ask Mr. Crockett if he would add some 
20 flesh to those bones and prepare formal Findings of 
21 Fact and Conclusions of Law. Conclusion of Law is 
22 obviously that the allocation is in accordance with 
23 acreage. Now, as to the issue concerning this $50,000 
24 check, or $52,000 check and some change, it appears to 
25 me from Exhibit "Y" that -- and when I say Exhibit MY", 
126 
1 I'm actually talking about a corresponding original of 
2 Exhibit MYM as it exists in the files. This document 
3 was in fact signed by Mr. Wade, and the signature is in 
4 fact his signature. It does appear to be the same 
5 signature or substantially the same signature as 
6 appears in the answer, in answering interrogatories, 
7 which he did accept as being his own. That being 
8 Exhibit MBB". 
9 Exhibit MYM acknowledges information as of, 
10 what, the 23rd of March, 1990, and indicates that Mr. 
11 Wade was allowing or acknowledging things that occurred 
12 after the purported date of withdrawal of Mr. Schwenke 
13 twelve months previously. And as a result I do not 
14 credit the unfiled withdrawal of counsel as 
15 constituting withdrawal, thereby relieving Mr. Wade of 
16 the agency relationship with Mr. Schwenke. That agency 
17 relationship abided and continued to abide until 1991, 
18 when Mr. Schwenke formally withdrew. And I believe 
19 that was in January of 1991. 
20 Alternatively, even if you assume what Mr. 
21 Wade has testified to, Mr. Wade has done in this 
22 litigation exactly what he did in his business 
23 transaction, and that is, he failed to adhere to his 
24 obligations, did not communicate with people who needed 
25 to be communicated with in the manner in which they 
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1 should have been communicated with. And that is, by 
2 letting the court and counsel know that he was no 
3 longer being represented by Mr, Schwenke, or attending 
4 in any way to a pending proceeding. And therefore, I 
5 conclude that Mr. Schwenke was the agent of Mr. Wade 
6 both in default and by appearances such that Mr. 
7 Schwenke's changing of the check in question, altering 
8 the check in question, is deemed to be an act of Mr. 
9 Wade. Therefore, there should be no offset or credit 
10 for the amount of that check. 
11 Now, are there any issues I have not 
12 addressed? 
13 MR. CROCKETT: I assume we'll submit 
14 affidavits of attorney's fees. 
15 THE COURT: Right. I mean, the evidence 
16 here on notice, if that is an issue, is before me. I 
17 haven't had time to read that letter, and I have these 
18 other documents, and I'm not about to resolve whether 
19 that constitutes notice or notice is adequate or 
20 whether the counterclaim constitutes notice, or whether 
21 that notice was adequate. I think that issue ought to 
22 be deferred, if it remains an issue, until a subsequent 
23 proceeding, if a subsequent proceeding is necessary. 
24 MR. CROCKETT: Okay. I take it that 
25 means, Judge, -- well, I'm not sure that notice bears 
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1 on the attorney's fees in this case. If you look at 
2 the contract — 
3 THE COURT: I don't either. 
4 MR. CROCKETT: If it doesn't bear, then 
5 all I think we will need to do is file an affidavit. 
6 If there's an objection, we will need to have a 
7 hearing. 
8 THE COURT: You need to prepare for me 
9 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the issues 
10 that I've resolved today. Both of you need to go 
11 forward and either settle or present in appropriate 
12 fashion the further issues that remain. And get those 
13 on for further hearing, if necessary. 
14 MR. CROCKETT: We'll prepare that, Your 
15 Honor, and submit it to counsel for approval as to 
16 form. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. Nelson, 
18 did I address all the issues that need to be addressed? 
19 MR. NELSON: I believe so, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Then we will be 
21 in recess. 
22 (Whereupon, court was in recess at 1:00 
23 o'clock p.m. and the proceedings were concluded.) 
24 
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230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Re: Wade v. Stanql, Case No. 920221-CA 
Supplemental Authorities 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, I am writing to set forth two recently decided 
supplemental authorities that are directly relevant to the 
arguments made in Appellee's brief (which was filed with the Court 
on December 18, 1992). 
Sukin v. Sukin, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, 49 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 
27, 1992), reaffirms that before a claim of bias or prejudice will 
be considered on appeal it must have first been raised with the 
trial court in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b). This 
authority applies to Point II, p. 16 of Appellee's brief. 
Custick v. Englesath, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 77, 78 (Utah Ct. App. 
Dec. 4, 1992), states: "If a court relies on extrinsic evidence, 
including other documents, to interpret an ambiguous document, its 
interpretation becomes a factual matter and we 'will not disturb 
the findings unless they are clearly erroneous.' Schmidt, 775 P.2d 
at 430. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52 (a)" (emphasis added). This 
authority applies to Point IV, p. 30 of Appellee's brief and to 
Point II.B, pp. 22-23 of Appellant's brief. 
Copies of these two decisions are attached for the Court's 
convenience. 
These supplemental authorities are raised at this point 
because they were only recently decided and reported in the 
December 15, 1992 edition of Utah Advance Reports. Appellee 
DEC 2 0 1S92 
-• T f~\jp fj D O C 
STGLAMTN.wr 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Mary T. Noonan 
December 24, 1992 
Page 2 
respectfully asks that the Court consider these supplemental 
authorities as part of Appellee's brief. 
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j .....,6 .v, 5am, uy seeiung review at the 
appellate level. Not only is this unfair to the 
party prevailing below, it is unfair to others 
seeking appeals. By increasing our caseload with 
close "judgment call" cases, we necessarily 
delay consideration of other important cases. In 
my view, this court must be more disciplined in 
its standard of review analysis and resist the 
temptation to second guess the trial court 's 
decisions by asserting that we, in our wisdom, 
may review the trial court 's findings of ultimate 
fact under a correction-of-error standard. 
Otherwise, we are inviting an onslaught of 
questionable appeals. 
It is not our task in this appeal to revisit the 
evidence and to redetermine whether there was 
entrapment. The trial court has already 
performed that task. Our inquiry is simply 
whether, in light of the governing law, the trial 
court 's finding of no entrapment is permissible. 
I believe it is.^ 
Conclusion 
Defendant has not shown that the trial court 
has committed any legal error. He has not 
challenged the trial court 's identification or 
interpretation of the governing law. Nor has he 
challenged any of the trial court 's subordinate 
facts. Defendant does not claim that the trial 
court 's application of the law to the facts is 
unreasonable or irrational. All that remains is 
defendant's disagreement with the trial court 's 
considered judgment that the facts, when viewed 
in light of the governing law, do not constitute 
entrapment. To this factual judgment we must 
defer. 
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge 
1. It is not enough to simply rehearse the differing 
standards for factual and legal questions as the main 
opinion does in this case Each issue raised must be 
explicitly characterized as either a factual challenge or 
a legal challenge so it is clear which standard is being 
applied and why. Rule 24(5) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure requires the parties to brief "the 
standard of review for each issue." We cannot be 
expected to do less in our opinions. 
2. A similar analysis applies when the question is 
whether the trial court has abused its judicial 
discretion. In Tolinan v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 
818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991), we recognized that a 
trial court's discretion is like an arena within which it 
may freely operate as it deems best. Its borders are 
established by the law. So long as the trial court 
remains within the arena defined by law, we defer to 
its judgment. But, if the trial court steps out of the 
arena, it is "exceeding" or "abusing" its discretion as 
a matter of law, and we will correct its error. Id. at 
26-27. 
3. An example may be helpful in understanding this 
concept. When a factfinder must determine whether a 
person has committed a crime, it is not allowed to 
decide arbitrarily what constitutes the offense. Rather, 
the factfinder must consider the elements of the crime 
as defined by the law. Furthermore, the factfinder is 
not allowed to base its decision on irrelevant factors 
wnicn me factfinder must function. The ultimate 
factual finding that the defendant did, or did not, 
commit the crime charged is a factual determination, 
"guided" by the law. To such findings we defer, so 
long as the factfinder remained within a properly 
defined Field of inquiry. 
4. In the negligence setting, for example, whether a 
person acted reasonably is a question of fact unless 
"fixed by law" by legislation or prior judicial 
decision. Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 
821. 825-26 (Utah App. 1989) cert, denied, 789 P.2d 
33 (1990). 
5. The main opinion overstates the scope of our 
review by concluding that "[tlhe trial court correctly 
held that the government conduct in this case did not 
constitute entrapment." (Emphasis added.) Inasmuch 
as our sole duty is to determine whether the trial 
court's finding was permissible, not whether it was 
"correct," our conclusion should be: "Since the trial 
court was not required to find that the use of Hall 
constituted entrapment as a matter of taw, it was 
permissible for the trial court to find that there was no 
entrapment in this case. We therefore do not disturb 
its ruling." Anything more is an unwarranted and 
unjustifiable intrusion into the province of the trial 
court. 
201 Utah Adv. Rep . 46 
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BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Dean Carey Sukin appeals from the tnal 
court 's order awarding custody of the part ies ' 
minor child to Elaine Rubin Sukin. We vacate 
the custody award and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
U T A H A D V A N C E R E P O R T S 
The parties were married in Chicago, Illinois, ] 
in November 1986. At the time of their 
marriage, Dean was in his third year of medical 
school. In 1988, the parties moved to Salt Lake j 
City in order for Dean to participate in a 
medical residency program at the University of 
Utah. The parties' only child, Gabrielle Lyana 
Sukin, was born on August 22, 1989, in Salt 
Lake City. 
Elaine filed for divorce in March, 1991. A 
hearing was held in April, wherein custody was 
awarded to Elaine during the pendency of the 
proceedings, subject to Dean 's reasonable 
visitation. Another hearing was held in May, 
wherein Dean was ordered to pay temporary 
child support, alimony, and attorney fees. By 
stipulation of the parties, the trial court 
appointed Dr. Elizabeth B. Stewart to perform 
a child custody evaluation. 
The case was tried in September, 1991. At the 
end of the trial, the court awarded custody of 
Gabrielle to Elaine, with reasonable visitation to 
Dean. Dean appeals the trial court 's award of 
custody. 
ISSUES 
On appeal, Dean claims (1) that the trial court 
abused its discretion, in light of the evidence, in 
awarding custody of Gabrielle to Elaine; (2) that 
the findings of fact are insufficient to explain the 
basis for awarding custody of Gabrielle to 
Elaine; (3) that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it misinterpreted the law and 
refused to consider Dr. Stewart 's custody 
evaluation; (4) that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it improperly considered 
gender-based preferences in awarding custody; 
and (5) that on remand this case should be 
assigned to a different trial judge. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Trial courts are given broad discretion in 
making child custody awards. Maughan v. 
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 1989). 
The trial court 's decision regarding custody will 
not be upset "absent a showing of an abuse of 
discretion or manifest injustice." Id. at 159. 
"However, to ensure the court acted within its 
broad discretion, the facts and reasons for the 
court 's decision must be set forth fully in 
appropriate findings and conclusions." Painter v. 
Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988). 
The findings must be sufficiently detailed "to 
ensure that the trial court 's discretionary 
determination was rationally based." Martinez v. 
Martinez, 728 P.2d 994, 994 (Utah 1986). 
"Specificity of findings is particularly important 
in custody determinations. This is so because the 
issues involved are highly fact sensitive." 
Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
ANALYSIS 
Inadequate Findings 
Dean argues that the trial court 's findings d< 
not adequately explain the basis for the tria 
court 's decision to award custody of Gabrielle t< 
Elaine. We agree. 
Both the supreme court and this court hav< 
continually instructed our trial courts to provid« 
adequate and detailed findings of fact in makin; 
custody determinations. 
To ensure that the trial court 's custody 
determination, discretionary as it is, is 
raitonally based, it is essential that the court 
set forth in its findings of fact not only that 
it finds one parent to be the better person to 
care for the child, but also the basic facts 
which show why that ultimate conclusion is 
justified. There must be "a logical and legal 
basis for the ultimate conclusions." Milne 
Truck Lines v. Public Serv. Comm 'n., 720 
P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986). As we stated 
in Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 
(Utah 1979): 
The importance of complete, accurate 
and consistent findings of fact in a case 
tried by a judge is essential to the 
resolution of dispute under the proper 
rule of law. To that end the findings 
should be sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached. 
Proper findings of fact ensure that the 
ultimate custody award follows logically 
from, and is supported by, the evidence and 
the controlling legal principles. Adequate 
findings are also necessary for this Court to 
perform its assigned review function. 
Smith, 726 P.2d at 426 (citations omitted); 
accord Roberts, 835 P.2d at 195; Jensen v. 
Jensen, 775 P.2d 436, 438 (Utah App. 1989); 
Painter, 752 P.2d at 909. 
There is no definitive checklist of factors to be 
used for determining custody since such "factors 
are highly personal and individual, and do not 
lend themselves to the means of generalization 
employed in other areas of the law . . . ." Moon 
v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah App. 1990). 
The trial court must, however, make adequate 
findings regarding the "best interests of the child 
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral 
standards of each of the parties." Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-10(1) (1989). The court must also 
consider which parent is "most likely to act in 
the best interests of the child, including allowing 
I the child frequent and continuing contact with 
the noncustodial parent as the court finds 
appropriate." Utah Code Ann. §30-3 10(2) 
(1989). In order to determine the best interests 
of the child the court should also consider and, 
where applicable, make appropriate findings on 
the following factors: 
[Tlhe preference of the child; keeping 
siblings together; the relative strength of the 
I child's bond with one or both of the 
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f w^ «z wcici unoea custody arrangements I 
where the child is happy and well adjusted. I 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 
1982). The court should also consider, where 
applicable, the following factors relating to the I 
prospective custodians: I 
IMJoral character and emotional stability; I 
duration and depth of desire for custody; 
ability to provide personal rather than 
surrogate care; significant impairment of 
ability to function as a parent through drug 
abuse, excessive drinking, or other cause; I 
reasons for having relinquished custody in I 
the past; religious compatibility with the I 
child; kinship, including, in extraordinary I 
circumstances, stepparent status; and 
financial condition. i 
hi. (footnotes omitted). Whenever "custody is 
contested and evidence presents several possible 
interpretations, a bare conclusory recitation of I 
factors and statutory terms will not suffice. We I 
must have the necessary supporting factual I 
findings linking those factors to the children's | 
best interests and each parent 's abilities to meet \ 
the children's needs." Roberts, 835 P.2d at 194. 
The trial court 's entire written findings, with . 
regard to custody, state as follows: 
11. Both parties are competent, loving 
parents and are equally fit and capable of 
providing Gabrielle with a stable and caring I 
environment. I 
12. Gabrielle 's interests would best be 
served if plaintiff were awarded her sole 
physical and legal custody subject to 
defendant's reasonable rights of 
visitation . . . . 
These conclusory findings clearly do not provide 
an adequate explanation of the basis for I 
awarding custody to Elaine. Furthermore, the 
trial court did not make any additional ' 
subsidiary findings in open court to support its 
ultimate finding that it would be in the best 
interests of the child for custody to be granted to 
Elaine. 
The trial court 's inadequate findings in this 
case constitute reversible error unless the facts 
in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of 
the judgment." Kinkclla v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 
233, 236 (Utah 1983). Elaine agrees that the 
findings "do not fully detail the many 
evidentiary predicates supporting a custody 
award to wife." She argues, however, that the 
award of custody is overwhelmingly supported 
by the factual record. We disagree. The record 
in this case is almost 1300 pages long. It 
contains abundant testimony from various 
witnesses supporting the claims of both parties. 
The facts simply are not clear, uncontroverted, 
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor 
of the judgment. 
We therefore conclude that the trial court 's 
subsidiary findings are inadequate to support its 
ultimate finding that it would be in the best 
..v, T„vmc me c o u r t s custody award and 
remand this case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. Having so 
concluded, we do not reach Dean's claim that 
the trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
custody to Elaine. 
Dr. Stewart's Evaluation 
Dean argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it refused to consider Dr. 
Stewart's evaluation because she recommended 
that any sole custody award to Elaine be 
predicated upon her living in a close 
geographical proximity to Dean. The trial court 
made the following statement with regard to Dr. 
Stewart's recommendation: "I'm not going to 
tell these people where they can live. I don't 
| think I can do that." Dean claims that this 
' statement indicates that the trial court 
misunderstood Dr. Stewart 's recommendation as 
requiring a restriction to be placed directly on 
Elaine's right to choose a place to live. He 
claims that because of this misunderstanding the 
t r i a l c o u r t r e j e c t e d D r . S t e w a r t ' s 
recommendations. Dean argues, however, that 
I Dr. Stewart did not suggest that a restriction be 
I placed on Elaine's right to choose a place to 
live, but instead that Elaine not be granted 
custody if she does not live close to Dean. 
We recognize that an award of custody can be 
predicated upon requiring the custodial parent to 
keep the children within this jurisdiction. See 
Curry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 204, 321 P.2d 
939, 943 (1958) ("plaintiff should be required to 
I retain the children in this jurisdiction until the 
further order of this court so that the defendant 
may enjoy the full privileges of visiting and 
! maintaining the best possible paternal 
relationship with them."). However, it is 
entirely unclear from the findings as to what 
i prompted the trial court to reject Dr. Stewart 's 
I evaluation. "|Ajlthough the trial court is not 
bound to accept the evaluation (of a court 
I appointed evaJuatorJ, we think some reason for 
I rejecting the recommendation . . . is in order." 
Turkey v. Tuckey, 649 P.2d 88, 91 (Utah 1982). 
Improper Gender-Based Preference 
J Dean argues that the trial court abused its 
I d iscret ion by i m p r o p e r l y cons ide r ing 
gender-based preferences. In particular, he 
j claims that when issuing its decision from the 
I bench, the trial court made several statements 
I against fathers that indicate an impermissible 
I gender-based preference. Dean points to the 
I court 's statement that it is normal for men to 
show less emotion than women--"it 's the nature 
I of the beast." He also points to the following 
I statements of the trial court: 
I I think there is no question, no question, 
I that | a | woman is going to spend more time 
I with the child, if (DeanJ remarries or if the 
I plaintiff remarries. 
I The plaintiff is still going to spend more 
I time with the child, and the defendant's new 
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child. So that is not something that is 
controlling as far as the court is concerned. 
In 1986, the Utah Supreme Court did away 
with gender-based preferences in custody 
determinations. Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 
119 (Utah 1986). The supreme court stated that 
" |w|e believe the time has come to discontinue 
our support, even in dictum, for the notion of 
gender-based preferences in child custody 
cases." Id. The court held that the maternal 
preference has the effect of denying custody to 
a father who is equally as capable of parenting 
as the mother, solely because of his gender. Id. 
at 120. The court stated that: 
the rule lacks validity because it is 
unnecessary and perpetuates outdated 
stereotypes. The development of the tender 
years doctrine was perhaps useful in a 
society in which fathers traditionally worked 
outside the home and mothers did not; 
however, since that pattern is no longer 
prevalent, particularly in post-separation 
single-parent households, the tender years 
doctrine is equally anachronistic. 
Id. The court stated that "we disavow today 
those cases that continue to approve, even 
indirectly, an arbitrary maternal preference, 
thereby encouraging arguments such as those 
made by the cross-appellant in this case." Id. 
Therefore, on remand, the custody award in this 
case cannot be based, directly or indirectly, on 
gender-based preferences or stereotypes. 
Reassignment on Remand 
Dean argues that it would be prejudicial to 
remand this case to the same trial court that has 
already made a custody determination and may 
be biased against his position. He therefore 
requests that any remand of this case be made 
with directions that the case be assigned to a 
different trial judge. 
Dean has not, however, raised the issue of 
bias or prejudice in the trial court. We are 
governed by the general principle that matters 
not put in issue before the trial court may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal. James v. 
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987). 
This principle applies where the bias or 
prejudice of a trial judge is alleged. Rule 63(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Whenever a party to any action or 
proceeding, civil or criminal, or his attorney 
shall make and file an affidavit that the 
judge before whom such action or 
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias 
or prejudice, either against such party or his 
attorney or in favor of any opposite party to 
the suit, such judge shall proceed no further 
therein, except to call in another judge to 
hear and determine the matter. 
This rule requires that a party alleging bias or 
prejudice must first file an affidavit in the trial 
court. See Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 
1023 (Utah App. 1987) (affidavits regarding bias 
or prejudice not admitted before the trial court 
win noi oe considered on appeal); see also 
Ha slam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P. 2d 
520, 523 (1948) (the issue of bias or prejudice 
is a matter to be determined by the trial court 
"in the first instance," subject to appellate 
review); Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 
3(C)(1) (providing examples of potential grounds 
for disqualification). We will not therefore 
address the issue of bias or prejudice when it is 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the trial court 's findings are 
inadequate to support its award of custody to 
Elaine. We therefore vacate the trial court 's 
order and remand for appropriate proceedings. 
On remand, the trial court must include findings 
addressing the statutory factors listed in Utah 
Code Ann. §30-3-10 (1989), as well as any 
other factors it finds relevant. Furthermore, if it 
is not otherwise clear from the findings, the trial 
court should include an explanation of its 
decision to accept or reject Dr. Stewart 's 
recommendations. The trial court must also 
avoid any reliance on gender-based preferences 
or stereotypes. Finally, we do not address the 
issue of bias or prejudice because it has been 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
We vacate the custody award and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
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I comment to make clear mv position on the 
standard of review for reasonable suspicion In 
State v Carter, 812 P 2d 460 (Utah App 
1991), cert denied, 836 P 2d 1383 (Utah 1992), 
I concurred with Judge Orme in the opinion 
written by Judge Billings on this same standard 
of review We said 
we are puzzled by what standard of review 
we should apply in reviewing a trial court 's 
determination of reasonable suspicion The 
Utah Supreme Court has previously treated 
a determination of reasonable suspicion as a 
f a c t u a l f i n d i n g , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t 
determinations of reasonable suspicion are 
properly reviewed by appellate courts under 
a clearly erroneous standard See State v 
Mendoza, 748 P 2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987) 
( In determining whether the facts support a 
reasonable suspicion a trial court must 
consider the totality of the circumstances 
facing the officers The reviewing court 
should not overturn the trial court 's 
determinat ion unless it is clearly 
erroneous ') 
Analytically, however, we are inclined to 
agree with the trial court that a 
determination of reasonable suspicion more 
logically falls into the conclusion of law 
category See also Hayes v State, 785 
P 2d 13 , 36 (Alaska Ct App 1990) 
(reasonable suspicion is mixed question, 
factual findings upheld unless clearly 
erroneous, but ultimate conclusion is subject 
to de novo review) 
Id at 466 , n 6 
In State v Munsen, 821 P 2d 13 (Utah App 
1991), I authored an opinion, with Judge Russon 
concurring and Judge Jackson concurring in 
result only,1 where we said 
Munsen does not challenge the court 's 
findings Rather she challenges the court s 
application of the law to the findings We 
"review the ultimate conclusions drawn 
from those findings as a matter of law, 
under a correction of error standard, 
affording no deference to the trial court 
State v Taylor, 818 P 2d 5 6 1 , 565 (Utah 
App 1991) See State v Mendoza, 748 
P 2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987), State v Carter, 
812 P 2d 460 466 n 6 (Utah App 1991) 
See also United States v 
Hernandez Aharado, 891 F 2d 1414, 1416 
(9th O r 1989) (setting forth the generally 
held view that whether reasonable suspicion 
exists is a mixed question of fact and law, 
and the trial court ' s u In mute conclusion 
regarding reasonable suspicion is a legal 
conclusion which is reviewed de novo) 
Id at 14 15 
I am still of the opinion that in a mixed 
question of law and fact, the final conclusion as 
to whether theie is reasonable suspicion is a 
conclusion of law, and therefore the standard of 
review should be correction of error 
1 In his concurring opinion Judge Jackson agreed 
with the trial court that the officer had reasonable 
suspicion to justify detention but thought the length 
and scope of the detention was not justified by the 
circumstances 
J A C K S O N , J u d g e (concurr ing) : 
I concur with the result reached by my 
colleagues but disagree with the standard of 
review for reasonable suspicion which they have 
selected Although Judge Orme, writing for the 
panel in State v Vigil, 815 P 2d 1296, 
1299 1300(UtahApp 1991), expressed concern 
for consistent application of the law as 
manifested in the doctnne of stare decisis, his 
opinion here ignores the important concept of 
stare decisis Judge GarfFs concurring opinion 
does likewise Rather, both prefer to rely upon 
court of appeals opinions such as State v Vigil, 
815 P 2 d 1296 (Utah App 1991), State v 
Carter, 812 P 2d 460 (Utah App 1991), cert 
denied, 836 P 2d 1381 (1992), and ignore the 
rule of law declared by the Utah Supreme 
Court The Utah Supreme Court has consistently 
applied the clearly erroneous standard of review 
to the issue of reasonable suspicion State v 
Mendoza, 748 P 2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987) (the 
reviewing court should not overturn the trial 
court 's determination of reasonable suspicion 
unless it is clearly erroneous) To date, no 
supreme court holding subsequent to Mendoza 
has modified, disavowed, or overruled this 
standard 
Today's decision should be controlled 
(bjy the important doctnne of stare decisis, 
the means by which we ensure that the law 
will not merely change erratically, but will 
develop in a principled and intelligible 
fashion That doctnne permits society to 
presume that bedrock principles are founded 
m the law rather than in the proclivities of 
individuals, and thereby contributes to the 
integrity of our constitutional system of 
government, both in appearance and in fact 
Vasquez v Hillery, 474 U S 254, 265-66, 106 
S Ct 617, 624 (1986) (quoting Burnet v 
Coronado Oil <k Gas Co , 285 U S 393, 412, 
52 S Ct 443 , 449 (1932) (Brandeis, J , 
dissenting)) Pursuant to this doctrine, 
reasonable suspicion is to be reviewed under the 
clearly erroneous standard of review The 
principle of stare decisis requires that we 
'continue the journey until our supreme court 
chooses to change course " Cannefax v 
Clement, 786 P 2d 1377, 1383 (Utah App 
1990) (Jackson, J , concurring), ajf'd, 818 P 2d 
546 (Utah 1991) 
Norman H Jackson, Judge 
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O R M E , J u d g e : 
Appellants challenge the trial court 's 
determination that a holographic will validly 
revoked the decedent 's p n o r will We affirm 
F A C T S 
The decedent, Vida Custick, by way of a will 
made in 1976, bequeathed her estate to a 
pour over trust to be administered by First 
Secunty Bank The trust agreement directed that 
the trust estate be divided into four equal shares, 
with one share for the appellee, the decedent 's 
only child, and one share for each of the 
decedent 's three grandchildren, two of whom 
are appellants in this action, to be distributed 
upon reaching their majonty 
On or about March 30, 1985, the decedent 
jotted some notes concerning, among other 
matters, a visit to the bank and a discussion with 
her attorney Other comments appear on the 
same paper in the form of a numbered list of 
things to be done The last lines of handwntten 
text consist of a sentence by which she appears 
to revoke her prior will That sentence contains 
the date and her full name written in a style she 
used when signing her name All of the writing 
on this single sheet of paper, including the 
apparent testamentary sentence, are in her own 
handwriting albeit in a grammatically confusing 
style 
Ms Custick wrote "Void" on the signature 
line of an unsigned copy of the 1976 will, across 
her signature on a copy of the 1976 will, and 
across her original signature on an original of 
the 1976 trust agreement Upon her death, all of 
the voided documents, along with the paper 
containing the 1985 holographic will, were 
discovered inside a plastic document holder, tied 
closed with a pink ribbon Also found with these 
documents was an envelope with the words "W 
papers in here," written in Ms Custick's 
handwriting All of these papers were 
discovered in a metal box locked inside a metal 
cabinet 
Appellee petitioned to set aside an informal 
probate undertaken by First Security Bank as 
trustee under the pour over trust agreement The 
trial court granted the relief requested by 
appellee, ruling that the 1985 holographic will 
was valid and legally revoked the 1976 will and 
that Ms Custick therefore died intestate The 
central issues at trial were whether the signature 
in the 1985 holographic will reflected signatory 
intent to authenticate the document1 and whether 
that document contained the required 
testamentary intent 
On appeal, appellants contend that as a matter 
of law the 1985 holographic will should be 
construed to lack testamentary intent and that the 
1976 will and trust agreement govern the 
disposition of Ms Custick's estate The 
appellee, on the other hand, argues the 1985 
holographic will should be upheld because it 
revokes a pnor will and meets the statutory 
requirements for a valid holographic will 2 
ANALYSIS 
According to Utah law, "|aj will which does 
not comply with section 75 2 502 (outlining the 
requirements of a formal will) is valid as a 
holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if 
the signature and the material provisions are in 
the handwriting of the testator " Utah Code 
Ann §75-2 503 (1978) Furthermore, the 
definition of a will "includes any 
testamentary instrument which merely 
revokes another will " Utah Code Ann 
§75 1 201(48)(1978) 
In cases where a will is unambiguous and can 
be accurately interpreted by considering the 
document within its foui corners alone, the 
interpretation presents a question of law which 
we review without any particular deference to 
the trial court Burgess v Paulsen, 190 Utah 
Adv Rep 49, 51 (Utah App 1992) See also 
Estate of Schmidt v Downs, 775 P 2d 427, 430 
(Utah App 1989) This, however, is not such a 
case 
The provision in question here is one sentence 
in a document which contains a list of random 
comments and reminders and which contains 
unusual language and incorrect, confusing 
terminology Q In re Ingram's Estate, 307 
P 2d 903 , 906 (Utah 1957) (fact that 
testamentary provision is a small part of a 
document does not preclude provision from 
constituting a will) Read in the context of the 
entire document but otherwise in isolation, the 
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j ~ ,v.^  uvi pnui win or u may mean 
that she has in mind to do so at some future 
time We therefore conclude that the provision 
is ambiguous as concerns Ms Custick s 
testamentary intent See Larson v Overland 
Thrift & Loan 818 P 2d 1316 1319 (Utah App 
1^91) ( Language is ambiguous if the words 
used ma> be understood to reach two or 
more plausible meanings ) See also Faulkner 
\ FamwKorth 665 P 2d 1292 1293 (Utah 
1983) (deteimination of whether document is 
ambiguous presents question of law) We thus 
reject appellants' contention that the key 
provision can be interpreted as a matter of law,3 
much less their contention that properly 
construed, the instrument is not a valid 
testamentary instrument 
In In re Estate of Enikson, 806 P 2d 1186 
(Utah 1991) the Utah Supreme Court noted that 
in order to resolve the question of intent when 
confronted with a possible holographic will, 
courts typically consider intrinsic evidence that 
is the document itself, and extrinsic evidence in 
the form of both documentary evidence and the 
testimony of witnesses Id at 1189 See Ingram 
307 P 2d at 905 06 (trial court correctly relied 
upon facts outside the document to strengthen its 
conclusion that the crude documents manifested 
testamentary intent) These interpretive 
principles apply in the present case and the trial 
court correctly considered intrinsic and extrinsic 
evidence to evaluate the will 
Among the extrinsic evidence the court 
considered were the voided documents stored 
with the 1985 holographic will and the manner 
in which that will was stored in a locked cabinet 
and document folder This extrinsic evidence 
was dispositive in the view of the trial court See 
note 3 supra 
If a court relies on extrinsic evidence 
including other documents to interpret an 
ambiguous document its interpretation becomes 
a factual matter and we "will not disturb the 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous " 
Schmidt 775 P 2d at 430 See Utah R Civ P 
52(a) Here the appellant failed to provide this 
court with a transcript of the trial proceedings 
Considering only the documentary and physical 
evidence primarily relied on by the trial court, 
however, its findings concerning the decedent s 
intent are not clearly erroneous 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The sentence claimed by appellee to be a 
holographic will is ambiguous The court 
properly considered extrinsic evidence to 
interpret the provision Its findings based on that 
extrinsic evidence, principally concerning other 
documents and the careful manner in which the 
holographic will was stored, are not clearly 
erroneous It follows that the judgment appealed 
from must be affirmed 
Gregory K Orme Judge 
WE CONCUR 
Russell W Bench, Judge _ _ 
UTAH ADVANCE 
1 " Signature includes any name mark or sign 
written with the intent to authenticate any instrument 
or writing " Utah Code Ann §68 1 12(l)(r) (Sunn 
1992) 
2 Appellee also argues that we should dismiss 
appellants case because they failed to provide a 
written transcript of the trial proceedings as required 
by Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and because they did not timely file their 
appeal under Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure These arguments are without merit No 
transcript is necessary because appellants sole 
argument on appeal is that the key document should 
be construed as a matter of law making recourse to 
other evidence unnecessary the appeal was timely 
because the court granted albeit only in one 
particular appellants motion to amend the court s 
findings 
3 Appellants argue that the trial court did not utilize 
extrinsic evidence but instead relied exclusively upon 
the four corners of the document Contrary to 
appellants assertion the trial court s findings make 
clear it based its interpretation of the 1985 holographic 
will upon extrinsic evidence in the form of substantial 
documentary and physical evidence This evidence 
included the fact that Ms Custick voided various 
copies and originals of the 1976 vs ill and trust 
agreement and that she carefully stored these 
documents along with the holographic will in a 
document holder tied with a pmk ribbon in a metal 
box locked within a metal cabinet 1 hese latter actions 
are typical of someone who is dealing with a 
document regarded as important such lengths are not 
ordinarily undertaken to preserve a mere list of things 
to do 
In addition to the documentary evidence the 
court also heard testimony at trial After considering 
the extrinsic documentary evidence the court noted in 
its findings that "having heard the parol evidence 
offered by the parties at trial the Court finds none of 
the parol evidence alters its interpretation of the 1985 
uill " The appellants mistakenly focus upon this 
sentence while ignoring the court s explicit reliance on 
documentary evidence We therefore disagree with the 
assertion that the trial court interpreted the 1985 will 
solely on the basis of a reading of the text within the 
document s four corners, although it is clear the court 
found the extrinsic documentary and physical evidence 
of more help than the oral testimony 
REPORTS 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BONDED BICYCLE COURIERS, 
Petitioner, 
v 
DEPARTMF NI OF EMPI OYMENT 
SECURITY; and John P Schoenfeld, 
Respondents 
No 920621-C A 
FIl ED December 4, 1992 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
ATTORNEYS 
Brenda L Flanders and Dena ( Sarandos 
Salt Lake City, for Petitioner 
R Paul Van Dam and K Allan Zabel, Salt 
I ake C ity, for Respondent Department of 
I mplo>ment Security 
Before Judges Jackson Bench and GarfT (Law 
& Motion) 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publicat ion in the Pacific Repor t e r . 
PER CURIAM 
This matter is before the court on its own 
notice of consideration for summary disposition 
We summarily dismiss the petition for review 
Petitioner seeks appellate review of a decision 
by the Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission awarding unemployment benefits 
to respondent Schoenfeld The decision at issue 
bears a date of August 18 1992, but was not 
mailed to the parties until August 25 , 1992 The 
petition for review was filed with the clerk of 
this court on September 28 , 1992 
The timely filing of a petition for review from 
final agency action is jurisdictional Silva v 
Department of Emp Sec , 786 P 2d 246, 247 
(Utah App 1990) (per curiam) Since this case 
was commenced after January 1, 1988, it is 
governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann §63 46b 1 to 
§63-46b 2 2 ( 1 9 8 9 & S u p p 1992) Section 14 of 
UAPA provides that "A party shall file a 
petition for judicial review of final agency action 
within 30 days after the date that the order 
constituting the final agency action is issued 
" Utah Code Ann § 6 3 ^ 6 b 14(3)(a) (1989) 
(emphasis added) 
The term issued" is not defined in UAPA 
and this court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
recently defined it in different ways In Wiggins 
v Board of Reuen 824 P 2d 1199 (Utah App 
1992) (per curiam) this court held that "issue," 
in this context means the date the agency 
action is properly mailed In the present 
^«ow, me UIUCI libeu provided that it was final 
on the date of mailing and that petitioner had 30 
days from the date of mailing to seek judi ial 
review However, the Utah Supreme Court 
recently reached a different conclusion, stating, 
"for the guidance of all those who petition for 
judicial review from agency action, we hold that 
the date the order constituting final agency 
action issues is the date the order beais on its 
face, and not the date it is mailed Dusty s Inc 
v Utah State Tax tommn 199 Utah Adv Rep 
7 9 (Utah 1992) (per curiam) 
Although it does not expressly say so Dusty s 
clearly overrules Wiggins Therefore despite 
this court s inclination to find that issued 
means mailed, we are bound to follow the rule 
of law as it has been pronounced by the Utah 
Supreme Court Applying the rule of Dusty s to 
this case, the order was issued" on August 18, 
1992, the date it bears on its face Since the 
petition for review was not filed within 30 days 
of the date of issue it is untimely and this court 
lacks jurisdiction over the appeal ! 
The petition is dismissed 
Norman H Jackson, Judge 
Russell W Bench Judge 
Regnal W Garff Judge 
1 The fact that the order specified that petitioner had 
30 days from the date of mailing to file a petition does 
not change this result for two reasons First the 
agency has no authority to enlarge the appellate 
jurisdiction of this court Second petitioner did not 
file a petition within "*0 days of the date of mailing 
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